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UNITED STATES MILITARY TRIBUNAL V
SITTING IN THE PaLACE OP JUSTICE, NURNBERG, GERHUNY
27 and 28 OCTOBER 1948

THE UNITED STATES OF «.iv^ICA
vs,

ijiilLHELIvi VON LEi2j3
HUGO SPERRLE

GEORG KaRL FRiEDhlCH-VijILHELIvl
VON KUSCHLER
JOHaNNES BLaSKOA'ITZ
HERi'.jANN HOTH
H^NS REINHARDT
Hi^NS VON S-^LirJTH
r^.AL HOLLIDT
OTTO SCHNIEIVIND

C&se No.

12

iurfcii^L VON RO0,UES
HERIVANN REINEGlUii
'li!/ii,LTLifv vi/i-^iiLxiViONT

OTTO '."/OEHLER, and
RUDOLF LEHi.L.NN
Defendants

JUDGIvlENT OF THE TRIBUN0.L

•i,

John 0. Young, Presiding Judge
'ilVinfield B, Hale, Judge
Justin ii'j. Harding, Judge
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This Tribunal is composed of Presiding

Judge

John C.

Young (formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Colora
do), and Associate

Judges

Justin W» Harding (formerly U-S'.

Territorial Judge of Alaska) and V/infield B. Hale (Justice
Tennessee Court of Appeals, on leave of absence).
It was created under and by virtue of Military Govern
ment Ordinance No. 7, effective 18 October 1946, adopted

pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, enacted 20 December

1945, in order to give effect to the London Agreement of 8

August 1945, and the Charter Issued pursuant thereto for the
prosecution of war criminals.
In Nurnberg, on 28 November 1947, in accordance with

Ordinance No. 7 (Article Illa) supra, an Indictment was lodged

against the defendants by Telford Taylor, Brigadier General,
U.S.A., Chief of Counsel for War Grimes, acting in behalf of
the United States of America.

A copy of the Indictment in

the German language was served upon each defendant at least

thirty days prior to arraignment on 30 December 1947, at
which time each, in the presence of counsel of his own selec

tion, entered a plea of "not ^ilty."
The Indictment named as defendants:

Generalfeldmarschall (General of the Array) Wllhelm von

Leeb, Generalfeldimirschall (General of the Army) Hugo Sperrlo,
Generalfeldmarschall (General of the Army) Georg Karl Fried-

rloh-'Wilhelm von Kuechler, Generaloberst (General) Johannes

Blaskowitz, Generaloberst (General) Hermann Both, General

oberst (General) Hans Relnhardt, Generaloberst (General) Hans
von Salmuth, Generaloberst (General) Karl Hollldt, Generaladmiral (Admiral) Otto Schnlewlnd, General der Infanterie

(Lieutenant General, Infantry) Karl von Roquea, General der
Infanterie (Lieutenant General, Infantry) Hermann Reinecke,
-
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General der Artillerie (Lieutenant General, -^irtlllery)
VVclter Warlimont, General der Infanterie (Lieutenant General,

Infantry) Otto v^oohlcr, and Generaloberstabsrichter (Lieuten
ant General, Judge Advocate) Rudolf Lehraann.
The defendant General Johannes Blaskowitz committed

suicide in prison on 5 -c'cbruary 1948, and thereby the case
against him was terminated.
THE

INDICTMEi^lT

Tho Indictment is in four counts charging (1) Crimes

against Peace; (2) War Crimes;. (3) Crimes against Humanity;
and (4) A Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged in Counts One, Two and Three,
Count One -

Crimes against Peace

Tho first count of tho Indictment, paragraphs 1 and 2,
is as

follo'ws 2

"l.

iill of the defendants, with divers

other persons, including tho co-participants
listed in Appendix A, during a period of years
preceding 8 May 1945, committed Crimes against
Peace as defined in Article

I I of Control

Council Law No. 10, in that they participated
.•u

i n the

i n i t i a t i o n of

invasions

of

other

coun

tries and wars of aggression in violation of
•international laws and treaties, including
but not limited to the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of v/ars of aggression,
and wars in violation of international treaties,
cxgreoments and assurances.

"2.

The defendants hold high military

positions in Geriminy and committed Crimes

against Peace in that they wore principals in,
accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a con
senting part in, were connected with plans
and enterprises involving, and wero members of
organizations ^vnd groups connected with, the

commission of Grimes against Peace."
Then follow

paragre.phs 3 to 44, both inclusive, cover

ing plans of aggressions, and wars and invasions against
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, Gen-

mark, Norway, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg,

-
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Yugoslavia, GroecG, the U,S.S.R,.and the United States of
America, and undertook to shov/ the unfolding of these plans
of aggression and to particularize the participation of the
defendants in the formulation, distribution, and execution
thereof.

Count Two - War Grimes and Crimes g.gainst Humanitys

Grimes against l«nemy hfelligerents and
frisoners

of

v^ar

Count Tv/o of the Indictment, paragraph 45, is as follows

"45.

Betv/een September 1939 and May 1945

all of the defendants herein, with divers
other persons including the co-participants

listed in Appendix a,

committed V/ar Crimes

and Crimes ;;igainst Humanity, as defined in
Article II of Control Council Law No. 10, in
that they participated in the commission of
atrocities and offenses against prisoners of
war

and members

of armed

forces

of nations

then

at war with the 'Ihird Heich or under the belli

gerent control of or military occupation by
Germany, including but not limited to murder,
ill-treatment, denial of status and rights, re
fusal of quarter, employment under inhumane
conditions .md at prohibited labor of prisoners
of war and members of military forces, and
other inhumane acts and violations of the lav/s
and customs of war.
The defendants committed

;Var Crimes and Crimes against Huiminity in that

they wore principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in,
wore connected with plans and enterprises in

volving, and wore members of organizations
and groups connected with, the coraraission of
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity."
Then follows paragraph 46, which in general terms sets
out the unlawful acts as follows;

"46.
Unlawful orders initiated, drafted,
distributed and executed by the defendants

directed that certain enemy troops be refused
quarter and be denied the sta.tus ^^nd rights of

prisoners of war, and that certain captured
members of the military forces of nations at

war Vi^ith Ucrmny be summarily executed.

Such

orders further dli'^ectod that certain members

of enemy armed forces be designated and treated

by troops of the Gorman armed forces, subordi
nate to the defendants, either as ^partisans,
communists, bandits, terrorists' or by other
terras denying them the status and rights of

prisoners of war. Prisoners of war vjero com
pelled to work in war operations and in work

having a direct relation to war operations.

-
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including the manufacture, transport and

loading of arms and munitions, and the build
ing of fortifications.
This work was ordered
v/ithin tho combat

i^one as well as

in rear

areas.
Pursuant to a 'total v/ar' theory and
as part of a program to exploit all non-G-erman peoples, prisoners of war were denied
rights to which they were entitled under con
ventions and the laws and customs

of war.

Soldiers were branded, denied adequate food,
shelter, clothing and care, subjected to
all typos of cruelties and unlawful reprisals,
tortured and murdered.
Special screening
and extermination units, such as l.insatz
Groups of the Secui'^ity Police and Gichcrheitsdionst (commonly known as the "SD"),
operating with tho support and under the
jurisdiction of the Wehrnucht, selected and
killed prisoners of v^ar for religious, poli
tical and racial reasons.
I/Iany recaptured
prisoners were ordered executed. The crimes
described in paragraphs 45 and 46 included,
but were not limited to, those set forth
hereafter in this Count."

This is followed by paragraphs 47 to 58, both inclusive,
which particularize certain unlawful acts, such as the is

suance and execution of the "Commissar Order", tho "Commando

Order", etc., and tho participation of the defendants in the
formulation,

distribution and execution of these unlav/ful

plans..

Count Thre^o -

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity:

"Crimes against Civilians
Count Three of tho Indictment, paragraph 59, is as
follows

"59.

Between September 1939 and May

1945 all of the defendants herein, wltn divers
other persons including tho co-participants
listed in Appendix A, committed War Crimes and
Crimes agc^inst Humanity as defined- in Article

II of Control Council Law Number 10, in that
they participated in atrocities and offenses,

including murder, extermination, ill treatment,
torture, conscription to forced labor, deporta

tion to slavo labor or for other purposes, im
prisonment without cause, killing of hostages,
persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds, plunder of public and private property,

Wr.inton destruction of cities, towns and villages,
devastation not justified by military necessity,
and other inhumane and criminal acts against
German nationals and members of the civilian
populations of countries and territories under

-
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the bolligoront occupation of,

or otherwise

controlled by Gormny. The defendants cominittcd War Crimes and Grimes against Huimnity, in that they a-ere principals in, acces
sories to,

ordered, abetted,

took a

consent

ing part in, v^ere connected with plans and
enterprises involving, and we're members of

organiautions and groups which wore connected
with, the commission of Wo.r Crimes and Crimes

against Humanity."
The following paragraphs 60 to 82 set forth generally

and particularly thc= enlavvful acts, such as enslavement of
.1. •

the population, plunder of.public and private property,
murder, etc*, and the participation of the defendants in

the formulation, distribution and execution of those unlaw
ful plans.
Count Pour -

Common Plan or Conspiracy

The Fourth Count, paragraphs 83 and 84, is as followsj
"83.

All the defondants, with divers

other persons, during a period of years

preceding 8 May 1945, participated as loaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplioes in
the

formulation and execution of a

common

plan and conspiracy to commit, and which in
volved the comi.iission of. Crimes against

Fcacc (including the acts constituting War
Crimes and Grimes against Humanity, which
were committed as an integral part of such

Crimes against Peace) as defined in Control
Council Law Number 10, and are individually

responsible for their own acts and for all

acts cormnitted by any persons in the execu
tion of such common plan or conspiracy.
"84.

The acts and conduct of the de

fendants sot forth in Counts One, Tv/o and
Three of this Indictment formed a part of

said common plom or conspiracy and all the
allegations made in said Counts are incor

porated in this Count."

r'Ai'- .•
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STATISTICS OP TRIAL

The trial began 5 February 1948, and the prosecution's
case v/as substantially completed on 5 March, at which time
a recess was taken until 12 April 1948 to enable counsel to

prepare their defense, then resumed and completed on 13
August 1948.

Each defendant has been represented by German

lawyers of his own selection who have conducted the defense
with great ability, energy and zeal,
^ huge mass of evidence has been submitted in behalf
of the prosecution and defense.

The trial was conducted

in two languages - English and German - and all documents

submitted were duly•translated

and given counsel.

The de

fense was also furnished with photostat copies of the ori
ginal captured documents.

The prosecution's case, including those introduced on
cross examination and rebuttal, was made in part by the in

troduction of 1778 documents, the vast majority of which
were taken from German records and documents captured by the
Allied Armies.

The defendants complained that the context

of many of these documents was necessary to their proper
i

understanding and evaluation and that other documents would
tend to explain or refute any Inference of criminality that
h-

might be drawn from the documents relied upon by the prose

cution.

The defendants requested that they be supplied with

additional material for their defense specified by them in
their application.

To this end the Tribunal ordered the

Secretary General to procure such thereof as it was possible

to procure and as a result of this order there were procured
from Vilashington 1503 document folders which filled 37 footlookers.

These the defense counsel and the defendants were

permitted to examine and they have used such thereof as
they deemed necessary in the presentation of their case
-
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either as new evidence, or to supplement and explain the docu
ments introduced by the prosecution.

The material used for such purpose by the defendants
was taken from 259 different document folders and comprised

2058 pages which were photostated and used as exhibits in
the case.

Such material was received at different times.

The first shipment from Vi/ashington was received on 10
April and the last on 27 May 1948.

The case was not closed

for the taking of testimony until 6 August 1948.

In addi

tion, the defense counsel and tho defendants were allowed
access to all of tho captured records and documents not

yot sent over to tho United States and still stored in the
Court Archivos in Nurnberg for the purpose of using such

portions thereof as they might deem material.
introduced a

The defendants

total of 2130 documents and affidavits as ex

hibits in the presentation of their defense.

The transcript

of the record contains 10,000 pages.

Insofar as lay wibhin its power, the Tribunal directed

and aided in procuring all the witnesses thp.t defense counsel

requested, that their testimony might be heard in open Court.
One hundred sixty-five witnesses were ordered summoned
for the defendants.

One hundred five of those summoned i t

was possible to procui'o and they v/ere brought to Nurnberg
and were available for the defendants to call to the witness •

stand.

Of those only eighty in fact were called by the de

fendants.

That so many of those requested were in fact

procured is a tribute to tho efficiency and to the co
operation that the administrative officers of the court house
have rendered in this trial.

-
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CLAIMED ERRORS IN TRANSLATIONS

At ni.?j:iy times during the progress of the case, counsel
for the dofendnnts insisted there "were many and damaging
errors made in the translations of the many documents pf-fered in evidence by the prosecution.

The Tribunf^l re

peatedly advised counsel th^t if any errors had been mnde and

were called to the Tribunal's attention, all efforts would
be made

to obtain a

correct translation.

In the closing statement of Dr. Surholt, counsel for

the defend nt Generrl Reineche, he said;

"The documents must be properly trans
lated,

that is, the Araericcn translation

must convey to the Tribunal the sense of the
German text correctly and without omissions.

This cannot be s^id of any of the document
boohs.
The English text in the hands of the
Tribunal contains such a vast number of mist'^kes that to correct even the essential
points is a task, the Defense is unnble to

cope with.

"The reviewing of the document books
arranged by the Defense went as far as Docu

ment Books 1 - 9Q, which is about half of the
material.

The number of mistakes

so

far

established amounts to 1,936."
And then he gave a few examples of the supposed erroneous
tr-nslations.

Before the trial ended, the Tribunal again pointed
out to counsel the -advisability of submitting lists of the

translations questioned.

Dr. Frohwein, representing the

defendant General Reinhardt, submitted v. list consisting
of thirty-one documents in which there were claimed errors

of tr nsl-tion.

This list was handed over to the prosecu

tion v/hich co.greed to all of the contentions with the ex

ception of three which were left to the decision of the
Tribunal.

Dr. Mueller-Torgow, for the defendant Both,

submitted to the Tribunal a list of eighteen documents con

taining erroneous translations.

All were agreed to by the

prosecution.
^
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Dr. Leverkuehn, representing the defendant Warlimont,
submitted one item which v^as agreed to by the prosecution.

Dr. von Keller, representing the defendant Dr. Lehmann, sub
mitted a list consisting of twelve documents containing al

leged errors, all of which were corrected by agreement with
the prosecution.

These were the only corrections submitted by any of the
counsel and many were of minor, if any, importance.

For in

stance, we notice in one spot there were deleted the words:
"These prisoners were shot on the spot after short interroga

tion."

And there was substituted:

"These prisoners are shot

on the scene of action after short interrogation."

At other

points, the word "partisan" is deleted and the word "fronctireur" substituted.

In other places, the word "officials"

w^s deleted and the word "functionaries" substituted in lieu
thereof.

Other criticisms were of more importance but this

shows that many were more captious than material.
Such errors and ambiguities as were material and were

not cleared up by agreement of counsel were noted and in
FiccorclrJice with proper rules of criminal procedure, any

doubts and rjnbiguities are resolved in favor of the defen
dants.
3. '
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THE BASIC

A•

USv'i Ai«ID

LAW OP THE CASE

Control Council Law I>io» 10

The pre-amble to Control Council Law No. 10 reads as
follows ;

"In order to give effect to the
terms

of the Moscow Declaration of 30

October 1943 and the London Agreement of
3 August 1945, and the Charter issued
•pursuant thereto and in order to establish
a uniform legal basis in Germany for the
prosecution of war criminals and other
similar offenders, other than those dealt

with by the International Military Tribunal,
the Control Council enacts

as follows s

Article I
"The Moscow Declaration of 30 October

1943
for

'Concerning PLesponsibility of Hitlerites
Committed Atrocities'

and the London

Agreement of 8 August 1945 'Concerning Prose
cution and Punishment of Major War Criminals

of the Euroi^ean Axis ' are ma be integral parts
of tjils lav/.
Adherence to the provisions of
the London Agreement by any of the United
ilctions, as provided for in Article V of that
Agreement, shall not entitle such Nation to
participate or interfere in the operation of
this

Law within the Control Council area of

authority in Germany.
Article I I

"1.
nized as

Each of the follov/ing acts is recog
a

crime s

Crimes against Peace.

Initiation of

invasions of other countries and v/ars of

aggression in violation of international laws
and treaties, including but not limited to
planning, preparation, initiation or waging a
war of aggression, or a war of viol a tion of
international treaties, agreements or assurances

or participation in a common plan or conspiracy
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
"(b) War Crirries.

Atrocities or offenses

against persons or property constituting vio
lations of the laws 'or' customs of v:ar, including

but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or
deportation to slave labour or for ary other
purpose, of civilian population from occupied
territory, murder or i l l treatment of prisoners
of v/ar or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of pxiblic or private property;
v/anton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military
necessity.
-
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"(c)

Crimes against Humanity,

Atro

cities and offenses, including but not limited
to murder, extermination, enslavement, depor
tation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or
other inhumane acts *committed against any
civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious ground
v/hether or not in violation of the domestic

laws of the country v/here perpetrated,

"(d) Membership in categories of a criminal
group or organization declared criminal by
the International Military Tribunal,

"2, Any person without regard to nation
ality or the capacity in which he acted, is
deemed to have

committed a

crime as

defined

in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he v/as

(a) a principal or (b) v/as an accessory to
the commission of any such crime or ordered

or abetted the same or (c) toolr a consenting

part therein or (d) was connected with plans
or enterprises involving Its comr.aission or
(e) was a member of any organization or group
connected v/ith the commission of any such
crime or (f) with reforonco to paragraph 1

(a), if he held a high political , civil or
military (including General Staff) position
in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-

belligerents or satellites or held high
position in the financial, industrial or
economic life of any such country."

In the judgment rendered by the International Military
Tribunal, it is saids

"The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is de
fined in the Agreement and Charter, and the

crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal, for which there shall .be individual
responsibility, are set put in Article 6.
The^ lav; of the Charter is decisive, and
binding upon tho Tribunal,
"The making of the Charter was tho exorcise
of tho sovereign legislative power by the countries
to vdiich the German Reich unconditionally

Eurrandorod; and the undoLibted right^of these
countries to legislate for the occupied

territories has been recognized by tho civilized
world.

The Charter is not an arbitrary

exercise of pov;er on the part of tho victorious

Kations, but in the viov; of the Tribunal,

as will be shov;n. It is tho expression of

international lav; existing at tho time, of
its creationi and to that extent is itself
a contribution to international lav/.
"The Signatory Pov/ers created this

Tribunal, defined tho law it was to administer,
and made regulations for tho proper conduct
of the Trial, In doing so, they have done

-
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together what any one of them might have done
singly^ for it is not to 'oe doubted that any
nation has the right thus to set up special
courts to administer law,- Y/ith regard to the
constitution of the Court, all that the defen
dants are entitled to ash is to receive a fair
trial on the facts and law.

•'The Charter makes the planning or v/aglng of

a v;ar of aggression or a war in violation of

International treaties a crimoj and it is there
fore not strictly necessary to consider v;hether
and to what extent aggressive v/ar v/as a crime
before the execution of the London Agreement,
But in viev/ of the great importance of the

questions of lav; involved, the Tribunal has
heard full argument from the Prosecution and the

Defense, and will express its view on the matter.

"It was urged on behalf of the defendants that
a fundamental principle of all law - International
and domestic - is that there can be no punishment
of crime without a pro-existing law,

sine lo^Q, nu^le- poopa sine logo, ^ It v;as submitted
tha^ ox post facto punishment is abhorrent to the
law o~all civilized nations, that no sovereign

power had'made aggressive war a crime at the time
that the alleged criminal acts v;ore committed, that

no statute had defined aggressive war, that no

eenalty had been fixed for its commission, and no
court had been created to try and punish offenders.
"In the first place, it is to be observed
that the maxim nullum crimon sine lege is not a

limitation of sovoreighty, but is in general

principle of justice.

To assort that it is unjust

to pmish those who in defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked neighboring states v;ithout warning is obviously lontrue, for in such
circumstances tho attacker must know that ho is

doing wrong, and so far from it being unjvist to

punish him, it would bo imjust if his -wrong wore

allov/od to go unpunished. Occupying the positions
they 'did In the GoverniTiont of Germany, the

defendants, or at least some of them must have
known of tho treaties signed by Germany, outlawing
recourse to war for tho settlement of international
disputes; they must have knovm that they wore

acting in defiance of all international law when
in complete doliboration they carried out their

designs of Invasion and aggression. On this view
of the case alone, it would appear that tho maxim
has no application to tho present facts.
"This view is strongly reinforced by a con-

siboration of the state of intornr;tional loyi in
1939 30 f^^
nessivo v;ar is concornod, Tho
General Treaty for tho rionunciation of V.'ar of
27 August 1928, more gonorally known as tho Pact

of panis or the ICellogg-Erland Pact, v;as binding
nn 63 nations, including Germany, Italy, and

Japan at the outbreak of war In 1959. In tho preamble.
the signatories declared that they v;oro
-

12 -

- f

'Dooply sonsiblo of tlioir solomn duty
to promote tho v/olfaro of rnanlrind; per
suaded that tho time has come when a
frank renunciation of war as an instru

ment of national policy should ho mado
to tho ond that the peaceful and friendly
relations now existing botwoon thoir
peoples should bo porpotuatod . . . .
all changes in their relations with one

another should bo sought only by pacific
moans «.• thus uniting civilised nations
of tho world in a common renunciation of
war as an instrimiont of thoir national

policy •... '
Tho f i r s t

two articles arc

follows:

*Articlo I. Tho High Contracting Parties
solemnly declare in the names of thoir
respective peoples that they condemn re
course to war for the solution of inter
national controvorsies and renounce i t as

an instrument of national policy in thoir
relations

to ono

'Article II.

another,'

Tho High Contracting Parties

agree that tho sottlenont or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of v/hatovor'

nature or whatover origin thoy may bo,

which may arise among thorn, shall never be
sought except by pacific moans.'
Tho question is, what was tho legal effect of this
Pact? Tho nations v;ho signed tho Pact or adhered
to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for
the future as an instrtmiont of policy, and expressly
.renounced it. lifter tho signing of tho Pact, any

nation resorting to war as an instrtimont of national

policy breaks tho Pact.

In tho opinion of the

Tribunal, tho solomn renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy necessarily Involves

tho nroposition that such a war is illegal in

international lav;; and that those who plan and v/ago

such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consoquoncos, are committing a crime in so doing.
War for tho solution of international controvorsios
undertaken as an instrument of national policy

certainly includes a war of aggression, and such
a v;ar Is thoreforo outlawed by tho Pact.

As J;ir•

Konry L. Stimson, then Socrotary of State of tho
United States, said in 1932s
'War botwoon nations was ronouncod by

tho signatorios of tho Kollogg-Brland
Treaty. This moans that it has bocomo
throughout practically tho entire world.,»
an illegal thing. Hereafter, when nations

engago in armed conflict, either ono or

both of them must be termed violators
of this general treaty law ..... Wo denounce
them as law breakers.'

-
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But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly
enact that such wars are crrjnes, or set up courts

to try those v-rho iiiake such wars.

To that extent

the same is true wi.th re^iard to the laws of war

contained in the Hague Convention.

The Hague

Convention of 190? prohibited resort to certain methods
of waging war. These included the inhui;^ane troat•lent of prisoners, the employment of poisoned

weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and
similar matters. Many of ttese prohibitions had
boon enforced long before the date of the Con-

vention; but since 1907 they have certainly been
crimes punishable as offenses against the laws
of v^ari yot the Hague Convention nov/hero d.signates such practices as criminal, nor is any

sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a
court to try and punish ofienders.

For many

years past, howevc-r, military tribunals have

tried and punished individuals guilty of violating
the rules oi iG-id "v-arfare laid dovm by this con
vention. In the opinion of the Tribunal those

who wage aggressive war ai'o doing that which is
equally illegal, and of jauch greater moment taan
a breach of one of the rules of th.e Hague Con

vention.

In interpreting the words of the Pact,

it must be reraeribered that international law is

not the product of an international legislature,
and that such international agreements as the

Pact of Paris have to deal vjith general principles

of law,and not ivith administrative matters of
procedure# The lavir of war is to be foiind not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices
of states which gradually obtained universal

recognition, and from the general principles of
justice applied by jurists and. practiced by

i^iilitary courts.

This law is not static , but by

continual adaptation follov;s the needs of a

changing world.

Indeed, I'.n -r-any cases treaties

do no more than express and define for :aore

accurate reference the principles of law already
existing.

"The view which the Tribunal takes of the

true interpretation of the Pact is supported by
the international nistor^/ which preceded it.

In thvj ;/ear 19^3 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual
Assistance was sponsored by thu League of Nations.
In Articlo I the Treaty declared •that aggressive

war is an internat5-onal crime*, and that the

parties \'rould • undertake that no one of them v/ill
be guilty of its commission*. The draft treaty
was submitted to 29 states, about half of whom

were in favor of accepting the text. The prin

ciple objection appeared to be In the difficulty
of defining the acts v/hich VJould constitute

'aggression*, rather thian any doubt as to tne
criminality of aggressive war. The preamble to
tho League of Nations 192U Protocol for thu
I^cific Settlement of International Disputes

(IGeneva Protocol*), after 'recognising the

solidarity of the .no ibers of the international
community*, declared t:,:.at ta war of aggression

- m •id--

constitutos a violation of this solidarity and
is an international crimo.'

I t wont on to doolaro

that tho contracting parties v/oro ^desirous of
facilitating tho conploto application of the
systoni provided in tho Covenant of the League
of nations for the pacific settloinont of disputes
botv/oon tho States and of ensuring the repression
of international crimes.'

The Protocol v/as

rocommendod to the mombors of tho Loaguo of

nations by a unanimous resolution in tho assembly
of tho 48 members of the-League. Those members
included Italy and Jo.pan, but Germany was not
then a mombor of the League.

"Although the Protocol v/as novor ratified, it
v/as signed by tho loading statosraon of tho v/orld,
reproscnting tho vast majority of tho civilized
states and peoples, and may bo regarded a s strong
ovidoncG of the intention to brand aggressivo war
as an international crirao.

"At tho mooting of tho Assembly of tho League
of nations on 24 Soptember 1927, all tho delegations
thon present (including tho German, tho Italian,
and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a declaration

concerning wars of aggrosslon.

Tho proatnblo to

tho declaration stated?
'The Assoublys

Recognizing tho solidarity v/hich unites
tho coDjmunlty of nations;

Being inspired by a firm desire for the
maintenancG of gonoral poaco;

Being convinced that a war of aggression can
novor servo as a moans of settling inter
national disputes, and is in consequence an
international crime

"The unanimous resolution of 18 February 1928

of 21 American republics at tho Sixth (Havana) Pan-

American Gonforonce, doclarod that »war of aggrosslon
constitutos an international crlmo against tho human
species ' •

All thesG oxprossions of opinion", and others
tha.t could bo cited, so solemnly ma.do, roinxorco
tho construction which tho Tribunal placod upon ^ho

pact of Paris, tha.t resort to a war of aggression is
not moroly illegal, but Is criminal. The prohibition
of aggrossivo war doma^ndod by tho conscionco of tho

world, finds its oxprosslon in tho series of paces

and treaties to which the Tribtuial has just roforrod.

"It is also important to romomber that Article
227 of the Treaty of Vorsaillos provided for tho
constitution of a spocial Tribunal, co'.eposod of

rOprosontativos of five of the Allied and i^-ssociatod

Powers v/hioh had boon bolligoronts in the first
V/orld V/ar opposed to Gorrjany, to try tho fox'mor
Gorman Emperor 'for a supromo offonse against

international morality and the sanctity of trioatios,'

Tho purpose of this trial was oxprossod to bo

-
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*to vindicato tho solonin obligations of inter
national -undertakings, .and tho validity of
intornational ciorality*. In Articlo 228 of
tho Treaty, tho Gorman Govornmont oxprossly

recognized tho right of tho /allied Powors *to
bring boforo military tribunals persons accused
of having committed acts m violation of tho
laws and customs

"It v/as

of \7ar*.

submitted that international lav; is

concerned with the actions of sovereign States,
and provides no pvinishriiont for individuals! and.

further,'that where tho act in question is an act
of State, those v;hO'carry it out arc not per
sonally rosponsiblo, but are protoctod by tho
doctrine of tho sovereignty of the State, In tho
opinion of tho Trib-unc.1, both those submissions

must be rojoctod. That international lav/ imposos
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well

as upon States has long been rocognisod. In the'
rocont case of Ex Parto Quirin (1942 317 XJ,S,'l),
boforo tho Supromo Court of tho United States,

persons v;ero charged during the v;ar with landing in
tho United States for purposes of spying and

sabotage.

Tho late Chief Justlco Stone, speaking

for the Court, saids

•Prom tho ve3?y boginning of its history
this Court has applied tho law of war as

Including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes for the conduct of v;ar,
tho status, rights, and duties of enemy
nations as well as enemy individuals.*

11© wont on to glvo a list of cases tried by the
Courts, whore individual offenders were charged

with offenses against tho laws of nations, and
particularly the laws of war.

Many other authorities

could bo cited, but enough has boon said to show
that individi-ials can bo punished for violations of
international law. Crimes against intornational
law are comnlttod by mon, not by abstract ontitios,
and only by punish5.ng individuals who commit sxich
crimes can tho provisions of intornational law
bo

enforced.

"Tho provisions of /u?ticle 228 of the Treaty
of Versailles already roforrod to illustrato and

onforco this view of individual responsibility..
"Tho principle of international lav;, which
under certain circuiastaiicos, protects tho roprosontativoa of a state, cannotbe applied to acts

which are condemned as criniinal by intornational
law.
The authors of thoao acts cannot shelter
themselves behind tholr official position in

order to bo freed from punishraent in appropriate

proceedings,

hrtlcle 7 of tho Charter expressly

doclaros s

•Tho official position of•Defendants,

whether as h60.da of State, or rosponsiblo

-
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officials in Govorni'.iGnt dopartrnonts,
shall not ho considoPGd as frooing

thom from responsibility, or mitigating
punisbmont.*

On the othor hand tho vory essonco of the Chartor
is

that individuals have intornational duties

\7hich transcend tho national obligations of
obodionco imposed by tho individual stato. He
who violatos the laws of war cannot obtain ii-imunity

while acting in pursuance of tho authority of the
state if tho state in authorizing action moves
outside its computenco under intornational la.w.
"it was also submitted on behalf of most of

theso defendants that in doing v/hat they did they

were acting under the orders of Hitlor, and there
fore cannot bo held responsible for tho acts

comiiiitted by thorn in carrying out thoso orders.

The Chartor specifically provides in Article 8:
*Tho fact that tho Defendant acted pur
suant to order of his Government or of

a supox'ior shall not froo him from res

ponsibility, but naif

considered in

mitigation of punishment. '

Tho provisions of this articlo arc in conformity with
tho law of all nations.
That a soldier was ordered
to kill or torture in violation of tho international,

law of war has novor boon recognised as a dofcnso to
such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter hero
provides, the order may bo urged in mitigation of

tho pionishmont.

Tho true tost, which is found ^

varying degrees in tho criminal law of most nations,

is not the existence of the order, but whether^moral
choice was in-fact possible," (Trial of the liajor

V/ar Criminals, Vol, I, pp, 218-224).

This reasoning applies also to Control Council Law
Ho, 10.

Tho same authority creating the London ji.groor::ont

created this Control Council Law.
Tribunal m

As was said by

in tho Justice Case;

"it can scarcely bo argued that
Court which owes its oxlstonco and juris^

diction solely to tho provisions of a
given statute could assume to exorcise

that jurisdiction and then, in tho exorciso
thereof, doclaro Invalid the act to which
it owes its oxlstonco.

Except as an aid

to construction wo cannot and need not go
behind the statute."

Tho Chartor, supplomontod by Control Council Law TTo.

10, is not an arbitrary exorcise of power, but "it is the
expression of intornational lav/ existing at tho tine of

-
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its croG-tion; and to that extent is itself a contribution

to international laviT." (Emphasis supplied. Judgment, HIT,
supra).

As a matter of interest to students wo might

point out that this general principlo is sustained by

tho following extract from Grotius, written in 1625s
"It Is proper also to observe that
Kings and those who are possessed of sovereign
power have a right to exact punishment not
only for injuries affecting inmodiatoly them
selves or their own subjects, but for gross

violations of tho law of_nat\uy^ jmd_of natTonSj^
done to othor '"3'tat'6¥ \nd s~ubyQTt3~r'"~"r6V6'tius',''"
The RigvEF of V/ah"ahd" Peace', trans'lated from
the Latin by A, C, G mpboll, A.H. (1901) li.

Walter Dune, publisher, V/ashington and London,

Cap. XX, p. 247).
Wo also refer to an article from tho hanchoster

Guardian of 28 September 1946, containing a description of
the trial of Sir Peter of Hagenbach hold at hreisach in

1474.

Tho charges against him wore analogous to "Crimes

against Humanity" in modern concept.
Ilowovor, those citations

Ho was convicted,

are of academic interest

only,- merely given to show tho soundness of tho Judgment
of the HIT.

We thinlc it may bo said the basic law before

mentioned simply declared, developed, and implemented
international common law.

By so construing It, there is eliialnatod tho assault
made upon it as being an ox post facto onnctmont,

O^r view is fortified by the judgment rendered in

Case ITo, 7, TJ.S, vs. Wilholm List, ot al, whore (p. 10434)
it is said:
"V/o conclude that prooxisting intornatlonal law

has declared tho acts con

stituting the crimes PIEREIH GI-L^PlGED and
included in-Control Council Lc-.vj Mo, 10 to

bo unlawful, both under tho convontijnal
law and tho practises and usages of land
warfare that had ripened into rocognlaod
customs which belligoronts wore bound to
obey. Anything in excess of existing
intornational law therein contained is a
utilisation of power and not of law.

-
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It

is truG, of ccurso, that courts authorizod
to hoar such casos wore not ostablishod nor

the. ponaltios to be ir.iposod for tho
violations sot forth.

to thoir validity.

But this is not fatal

Tho acts prohibited are -

without dotorront effect unless

they arc

punishable as crimes." (Emphasis supplied)
Then there Is quoted tho language of tho II,!T horotoforo
set out at page 14 of this opinion.

Hany of the questions in tho I?;IT Case are presented
in this case.

Tho same unlawful orders, acts, and

practices are involved; only tho dofendants are different.
Hitler was the very center of vast expanding concentric

rings of influonce that touched ovory person in Goruany.
Tho dofendants in this case aro only one or tv;o steps
renovod fron Gooring, Keitel, Jodl, Doenitz, and Raoder,

dofendants in tho XI.1T Caso.

Much of tho evidenco intro

duced In this case was introduced in tho II.IT hearing.

Consequently, tho great importance of tho judgnont of
that tria.1, as applyiug to tho issues of law involved m
this caso, is readily apparent.

Tho IIXT Judgment contains an olaborato s.ccount of

Hitler*s rise to powor, tno plans and acts of aggression,
and tho barbarities and crimes perpetrated upon the armed
forces and civilians of tho countries with which Gorma ny
was at war.

In view of tho fact that those general

findings are svipportod by the record in tho Instant case,
wo shall make further liberal quotations fron and
references to it In this judgi:iont.

-
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B.

International Treaties

In the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
it is

said:

"The Charter defines as a crime the planning
or vjrging of war that is a war of aggression or a
v;ar in violation of international treaties.
The
Tribunal has decided th^t certain of the defendants

planned and waged aggressive wars against 12 nations,
and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes.
This makes it unnecessary to discuss the subject in
further detail, or even to consider at any length

the extent to which these aggressive wars were also
'wars in violation of international treaties, agree
ments, or assurances.'

"These treaties are set out in Appendix 0 of
the Indictment.

Those of principal importance are

the following.

Hague Conventions

"In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers
agreed: 'before an appeal to arras . . . to have
recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the
good offices or medhotion of one or more friendly
powers.' A similar clause was inserted in the Con
vention for P-^clfic Settlement of International

Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Convention
Relative to Opening of Hostilities, Article I con
tains this frr more specific language: 'The Con
tracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous nnd ex
plicit warning, in tiie form of either a declaration
of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a con
ditional decl'-r.ntion of war. '

Germany was a party

to these conventions.

Versailles

Tre:>ty

"Breaches of cert-^ln provisions of the Ver
sailles Trenty are rlso relied on by the Prosecu
tion—Not to fortify the left bank of the Rhine

(Articles 42-44); to 'respect strictly the Inde

pendence of Austrl!^' (Article 80); renunciation of
any rights in hemel (Article 99) and the Free

City of Danzig (Article 100); the recognition of
the independence of the Czechoslovak St^^te; and the
military, naval, and air clauses o.gainst German re
armament found in Part V.

There is no doubt that

action w'-'S taken by the German Government contrary

to all these provisions, the details of which are
set out in Appendix C. With reg'^rd to the Treaty
of Versailles,
1.

the matters relied on are:

The violation of Articles 42 to 44 in

respect of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland;
2.

The annexation of Austria on 13 M^rch

1938, in violation of Article 80;
-
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3.

The incorporation of the district of Kernel

on 22 March 1939, in violation of Article 99;
4.
The Incorporation of the Free City of
Danzig on 1 September 1939, in violation of Article

iOOj

—

- .

5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bo
hemia and Moravia on 16 March 1939, in violation
of Article 81;
6.
The repudiation of the military, naval, and
air clauses of the Treaty, in or about March of 1935.

"On 21 May 1935 Germany announced that, whilst
renouncing the disarmrment clauses of the Treaty,

she would still respect the territorial limitations,
and would comply with the Locarno Pact.
(With re
gard to the first five breaches alleged, therefore,

the Tribunal finds the allegation proved.)
Treaties of Mutual Guarantee.
Arbitration, and Non-Aggression

"It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail
the various treaties entered into by Germany with
other Powers.
Treaties of.mutual guarantee were

signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the main
tenance of the territorial status quo.

Arbitration

treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno

with Czechoslovakia,'"Belgium, and Poland.

"Article I "Of the latter treaty is typical,
providing:

'All disputes of every kind between

Germany and Poland . . . which it ma.y not be pos
sible to settle amicably by the normal methods of

diplomacy, shnll be submitted for decision to an
arbitral tribunal .

^

^

"Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation

were entered into between Germany, the Netherlands,
and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and Luxem
bourg in 1929.
Mon-aggression treaties were executed
by Germany with Denmark and Russia in 1959.
Kellogg-Brignd Pact

"The Pact of P^irie was signed on 27 August 1928
by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and other coun
tries; and subsequently by other Powers.
The Tri
bunal Mrs made full reference to the nature of this
Pact and its legal effect in another part of this

judgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss
the matter further here, save to state that in the

opinion of the Tribunal this Pact was violated by

Germany in all the cases of aggressive war charged
in the Indictment.

It is to be noted that on 26

January 1934 Germany signed a Declaration for the

Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland, which
was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in

-
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which the use of force was outlawed for a period
of 10 years.
^^The Tribunal does not find i t necessery to

consider eny of the other treaties referred to in
the Appendix, or the pepeated agreements and as

surances of her peaceful intentions entered into

by G-erm.rny."
03JECTI0ITS DURIHG Tim TRIAL

The objection has boon raised that this Tribvinal is not
a proper forum in which to try the dofondants for tho crimes

charged.

It Is said that they wore prisoners of war and

that they arc subject to trial only by a goneral courtmartial.

V/e find no merit in such contention.

Thoro is no doubt of the criminality of tho acts with

which tho dofondants are charged.

They are based on vio

lations of International Law woll rocognized and existing
at tho tiiuo of their commission.

True no court had boon sot

up for tho trial of-violations of International Law.

A

state having enacted a criminal law ma y set up ono or any
numbor of courts and vost oach v/ith jurisdiction to try an
offondor against its internal Ir.ws,

Evon after tho crimo is

charged to have been corxiittod v/o know of no principle, of
justico that would give tho defendant a vested right to a
trial only in an existing forum.

In tho exorcise of its
I

sovereignty tho state has tho ri^t to sot up a Tribunal at

any timo it sees fit and confer jurisdiction on it to try

violators of its criminal law s.

The only obligation .a

sovereign state owes to tho violator of one of its laws

Is to give him a fair trial In a forum whore ho may have

counsel to represent him - where ho may produce witnesses
in his behalf and where he may speak in his own defense-.
Similarly, a defendant charged with a violation of Inter
national Law la in no sense done an injustice if ho is

accorded tho same rights and privllogos.
-
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Tho defendants in

this caso havo boon aocordod those rights and privileges,
is regards the contontirin that the defendants are

prisoners of v;ar and that the Geneva Convention, Article
y

63, reciniros that a prisoner of war bo tried by a general
court-nartial we call attention to the fact that this pro-

vision referred to is found in an international agroenont,
that ?/as entered into dnd to which both the United States

and Gernany wore signatories, to protect prisoners of war
after they acquiro such status and not to extend to then

any special rights or prerogatives v;ith respect to crines they
nay havo connittod before acquiring a prisoner of v/ar status.

Such is the reasoning of the Yanashita Case 327 U, S, 1:66 Sup
Ct 348,

ViTo think tho reasoning sound,

Articlo 63 of tho Geneva Convention provides:

"Sentence nay bo pronounced against
a prisoner of v;ar only by tho sane courts and
according to tho sane procedure as in tho
caso of persons belonging to the arned forces
of tho detaining power,"
Therefore, say defense counsel, the defendants nust bo tried

by a general court-nartial since tho defendants were prisoners
of v/ar taken by the United States and nonbers in tho amed

forces of the United States conjiitting crines are tryable
by court-nartial.

But tho trial of nen in the r.iilitary

forces of the United States by court-nartial can be only for
crines connittod after tho accused acquires and during the
tine he possesses tho status of a nonber of the arr.iod forces

of the United States,

One v;ho connltted nurdor and thereby

violated tho lav; of tho state before ho was inducted into

tho nilltary service clearly could not bo trlod for that
crine by a court-nartial for violating articles of war which
did not apply to hin v;hon ho connltted tho nurdor,

llor do wo think it necessary that defendants be discharged
as prisoners of war before being brought to trial.

-
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Certainly

if a nan is arrostcd for violating a municipal traffic
ordinancG v/hich subjocts him only to a civil penalty in a
magistrate's court and while he is in custody i t is dis

covered that

the day before he comnittod a nurdor, there

is no violation of any principle of justice in holding him
in custody and surrendering hin to the officers of a court
that has competency to try him for murder.
Wo arc not deciding whether the United States or Franco
or any other nation lawfully could or could
not try the defendants in a court-martial for a violation

of international law.

That is not before us.

If that may -

be done, a court-martial has not exclusive jurisdiction.

The crimes including the v/ar crimes charged against the
defendants are for violations of intornational criminal law.

This Tribunal by Control Goiancil Law No. 10 is vested v/ith

authority to try defendants for the crimes charged.

That

such jurisdiction possibly ma^r bo exorcised by another military
court also is of no consequence.

If two courts have conciurent

jurisdiction to try the same case the first court that

exorcises jurisdiction may properly dispose of the case.
The II.IT said:

"The jixrisdictlon of the Tribunal is defined
in the /-tgroomont and Charter, and the crimes
coning within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
for which there shall bo individual res

ponsibility, are sot out in i^rtlcle 6.

lav; of the Charter is doclslvo,

The

and binding

upon the Tribunal . . .

"The Tribunal is of course bound by the
Charter and the definition which it gives of

war crimes and crimes against humanity (Trial
of the Major V/ar Criminals, Vol, I, pp. 218,
253).

What was held by the iJtiT with respect to the London
%

^

Agreement and Charter, the basic lav;s under which it ftinctlonod,
Is authority for a similar holding by this Tribunal with

respect to the basic law under which It was sot up and under
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whicii i t functions,

/Je deem i t unnecessary to discuss the objection that
Control Council Law No, 10 is in violation of the maxim
nullum crlmen sine lege:

without merit.

nulla ooena sine lege.

VJe find i t

It has been passed upon so many times by the

Nurnberg Tribunals and held without merit, that further com
ment here is unnecessary.

The further objection was made that one of the nations,

namely the USSR, cooperated in the promulgation of Control

Council Lrvj No. 10 after it had engaged in a war of aggression
which is made criminal under the law; this objection also is
without merit.

The London Agreement and Charter from which

Control Council Law No, 10 stems has been approved by 19
nations other than the four signatories thereto.

need not

and do not determine whether the charge that one of the signa
tories of the London Agreement and Charter and Control Council
Law No. 10 is guilty of aggressive war for such determination

could avail the defendants nothing.

Under general principles

of law, an accused does not exculpate himself from a crime

by showing that another committed a similar crime, either
before or after the alleged commission of the crime by the ac
cused.

Various of the defendants by v^ay of objection or motions
have raised the question of the sufficiency of the evidence

on the part of the prosecution to mshe out a prima facie

case of the guilt of the respective defendants.

Numbers of

these motions were ruled uoon during the course of the

trial,

such motions not heretofore ruled upon, . the

same are denied, inasmuch as the questions raised by such
motions are involved in the final determination of the guilt
or the innocence of the defendants.

-
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CONSPIR.\CY COUNT

In view of tho conclusions presently to be announced,
wo think it proper now to dispose of this count.

Wo have horotoforQ sot out pai:agra^h 2 of Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10, which provides that any
person who was an accessory to tho ooinoission of Crinos
against Poaco, War Crimes, or Crinos against Humanity, as
✓

,

defined in said law by Lrticlo II, Soc. 1, paragraphs (a),
(b), and (c), or who ordorod or abottod such of Tonso, or
took a consonting part thoroin, or who was cohnoctod with
any plans or ontorprlsos involving its connission should
bo doonod guilty of tho connission of said offonsos.

It

is difficult to soe, as tho facts have dovolopod in this

case, how a conspiracy chargo can be of tho sllghtost aid
to the prosocutlon.

IH tho dofondants couirdttod tho acts

charged in this conspiracy count, they arc guilty of crinos
charged under Counts Ono, Two, and Three and are punishable
as principals.

Tho conspiracy count has not resulted in tho introduction

of any ovldonco that is not adnissiblo undor tho othor

coijints, nor docs it,'as tho ovidohce has dovolopod ih'
this case,. Inposo any crinlnality net attached to a
violation undor such procoding counts.
Inasnuch as

wo hold that undor tho facts of this

case no soparato substantive offonso is shown undor Count

Four, wo strike it as tondoring no issue not contained in
tho procoding counts, and procood to dotornino tho guilt
or innoconco of tho dofondants undor Counts Ono, Two, and
Throe of the Indlctnont.
i.'j.

'

In so striking Count Pour, we havo roforonco only to

i»tt

tho facts as thoy havo boon prosontod in this case and
1 A*'* K

f,:' • ' ^
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oxprosa no opinion as to whothor in all casos ..and under

all factual dovolopnonts tho chargo of conspiracy should
bo disrogardod.

Such dotornination should depend upon

the proof adduced in oach case.
In this connection wo dosiro to advort to the last

pa ragraph of Soction 2, Article II, Control Council Law

Uo. 10, viz

"or (f) with roforonco to paragraph 1(a) if

ho hold a high political, civil, or military (Including

Gonoral Staff) position

or held high position in the

financial, industrial or ccononic lifo" in Germany, such
person would bo guilty imdor paragraph 1(a) defining
Grlmos against Poaco.

The prosecution doos not undortako to fix liability
upon this basis and wo need not notice it further than to

observe that wo nay draw from any known facts such infer
ences as wo deen they warrant»

•

•.
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CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES

IN TRIAL

The proper attitude to he observed in approaching a
case of the character of the one before the Tribunal is so

well stated by Judge Anderson in his concurring opinion in

Case No. 10, the U". S, vs. JlRUPP that we sef; it forth, omit
ting only such portions as had particular application to
that case, as a statement of the principles that we deem con
trolling in the approach to the instant case.

Therein he

said;

"There are certain matters of general ap
plication which must be stated in the outset of

this investigation.
throughout

They must be borne in mind

the discussion.

The first is that

this Tribunal was created to administer the law.

It is not a manifestation of the political power
of the victorious belligerents which is quite a
different thing. The second is that the fact
that the defendants are alien enemies is to be

resolutely kept out of minci.

The third is that

considerations of policy are not to influence a

disposition of the questions presented.

Of these

there are but two: (a) what was the law at the
time in question and, (b) does the evidence show

prima facie that the defendants or any of them
violated i t .

The fourth is that the defendants

tlrir oughout are presumed to be innocent and be

fore they can be put to their defense, the pros
ecution must make out a prima facie case of
guilt by competent and relevant evidence.
It
is true that the procedural ordinance of the

Military Government for Germany (US) provides
that *they (the Tribunals) shall adopt and apply
to the greatest possible extent . . . non-tech
nical procedure.'
But neither the members of
this Tribunal nor the people of the nation
prosecuting this case regard the presumption
of innocence as nothing more than a technical

rule of procedure.

Nor do they, or we, think

it a mere rhetorical abstraction to which lip

service will suffice. Upon the contrary, in
addition to its procedural consequences, it is
a substantive right which stands as a witness

for every defendant from the beginning to the
end of his trial.

.

.

. The sixth is that it

is a fundamental principle of criminal justice
that criminal statutes are to be interpreted

restriotively; that criminal responsibility
is an Individual matter; that criminal guilt
must be personal.

The seventh is that the

application of ex post facto laws in criminal
cases constitutes a denial of justice under

international law (Quincy V/right: "The Law
of the wurnberg Trial," American Journal of

International Law, Volume 41, January 1947,

page 53).
-
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Hence,

i f i t be conceded that Control Council

Law No. 10 is binding on the Tribunal, it
nevertheless must be construed and applied
to the facts in a way which will not con

flict with this view." (Case No. 10, Con
curring Opinion, pps.fi -

7)

To the above we add that the burden rests upon the
prosecution to present evidence that satisfies the Tribunal

of the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.

This rule also we have adhered to in arriving at our Judg
ment.

iilfhere there was ambiguity in the testimony or un

certainty as to the defendant's connection with the trans

actions relied upon to establish their guilt, we have fol
lowed the well recognized principle of criminal law and have
accorded to the defendants the benefit of the doubt.

•ii
•w-"
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COUI^'T 01^5 OF TH5 IImDICThEIvT ••

AOaH^SSlVE wAR

Count One of the Indictment, heretofore set out, charges
the defendants with Crimes against Peace,

Before seehlng to determine the law applicable It la

necessary to determine with certainty the action which the
defendants are alleged to have taken that constitutes the
crime.

As a preliminary to that we deem it necessary to

give a brief consideration to the nature and characteristics
of war,

We need not attempt a definition that is all in

clusive and all exclusive.

It is sufficient to say that war

is the exerting of violence by one state or politically

organised body against another.

In other vjords, it is the

implementation of a political policy by means of violence,

v^srs are contests by force between political units but the

policy tha.t brings about their initiation is made and the
actual waging of them is done by individuals, ".'daat we have
sifcid thus fcx is equally as applicable to a just ps to an

unjust war, to the initiation of an aggressive and, there
fore, criminal war as to the waging of defensive and,

therefore,legitimate war against criminal aggression. The
point we stress is that war activity is the implementation
of s predetermined national policy.

Likewise, an invasion of one state by another is the

implementation of the national policy of the invading state
by force even though the invfded state, due to fear or a
sense of the futility of resistance in the face of superior
force, adopts a policy of non-resistance and thus prevents
the occurrence of any actual combat,

Xn the ll^ht of this general characterization and

definition of war and invasions we now consider the charge

contained in the Indictment, The essence of the charge Is
-
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participation in_the_init.iation of„agfe'ressiv^ invasions and
in_the_jpla^ning,_preparaiion_and_wagin£ of^aggrepsivje wars.
The remaining parts of paragraph 1 are merely a statement of

particular actions which are sufficient to constitute a com
mission of the crime charged.

Paragraph 2 charges that the

defend?jits vjere principals, or accessories, to,•

or were in

other ways involved in, the commission of the previously

charged Crimes against Peace.
nature

These are charges as to the

of their relationship to the crime otherwise chorged

in the Indictment, and add no new element to the criminality
*

charged in paragraph 1.

The reference in paragraph 2 to the

high military positions formerly held by the defendants has
relevarce in the Indictment and in the law (Control Council

Law No. 10, Art. II, Sec. 2), not to show or charge addi
tional Crimes against Peace, but to show what persons may

be included and what persons may not be excluded from being

charged and convicted of the offense set forth in Sec. la.
The prosecution does not seeh, or contend that the la^^

authorizes, a conviction of the defendants simply by reason
*

of their positions as shown by the evidence, but it con

tends only that such positions may be considered by the friA

bunal with all other evidence in the case for such light as

they may shed on the personal guilt or innocence of the in- ,

dividual defendants.

The prosecution does contend, and we

think the contention sound, that the defendants are not re

lieved of responsibility for .notion which would be criminal
in one who held no military position, simply by reason of
their military positions. This is the clear holding of the

Judgment of the IMT, and is so provided in Control Council
Law No. 10, Art, II, Sec. 4a.
The initiation of war or an invasion is a unilateral

operation.

'When war is formally declared or the first shot
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Is fired the initiation of the war has ended and from then

on there is a waging of war between the two adversaries,

Whether a v/ar be lawful, or aggressive and therefore unlawful
under international law, is and can be determined only from a
consideration of the factors that entered into its initiation.

In the intent and purpose for which it is planned, prepared,

initiated and waged is to be found its lawfulness or unlawful
ness.

As we have pointed out, war whether it be lawful or un-

lavjful is the implementation of a national policy.

If the

policy under which it is initiated Is criminal in its intent
and purpose it is so because the individuals at the policy
making level had a criminal intent and purpose In determining

the policy.

If war is the means by which the criminal ob

jective Is to be attained then the waging of the v;ar Is but an
implementation of the policy, and the criminality which at
taches to the waging of an aggressive war should be confined
to those who pa-rtioipate in it at the policy level.

Ihis does not mean that the Tribunal subscribes to the

contention made in this trial that since Hitler was the
Dictator of the Third Reich and that he was supreme in both
the civil and military fields he alone must bear criminal re
sponsibility for political and military policies.

No matter

how absolute his authority Hitler alone could not formulate

a policy of aggressive war and alone implement that policy

by preparing, planning, and waging such a war.

Somewhere

between the Dictator and Supreme Commander of the Military

Forces of the nation and the common soldier is the boundary
between the criminal and the excusable participation in the

waging of an aggressive war by an individual eng-ged in it.
Control Council Law No. 10 does not definitely draw such a
line.

I't points out in Sec. 2 of Article II certain fact
-
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situations and estSlished relations that are or may be
sufficient to constitute guilt and sets forth certain

categories of activity that do not establish immunity from
criminality. Since there has been no other prosecution under
Control Council Law No. 10 with defendants in the same

category as those in this case, no such definite line has
been Judicially drawn. This Tribunal is not required to fix
a general rule but only to determine the guilt or innocence
of tiie present defendants.

The Judgment of the IMT held that: (page 48)
"The Charter is not an arbitrary exer-

cise of power on the part oT

victorious

mtions but in view of the Tribunal, as

vrui be'shown, it is the expression of in

ternational law existing at ohe time of its
creation; and to that extent is itself a
contribution to international law.

We hold that Control Council Law No. 10 likewise is

but an expression of international law existing at the time
of its creation. We cannot therefore construe it as extend

ing the International Common Law as it existed at the time
of the Charter to, add thereto any new element of criminality,

for so to do would give it an ex post facto effect which
do not construe it to have intended. Koreover, that this
vas not intended is indicated by the fact that the London
Charter of 10 August 1945 is made an integral part of tne
Control Council Law,

since International Common Law grows out of the common

reactions and the composite thinking with respect to recur
ring situations by the various states composing the family
of nations, it is pertinent to consider the general attitude

tL citizens of states with respect to their military comLnders siid their obligations when their nations clan, pre
pare for ahd initiate or engage in war.
-
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Vtolle it is undoubtedly true thst International Common

Law in case of conflict with State Law takes precedence
over it and while it is equally true that absolute unanxmity

amons all the states in the fajnily of nations-is not required
to bring an International Common Law into being, it is

scarcely a tenable proposition that International Common Law
will run counter to the consensus within any considerable
number of nations.

Furthermore, we must not confuse idealistic oojeotives

with realities. The world has not arrived at a state of
civilization such that it can dispense with fleets, armies,
air forces, nor has it arrived at a point where it c.an

safely outlaw war under any and all circumst-^nces and situa
tions. Inasmuch as all war cannot be oonsioered outlawed
then armed forces are lawful instrumentalities of st^te,
which have internationally legitimate functions. An unlc.w

ful vtar of aggression connotes of necessity a lawful war of
defense against aggression. There is no general criterion
under International Common Low for determining the extent
which a nation may arm and prepare for war. As long as there

is no aggressive intent, there is no evil inherent in a
nation making itself militarily strong. An example Is
Switzerland which for her geographical extent, her population
and resources is proportionally stronger militarily than many
nations of the world. She uses her military strength to

implement a national policy that seeks peace and to maintain
her borders against aggression.

There have been nations thst have initiated and waged

aggressive wars through long periods of history; doubtless
there are nations still disposed to do so; and if not, judg

ing in' the light of history, there may be nations which to
morrow will be disposed so to do. Furthermore, situations
-
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may arise in which the question whether the war is or is

not aggressive is doubtful and uncertain. Vie may safely as
sume that the general and considered opinions of tne people v/itV}in ctatos- the courco frcr; ^yhich Intornatiinal Couinon Lawsprings-

ara not'

such as to hamper or render them impotent to do

the things they deem necessary for their

are of the opinion that as in ordinary/cases, so in

the crime denominated aggressive war, the same elements must
all be present to constitute criminality. There first must
be actual knowledge that an aggressive war is intended and
that if launched it will be an aggressive war. But mere
knowledge is not sufficient to make participation even by

high-ranking military officers in the war criminal. It re
quires in addition that the possessor of such knotvledge,
after he acquires it shall be in a position to shape or
influence the policy that brings about its initiation or its
continuance after initiation, either by furthering, or by
hindering or preventing it. If he then does the former,

he becomes criminally responsible; if he does the latter to
the extent of his ability, then his action shows the lack
of crimina-1 intent with respect to such policy.
If a defendant did not know that the planning and prep

aration for invasions and wars in which he was involved were
concrete plans and preparations for aggressive wars and for

wars otherwise in violation of international laws and
treaties, then he cannot be guilty of an offense. If, however,
after the policy to initiate and wage agfiTesslve wars was

formulated, a defendant came into possession of knoviledge
that the invaeions and wars to be weged, were aggressive and
unlawful, then he will be criminally responsible if he, being
on the policy level, could have influenced such policy and
failed to do so.
-
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If and as long as a member of the armed forces does not

participate in the preparation, planning, initiating or xmg-

Ing of ag^^ressive war on a policy level, his war activities
do not fall under the definition of Grimes against Peace.

It is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape
or influence the policy of his State, which is the relevant
issue for determining his criminality under the charge of
Crimes against Peace.
International law condemns those who, due to their

actual power to shape and influence the policy of their

nation, prepare for, or lead their country into or in an ag

gressive war. But we do not find that, at the present stage
of development, international law declares as criminals those
below that level who, in the execution of this war policy,
act as the Instruments of the policy makers.

Anybody who is

on the policy level and participates in the war policy is
liable to punishment.

But those under them

pxmlshed for the crimes of others.

cannot be

The misdeed of the policy

makers is all the greater in as much as they use the great

mass of the soldiers and officers to carry out an internation

al crime; however, the individual soldier or officer below
the policy level is but the policy makers' instrument, find
ing himself, as he does, under the rigid discipline which is
necessary for and peculiar to military organization.
We do not hesitate to state that it would have been

eminently desirable had the Commanders of the German Armed

Forces refused to implement the policy of the Third Reich by
means of aggressive war. It would have been creditable to
them not to contribute to the cataclysmic catastrophe. This
would have been the honorable and righteous thing to do; it
would have been in the interest of their State. Had they done

80 they would have served their fatherland and humanity also.
-
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But however much their failure is morally reprimandable, we

are of the opinion and hold that International common Law,
at the time they so acted, had not developed to the point
of making the participation of military officers below the

policy making or policy influencing level into a criminal
offense in and of itself.

International lavj operates as a restriction and limita-

tion on the sovereignty of nations.

It may also limit the

obligations which individuals owe to their states, and create
for them international obligations which are binding upon them
to an extent that they must be carried out even if to do so
violates a positive law or directive of state. But the
limitation which International Common Law imposes on national
sovereignty, of on individual obligations, is a limitation
self-imposed or imposed by the oomposite thinking in the in
ternational community, for it is by such democratic proces
ses that Common Law comes into being. If there is no

generality of opinion among the nations of the world as to a
particular restriction on national sovereignty or on the
obligations of individuals toward their own State, tnen taere
is no International Common Law on such matter.

By the Kellogg-Briand Pact the sixty-three signatory
nations including Germany, renounced war as an instrument
of National Policy. If this, as we believe it is, is
evidence of s sufficient crystallization of world opinion

to authorize a judicial finding that there exist Crimes

against Peace under International Common Law, we cannot find
that law to extend further than such evidence indicates.
The nations that entered into the Kellogg-Briand Pact con
sidered it imperative that existing international relation
ships should not be changed by force. In the preamble they
state tliat tb.ey are.

-
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''persuft'3.ed that the time has come vhen . . ,
all changes in their relationships with one
another should be sought only by pacific

means*" # # «

This is a declaration that from that time forv/ard each
I

of the signatory nations should be deemed to possess and to

have the right to exercise ell the privileges and powers of-a

sovereign nation within the limitations of international
law, free from all Interference by force on the part of any
other nation.

As a corollary to this, the changing or at

tempting to change the international relationships by force

of arms is an act of aggression and if the aggression results
in war, the war Is an aggressive war. It is, therefore, ag

gressive vjar that is renounced by the pact.

It is aggressive

war that is criminal under International law.

The crime denounced by the law is the use of war as an

instrument of national policy.

Those who commit the crime

are those who participate at the policy mahlng level in

planning, preparing, or In initiating vjar.

After war is

initiated, and is being waged, the policy question then in
volved becomes one of extending, continuing or discontinuing

the war. The crime at this stage likewise must be committed
at the policy making level.

The making of a national policy is essentially political,
though it may require, and of necessity does require

if war

is to be one element of that policy, a consideration of mat
ters military as well as matters political.

It is self evident that n^itional policies are mode by

men. liVben men make a policy that is criminal under internatlona.l law, they are criminally responsible for so doing. Tliis
is the logical and inescapable conclusion.
The acts of Commanders and Staff Officers below the

policy level, in planning campaigns, preparing means for car
rying them out,, moving against a country on orders and
-
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fighting a war after it has been instituted,do not constitute

the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of war or the
initiation of invasion that international law denounces as
criminal.

Under the record we find the defendants were not on the

policy level, and are not guilty under Count One of the Indieument. With crimes charged "to have been committed by them in
the manner in which they behaved in the waging of war, we deal
in other parts of this Judgment.

^
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WAR CRIMES AND

CRIMES AGAINST HITMANITY

In the Judgment of the internstional Military Tribunal at

pages 226 - 232, et seq., is a statement of the v^ar crimes com
mitted by the yehrmacht.

Extracts from this are as follows:

"The evidence relating to War Crimes has been
overwhelming,

in its volume and its detail.

It is

impossible for this Judgment- adequately to review it,
or to record the m^se of documentary and oral evi
dence that has been presented.

The truth remains

that War Crimes were committed -on a vast scale, never

before seen in the history of w:r.

They were perpe

trated in all the countries occupied by Germany, and
on the High Seas, and were attended by every conceiv
able circumstance of cruelty and horror. There can be
no doubt that the majority of them arose from the Nazi

conception of 'total war', vath which the aggressive
Miprs were waged. For in this conception of 'tota.! T-far *
tne moral ideas underlying the conventions which seek

to
war more humane are no longer regarded as hav
ing force or validity. Everything is made subordinate

to tne overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regula—
cions^ assurances, and treaties all alike are of no
moment; and so, freed from the restraining influence

of international law, the aggressive war is conducted

by tiie Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way.

Accord-

ingly, y-ar Crimes, were committed xvhen and wherever the

Fuehrer and his^close associates thought them to be
advantageous. -J-hey were for the most part the result

of cold and criminal calculation.

"Other War Crimes, such as the murder of pri

soners of war who had escaped and been recaptured, or
tne murder of Commandos or captured airmen, or the
destruction of the Soviet Commissars, were the result
of direct orders circulated through the highest of
ficial channels.

"Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and
murdered, not only in defiance of the vjell—established

rules of international law, but in complete disregard

of the elementary dictates of humanity.
*

*

*

*

♦

' In tne course of the war, many Allied soldiers who

ha.d surrendered to the Germans were siiot Immediately,
often as a_ matter of deliberate, calculated policy.
On 18 October 1942, the Defendant Keitel circulated a
directive authorized by Hitler, v/hich ordered that all

members of Allied 'Commando' units, often when in uni
form and whether armed or not, were to be 'slaughtered
to the last man , even if they attempted to surrender

It was further provided that if such Allied troops

came into the hands of the military authorities after

«
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being first captured by the local police, or in any
other way, they should be handed over immediately
to the SD. This order wrs supplemented from time
to time, and vjs.s effective throughout the remainder
of the war, although after the Allied landings in
Normandy in 1944 i t was made clear that the order

did not npply to 'Commandos' captured within the im
mediate battle area.
Under the provisions of this

order, Allied 'Commando' troops, and other military
units operating independently, lost their lives in

Norv'ay, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy.

Hany of

them were killed on the spot, and in no case were
tho'se who were executed later in concentration cajaps
ever given a

trial of any kind.
«

-it-

^

^

«

"In harch 1944 the OKH issued the 'Kugel' or
'Bullet' decree, which directed that every escaped
officer and NCO prisoner of war who had not teen

put to work, with the exception of British and Amer
ican prisoners -of war, should on recapture be hand
ed over to the SIPO and SD.

This order was distri

buted by the SIPO and SD to their regional offices.
These esc^^ped officers and KCO's were to be sent to

the concentration camp at Kauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.-

"In Manch 1944 fifty officers of the British

Royal Air Force, who escaped from the camp at Sagan
where they were confined as prisoners, were shot on
recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler.

Their

bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns conta-inlng their ashes v^ere returned to the camp.
It
was not contended by the defendants that this was

other than plain murder, in complete violation of
intern'^tional law.

"vVhen Allied airmen were forced to land in Ger

many, they were sometimes killed at once by the "
civilian population.
The police x^rere Instructed not

to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry
of Justice v/as informed that no one should be prose
cuted for taking part in them.

"The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was
characterized by p-'^rticular irihumanity. The death
of so many of them was not due merely to the action

of individual guards, or to the exigencies of life
in the camps. It was the result of systematic
plans to murder.

More than a month before the Ger

man invasion of the Soviet Union, the OK^vV were mak
ing special plans for dealing with political re
presentatives serving with the Soviet Armed Forces
who might be captured. One proposal was that

'political Comrnies-^rs of the Army are not recognized
as Prisoners of h'ar.

and are to be liquidated at

the latest in the transient prisoner of viar camps. '

The Defendant Keltel gave evidence that instructions
incorporating this proposal were Issued to the Ger
man Array.

-
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"On 8 Seotember 1941 regulations for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war In all pri
soner of war c?mps were issued, signed by General

Reineohe, the hend of the prisoner of wrr depart
ment of the High Command.
Those orders stated:
^The Bolshevist soldier has therefore
lost all claim to treatment as an

honorable opponent, in accordahce with
the Geneva Convention.

.

.

.

The order

for ruthless and energetic action must
be given at the slightest Indication
of insubordination, especially in the
case of Bolshevist fanatics.

Insub

ordination, active or passive resis
tance, must be broken immediately by

force of arras (bayonets, butts, and
firearms) . . . Anyone carrying out
the'order who does not use his weapons,

or does so with Insufficient energy,
is punishable.

.

.

. Prisoners of war

attempting esc-^pe are to be fired on

v;ithout previous challenge.

^

shot must ever be fired.

.

No warning
.

.

The use

of arms against prisoners of wer is as
a rule legal,'
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suit

able clothing; the wounded without medical care;
?•

they were starved, and in many cases left to die.

"On 17 July 1941, the Gestapo Issued an order
providing for the killing of all Soviet prisoners
of w;r who were or might be dangerous to National
Socialism.

The order recited:

'The mission of the Coramanders of the
SIPO and SD strtioned in Stnla.' s is the

political investigation of all camp in
mates,

the elimination and further

'treatment' (a) of all political, crimi

nal, or in some other way unbearable

elements among them, (i.) of those per
sons who could be used for the recon

struction of the occupied territories, , •
, Further, the commanders must make ef

forts from the beginning to seek out
among the prisoners elements which appear
reliable, regardless of whether there are

Communists concerned or not, in order to

use them for intelligence purposes inside

of the camp, and if advisable, later in
the occupied territories also.

By use of

such informers, and by use of all other

existing possibilities, the discovery of all
elements to be eliminated among the prison
ers must proceed step by step at once. .

'Above all, the following must be
discovered: all important functionaries of
State and Party, especially professional
revolutionaries.

. all People's Ccmmls-

sars in the Red Army, leading person'lities
of the St' te , , , le ding person'^litiee of
the business world, membcr.s of the Soviet

-
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,

Russian Intelligence, all Jews, all per
sons who are found to be agitators or
fi-natical Communists.

Executions are not

to be held in the cojnp or in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. . . , The prisoners
are to be taken for special treatment if
possible into the former Soviet Russian

territory.^

The affidavit of Warliraont, Deputy Chief of Staff
of the'-Wehrmacht, and the testimony of Ohlendorf,
former Chief of Amt III of the RSKA, and of Lahousen,

the head of one of the sections of the

Abwehr, the Wehrmocht's Intelligence Service, all
indicate the thoroughness with which this order
wa.s

carried out.
*****

"In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were brand
ed with a special permanent mark.
There was put
in evidence the OKW order dated 20 July 1942 which

^

laid down that:

'The brand is to take the shape of an
acute angle of about 45 degrees, with
the long side to be 1 cm. in length,
pointing upwards and burnt on the left
buttock.

.

,

.

This brand is made with

the aid of a lancet avoliable in any
military unit.
The coloring used is
Chin ese ink,'
The carrying out of this order was the responsibil
ity of the military authorities, though it was
widely circulated by the Chief of the SIPO and SD
to G-erman police officials for information,

"Soviet prisoners of wrr were also made the
subject of medical experiments of the most cruel
and inhuman kind.
In July 1943 experimental work

^

w s begun in preparation for a camp-ign of bacte
riological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were
used in these medical experiments, which more often
than not proved fatal.

\

*****

"The argument in defense of the charge with
. regard to the murder and ill-treatment of Soviet

prisoners of war, that the U.S.S.R, was not a

party to the G-eneva Convention, is quite without
foundation.
On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canarie
protested against the regulations for the treat

ment of Soviet prisoners of war, signed by Gener?^l
Reinecke on 8 September 1941.
He then st-ted:
'The GeneVcO Convention for the treatment
of prisoners of w?r is not binding in the
relationship between Germany and the
U.S.S.R.
Therefore only the principles of

general international law on the treatment
of prisoners of war apply.
Since the l&th
century these have gradually been established
along the lines that war captivity is neither

-
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revenge nor punishment, but solely pro
tective custody, the only purpose of
which is to prevent the prisoners of war
from further p^^rticipcntion in the war.
This principle wrs developed in accord
ance with the view held by all armies

thst it is contrary to military tra
dition to kill or injure helpless people.
.

.

, The decrees for the treatment of

Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are
based on a fundajnentally different view
point, '

This protest, which correctly stated the legal po
sition, was ignored.

The Defendant Keltel made a

note on this memorandum:

'The objections arise from the military
concept of chivalrous warfare.

the destruction of an ideology.

This is

There

fore I approve and back the measures. ' ''

All of these unlawful acts, as vjell as employment under in
humane conditions and at prohibited labor, is shown by the
record In this case.

They were deliberate, gross and con

tinued violations of the customs and usages of war as well
as of the Hague Regulntlons (1907) and the Geneva Conven

tion (1929) and of International Common Law.

»

44 -

-Mm.

GRiiias

civilians

Tho rocord in tho instant case is replete with horror.
Never in the history of tian^s inlivirianity to man have so
nany innocent people suffered, so much.
.Millions of people whoso only offense was that they

wore of Jey/ish blood, or Soviet Nationals, or gypsies, or •

Polos, designated as social inferiors, sub-hur.ians, and

boasts, received what the Hitlerites called "special treat
ment" or "liquidation" or "final solution" and woro ex-

terDinatod regardless of ago or sex.

No nation, no army

and its loaders, of any time, civilized or uncivilized,
labor under so great a load of guilt as do Hitler's Germany,
its army and its leaders, in their troatr.iont of these imfortunate people•

In addition, the civilian population of tho countries

over-run by Gorman arms were enslaved, deported for forced

labor, starved, tortured, murdered, oxocutod as hostages

and, by way of reprisal, were coi;ipollod to erect fortifi
cations and remove live minesj their property, public and •

private, plundered and destroyed, and they suffered other
crimes at tho hands of their conquerors.
In the I.M.T. Judgment i t is saids

"Article 6(b) of tho Charter provides
that 'ill-treatnent,.,of civilian population

of or in occupied territory, ... killing of
hostages,wanton destruction of cities,
towns, or villages' shall be a war crime.

In tho main, those provisions are merely
declaratory of tho existing laws of war
as expressed by tho Hague Convention,

Article 46, which stated: 'Family honor

and rights, the lives of persons^and
private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice must bo res

pected, '

'"The torritorlos occupied by Gen.iany

v^ero administerod in violation of the laws
of v/ar,

Tho evidence is quite overwhelming'

of a systematic rule of violonce, brutality,
and terror,

Gn V Dooombor 1941 Hitler

-
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fV:

issuod tho diroctivo sinco known as

the

^Nacht

und ITobol Erlass ^ (Ilirhu and Fog DocrGo), undor
which persons v;ho coaijitfcod offonsos against-tho Roich
or tho Gornan forces in occiipiod torritorios, oxcopt
whoro tho doath sontonco v/n.s cortain, wore to bo
takon secretly to Germany and handed over to tho
SIPO and SB for trial or punlshnjcnt in Germany,

Thi^ docroo was signed by tho Defendant Koitol.

hftor thesG civilians arrived in Germany, no v/ord
of thorn wns pormitted to roach tho country from
v/hich thoy caivio, or their rolativos? oven in casos
whon they died aavalting trial tho families v/oro not

informed, tho purpose being to croat anxiety in tho
minds of tho family of the arrested person, Hitler *3
purpose in issuing this decree was stated by tho
Defendant Koitol in a covering letter, dated 12 Doconbor
1941, to bo as follows:
^Efficient and enduring

intimidation can

only bo achieved either by capital punisli-

mont or by measures by which tho relatives
of tho crii.iinal and tho population do not
knov/ tho fate of the criminal.
This aim
is achiovod v/hon tho crneinal i s transforrod

to Germany.*

Even persons v/ho wore only suspected of ooposing any
of tho policies.of the Gorman occupation authorities

woro arrostod, and on arrest woro intorrogatod by tho
Gostano and tho SD in tho i.;ost shameful manner.

On IJ

Juno 1942 tho Chief of the SIPO and SD published, through
Mueller, tho Gostapo Chief, an ordor authorizing
tho use of *thlrd dogreo^methods of interrogation, whoro
prollminary investigation had Indicatod that bho

person could give information on Imiportant matters,
such 0.3 subversive activitios, though not for tho
purpose of oxtorting confos ;ions of the prisoner's
own

crimes

This

ordor •orovldods

Third dogroo i-iay, under this supposition',
only
bo omployod against
iM'i.i.J.J
J.1J.O L> Gormnin
u W...
Via. L sts,
O UO ,
1Mo.rxists,
JVJ-O
Johovah 's Y/ltnossos , saboteurs,' torroris ts,
mombors of rosistanco novononts, o-.raohuto
agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet
Russian loafors or tramps; in all othor casos
my permission must first bo obtainod,.,.

Third dogroo can, according to circuristancos,
consist amongst othor methods of very simple

diet (broad and water), hard bunk, dork cell,
doprivation of sloop, exhaustive drilling,

also in flogging (for moro than tvi^onty strokes

a doctor must bo consultod),'

Tho brutal suppression of all opposition to tho Gorman
occupation v/as not confined to sovoro moasuros against

suapoctod mombers of rosistanco movononts thomsolvos,
but v/as also oxtondod to thoir famllios. On 19 July
X944 the Commandor of the SIPO and SD in tho district
of Radon, in Poland, piiblishod an order, transmittod
through tho Higher 3S and Police Leaders, to tho
offoot that in all cases of assassination or attempted
gsination of Gormans, or whoro saboteurs had

-
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dostroyocT vitnl .Installations, not only tho

person, bnt also r-l?. his or hor nalo rolrtivos
should ho shot, and for.io.lo relatives over 15 years
of nco put into a concentration carip.

"Tho practice of hooping hostages to prevent
and to punish any form of civil disorder was

resorted to by tho Germans 5 an order issued by tho
Defendant Keitel on 15 September 1941 spoke in

terms of fifty or a hundred lives from tho occupied
areas of tho Soviet Union for ono German life taken.
Tho order stated that ^it should bo romoDborod that
a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts

for nothing, and a dotorront effect can bo obtained

only by unusual severity-, * Tho exact nuifoor of
persons killed as a result of this policy is not
known, but largo nuiabors wore killed in Itranco and
tho other occupied territories in tho V/ost, while
in tho East tho slaughter was on an oven moro ex
tensive scale.
In addition to tho killing of
hostages, entire tov:ns v/ero destroyed in some cases;
such massacres

as those of Oradour-sur-Glano in

franco and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both o.f which
V7oro doscribod to tho Tribunal in detail, a.ro ex

amples of the organised use of terror by the occupying
forces to boat down and destroy all opposition to
their rule.

"One of the riost notorious means of terrorizing

the people in occupied torritorios v/as tho use of
concentration canrjs.

They v/oro first established In

Germany at the moment of tho seizure of power by tho
Nazi Government,

Their original purpose was to

imprison without trial all those persons who were

opposed to tho Govornioont, or v/ho were in any way
obnoxious to Gorman authority.

V/lth tho aid of a

secret police force, this practice was v/ldoly ex

tended, and in course of time concentration camps
bocamo places of organized and systematic murder,
where millions of people wore destroyed.
"In the administration of tho occupied

torrltories tho concentration camps wore used to

destroy all opposition groups, Tho persons arrested
by the Gestapo wore as a rule sent to concentration

camps, Thoy wore convoyed to the camps in many
casos without any care whatever being taken for
them, and groat numbers died on tho v/ay. Those
who arrived at the cai.ip wore subject to systematic

cruelty,

Thoy wore given hard physical labor, in-

adoquo.to food, clothes and shelter, and woro

subject at all times to tho rigors of a soulloss
rogii:]o, and tho private whins of individual guards.

"A certain nur.ibor of tho concontration camps

v/oro equipped v/ith gas chambers for tho wholesalo
dostruotion of tho Inmatos, and with furnacos for
the burning of tho bodies. Some of thorn woro in

^
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fact used for tlio Gxtcr-iin'-tioii of Jews as part of
the 'final solution' of the Jewish problGr.i, Most
of the non-Jewish ini'.iatos wore used for labor, al

though the conditions under v/hich they worked loado
labor and death almost synonynous terms.

Those

inr.ia.too v/ho became i l l and were unable to work wore

either destroyed In the gas chambers or sent to

special infirmaries, v/hero they were given entirely
inadequate medical treatment, worse food if possible
than the v/orking inmates, and loft to die.
"The murder and ill-troati:iont of civilian popu

lations reached its height in the treatment of the
citizens of• the Soviet Union and Poland,

"Somo four

v/ocks before the invasion of Russia began, special
task forces of tho SIPO and SD, called Sinsatz

Groups, v/ero formed on the orders of Himmler for
tho purpose of following the Goinnan Armies into

Russia, combating partisans, and members of Rosistanco
Groups, and oo: tormina ting the Jews and communist
loaders- and other sections of tho x^op^^l^'-tion.

In

tho beginning, four such Einsatz Groups wore formod,

one operating in tho Baltic States, one towards
Moscow, one tov/ards liiov, and -ono operating in tho
south of Russia.

Ohlondorf, formor Chief'of .luot

III of the RSIAt, who led tho fourth group, stated

in his

aff idavi'b ?

'When tho German army invaded Russia, I
was loader of'Einsatzgruppo D, in tho
southern sector, and in tho course of tho
year during which I was loader of the
Einsatzgruppo D it liquidated approxinatoly 90,000 men, women, and children.
The majority of those liquidated were

Jov«rs, but there wore a]so among thorn
some communist functi:)iiarios, '

In an ordor issued by tho Dofondant Roltol on 23
July 1941, and drafted by oho Dofondant Jodl, it was
stated that 2

'In view of tho vast size of tho occupied

areas in tho East, tho forces availobio

for ost-blishing security in those areas
will bo sufficient only if all rosistanco

is punishod, not by legal prosecution of
tho guilty, but by tho spreading of such
terror by tho Armed Forces as is alono

^^^PP^'^'pniato to oro.dicato every inclination
to resist among the population
Coroandors raust find tho moans of kooping

ordor by applying suitable Draconian

moasuros.'

Tho ovidonco has shown that this order v/as ruthlessly

carried out in tho territory of tho Soviet Union and

In Poland. A significant illustration of the
moasuros actually applied occurs in tlio docvu'.iont
which was sent in 1943 to tho Dofondant Rosenborg

by tho Rolch Gonmissar for Eastern Territories, vdao
wrote:

-
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' I t shoulc". "bo possible to civold atrocities

and to burr 'jhoso who IiavG boon liquidatGd.
To lock r.ion, wonon, and childron into
barns and sot xiro to thoi;] docs not appear'

to bo a suitable nothod of conbating bands,
Gvon i f i t is dosircd to oxtorriinato tho

population. This motliod is not v/orthp of
tho Gornan cause, and hurts our reputation
severely.'

''The foregoing crincs-against tho civilian
population are sufficiently appalling, and yet the
ovidcnco shovirs that at any rate in the East" tho nass
murders and cruoltios wore not coi::mittod solely for
tho purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to

tho German occupying forces.

In Poland and tho Soviet

Union those crimes wore part of a plan to get rid
of whole native populations by expulsion and anni

hilation, in order that tjioir territory could be
used for colonisation by Germans.

Hitler had written

.

in lie in Kaiopf on these linos, and tho plan was clearly

-iT

stated by Himmlor in July 1942, when ho wrotos

'It

is not our task to Gonmanizc tho East in tho old

sense, that is to teach the people there tho Gorman

language and the Goihian lawg but to see to it that
only people of purely Germanic blood live in the
East. '

"In hugust 1942 tho policy for tho Eastern
Torritorios as laid down by Bormann was suie; aarisod by
a

subordinate of Rosenborg as followss
'The Slavs are to 'jvorlc f or* us.

In so

far as wo do not need them, they may die.
Thoroforo, compvilsory vaccination and
Germanic health services arc superfluous,
Tho fertility of tho Slavs is undosirablo,'

It was Himmlor again who stated in October 1945

'hliat happens to a Russian, a Czech, does
not interest mo in tho slightest. Vdiat
tho nations can offer in tho way of good
blood of our typo, wo will take.

If

necessary, by kidnapping their childron
and raising then hero with us.

Whether

nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests mo only in so far as wo
need then as slaves for our Kultur, othorwiso i t is of no interest to no. '

In Poland tho intolligontsia had boon ..larkod* down
for oxterninatlon as early as September 1939, and in

liay 1940 tho Defendant Pranlc wrote in his diary of

'taking advantage of*tho focussing of world intorost

on tho Western Front, by wholesale liquidation of
thousands of Poles, first loading roprosontativos of
the polish intolligontsia,' Earlier, Franlr had. boon

diroctod to roduco the 'ontiro Polish economy to an
absolute mininui.i necessary for baro existence.

Tho

%
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Poles shall bo the slaves of the Greater Gorr.ian

World Enpiro.*

In Janur.r"" 1940 ho recorded In

his diary that 'cheap labor nust be renovod fron
the General Govornnont by hiandrods of thousands.
This will hanpor the native biological propaga.tion.
So successfully did the Gornans carry out this

policy in Poland that by tho end of the war^ono
third of tho population had boon killed, and tho
whole co;mtry devastated.
''It v/as tho sane story in tho occupied area of
the Soviet Union, ht tho tine of the launching of
tho Gorioan attack in June 1941 Rosenborg told his
collaborators :

'The object of feeding tho Gornan Pooplo
stands this year without a doubt at tho top
of the list of C-ornany's clains on tho

East, "and there tho southern territories
and tho northern Crnicasus will have to
servo as a balance for tho feeding of

the Gornan People .,.— very oxtonsivo

^

W

evacuation v/ill bo nocossary, without

any doubt, and it is sure that tho future
will hold very hard years in store for
tho Russians,'" (Trial of tho Major War

f

Crlninals, Ibid, pp.232-238),

Those findings of tho IMT are sustained by the record
in this case, and other offonsos are shown as woll.
'

Tho connection of tho dofondants with thoso offonsos

is disposed of in our discussion of tho individual casos.

-
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GERMA1\^ l-IILITARY SYSTEii

Soon after Hitler came to power, an Air Ministry was
established with Soering as the Minister.

In 1935, the'Ger

man Government openly denounced the Military, Kaval, and Air
j

Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

At the same time, it

TfJas announced that Germany was building a military air force.

The Reichsx-^ehr Ministry was re-named the "War Ministry",
and the Minister, von Blomberg, assumed the title "Commander-

in~Chief of the Armed Forces".

Subordinate to von Blomberg

were the Commander-in-Ghief of the Army (von Fritsch) and

of the Navy (Haeder).

In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief

of the German Air Force, Goering was also subordinate to

von Blomberg, but in his capacity as Minister for Air, he

Was of co-equal cabinet ranh, and, needless to say, Goering
i

was a very much more powerful figure in "the Third Reich.
In February 1938, a crisis in the relations between

Hitler and the Army led to a drastic re-organisation of the

High Corap.and.

In place of the Ministry of War, over-all

control and co-ordination of the three services was achieved

through the newly created Armed Forces High Command (Oberhommando der

Wehrmacht, known as "OKW").

Hitler himself

assumed the title "Commander-ln-Chief of the Armed Forces",
and the OKW

was, in essence, Hitler's working staff for

Armed Forces matters.

Kcitel was given the title "Chief"

of the OKW and the rank of Minister.

Von Brauchltsch re

placed von Fritsch as Commander-In-Chief of the Army,
A.

The OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)Supreme Commend of the Armed Forces

The OKVJ controlled all matters of inter-service policy,
It xiras responsible for preparations for national defense in

of peace, and for the over-all conduct of operations

^

51 -

during war.- Directly under Hitler, Keltel served as Hitler's
highest executive officer in the administration of the Armed
Forces and in the application of Hitler's policies and plans.
There has been considerable testimony in the case relative

to the powers of the OKW and to the effect that Hitler fre

quently operated directly through the commanders-in-chief
of the OICH, the OKL, and the OKM and obviously after he as
sumed command of the OKH, he in many instances operated

directly as Commander-in-Chief of the OKH,

It is neverthe

less apparent that Hitler, through exercise of his
functions us the Supreme Commander of the OKVii, could and

In many instances did, exercise through the OK\i/ the
over-all command of the throe branches of the armed,
services.

The most Important section of the OKW, directly concerned
xvlth operations in the field, etc., was called the Armed

Forces Cperrtions Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab or WFST).
This i^as headed during the vjar by Ceneral Alfred Jodl.

Jodl's

immediate subordinate was the defendant, "Wnrllmont, as chief

of Department National Defense (Landesverteidigung (L) ) In
the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

In addition, In January

1942, Warlimont was appointed Jodl's deputy with the title of
Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff,
Besides the 'JFST, there were numerous additional

branches aiid sections within the OKW, all headed by senior

officers, experts in their own fields, vh.o were directly re

sponsible to Keitel.

However, these branches were mostly

with the rear echelon (as distinguished from the WFST,
which usually was with the Fuehrer-Headquarters in the

"field"), and dealt with numerous administrative matters of

joint interest to the three branches of the Armed Forces,
The G-eneral Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines
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Wehrrriaclitamt - AVJA) was one of the principal administrative
agencies within the OKW.

The chief of this office was the

defendant Heineche who held this position continuously from

December 1939 until May 1945.
of this office

The primary responsibilities

were administrative end executive rather than

operational.

One of the most important sections of AWA was the Office

of the Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs (Chef des Kriegs-

gefangenenwesens - Chef Kriegs-Cef) which was in administra
tive charge of all matters relating both to G-erraan and Allied

prisoners of war.

The Office of the Chief of Prisoner of War

Affairs remained a part of the General Armed Forces Office

(A;3A) until October 1944, at which time many functions of this
office were tr.ansferred to SS supervision.

Another section of

AWA was the National Socialist Guidance Staff of the OKW

(Nstionalsozialistischer Fuehrungsstab des OKW - NSF/OKW),
established in December 1945.

This "gency was to insure uni

form political indoctrination in the Armed Forces in co

operation with the Nazi Party Chancellory.

This office was

placed under the direct control of the defendant Reinecke.
Another important branch of the OKVJ was the Armed Forces

Legal Department (Wehrmachtrechtsabteilung - WR).
until 1945 it was headed by the defendant Lehmann.

From 1938
The Legal

Department was charged with certain legal matters in the pre

paration of legal opinions of interest to all three branches
of the Armed Forces, but the legal staffs of the three forces
were not subordin-'te to him.
B.

The OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe) Buoreme Command of the Air Force

The Air Force was the youngest of the ttnree branches

comprising the German Armed Forces.

-
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The creation of the German

Air Force occurred offlclf^lly in Morch 1935, end &oering wes

appointed r.s its Comrr.ender-in-Chief with the rank of Air Force
3-ener-^l.

Shortly after the announcement of the creation of

an indeoendent Air Force, all anti-r.ircraft artillery and at
tached signal units were taken over from the Array by the Air
Force.

G-oering served in the dual c-:rpacity of Minister of

Aviation (Reichsminister der Luftfahrt) and Commender-in-

Chief of the German Air Force (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftv/affe)
and continued to head the Air Force until shortly before the
end of the war.

C,

The OKM (Oberkomrnando der Kriegsmarine) Supreme Command of the Navy

The navy was the smallest of the services, and its per

sonnel and units were numerically the smallest within the

German Armed Forces.

From 1928 until 1943 the OKM wps headed

by Fleet Admiral Erich Rneder.

From 1943 to the end of the

war in May 1945, Fleet Admiral Doenitz, succeeding Raeder,

T^os Commander-in-Chlef of the German Navy, having previously
been in charge of its most importsnt weapon, the submerlne,'
I'fithin OKM, performing functions somewhat analogous to

^ the General Staff of OK?I, was the Naval VJpr Staff (Seekrlegsleltung (SKL) ) directly subordinate to the Commander-ln-

1

Ohief of the Navy.

It concerned Itself mostly with operational

f-nd intelligence questions.

Between the years 1938 and 1941

the defendant Schniewlnd was the Chief of Staff of the SKL,
directly responsible to Raeder.

Under the OKM, the Naval Group Commands (Marinegruppen

Befehlshaber) controlled all naval operations In a given sector,
with the exception of the operations of the High Sea Fleet and
the submarines, v^hlch by their very nature were too mobile to

he restricted to a given area command. Between 1941 and 1944
the defendant Schniewlnd, was Goraraander of the High Sea Fleet.
-
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E.

The OKH (Oberkomraando des Heeres) Supreme Command of the Army

The Army v/as by far the l^^rgest and most importa.nt of the
three branches of the Wehrmacht,

From 1938 until December 1941.

Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch was Commander-in-Chief of

the Crerman Army with General Franz Haider as his Chief of Staff.
In December 1941 Hitler relieved von Brauchitsch of his as- signmont and himself took over command of the German Army,

Hitler retained his position as Commander-in-Chief of the

German Army until his presumed death at the end of the war;
and the result of unification of command, whereby Hitler v/r.s
Supreme Commender-ln-Cliief of the German Armed Forces and

Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, was a partial merger
and overlapping of the functions of the OKW and OKH.

In

Septeraber 1943 Haider w:.'s relieved as Chief of Staff by General
Kurt Zeitzler,

Colonel-General Heinz Guderlan replaced

Zeitsler in July 1944 and himself gave way to General Hans
Krebs in February 1945.

After Hitler himself took command of the German Army,

the highest Field and Occupational Headquarters of the German

Army v;ere directly under Hitler, either in his capacity as
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, or in his capacity as
Commandor-in-Ghief of the Army.

Because of the paxtial

merger axising from Hitler's dual capacity and command func
tions, it became difficult at times to delineate clearly between
the responsibilities of the OKW and those of the OKH.

E,

Army Field Headquarters

Army Groups and Armies. The largest field formation in
the German Army was known as an Army Group, which was a Head

quarters controlling two or more Armies. An Army Group was cus

tomarily Goramanded by a Feldmaxschall(flve star general), or mopt

-
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rarely "by a G-eneraloberst (four star general).

An Army might

be commanded by a Feldmarschall, a G-eneraloberst, or a

G-eneral (three star general).
At the beginning of the war, sn Army Group Headquarters
was usually formed for a particular campaign or occupational

theater.

During actual operations, the principal purpose of

an Army Group x-^as to exercise operational command over the
Armies subordinated to it.

It had at first a relatively small

staff devoted purely to operational matters.

As the war pro

gressed, administrative functions were added and its staff in
creased.
>

framework.

An Army Headquarters was a more permanent command
In addition to its operational and tactical con

trol of subordinate units, the Army was the top field head-

quarters for matters of administration, supply,and

other

functions.

Corns and Lower Headquarters.

An Army controlled one or

more (usually between two and seven) Corps.

The Corps x^as a

permanent headquarters which controlled as a rule from two
to seven divisions.

The division xvas the basic "self-contained",

unit of tne German Array and its structure varied according to
its type.
-A

Headquarters Staff Organization.

The size and structure

of an Army Keadaunrters, varied to a considerable extent.

All

headquarters were, however, organized according to a uniform
system and consisted basically of a commanding officer assist

ed hy a stoff.

The staffs of corps nnd higher headquarters

were headed by a chief of staff.

At all German headquarters, .

the staff officer in charge of operations vjas known as "la",
the chief supply officer as "lb", and the chief intelligence
officer as "Ic".

SS Field Formations (Waffen SS),

"When the war broke out

in 1959, Hirnmler commenced the formation into Divisions of units

^
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of tlie SS, armed and trained for employment with the army.

Only

two or three such divisions were formed prior to the Russian

campaign, but by the end of the war there were many SS divisions.
For certain administrative purposes, the Waffen SS units

remained part of the SS and under the control and command of
Himmler as Heichsfuehrer SS*

However,

for operational pur

poses in combat and In occupied areas, the SS divisions were
under the command of the array, and their employment differed
little from that of the regular divisions of the army.

F.

Occupational Headquarters and Units,
Armed Forces Commander.

In a territory occupied by German forces,

the Germans

sometimes found it desirable to appoint a senior over-all

commander to whom the heads of the army, navy, and air force
In the territory were all tactically responsible.

Such com

manders had strategic as well as administrative responsi
bility, and. were directly responsible to OKW.

Mllitag-^y Commander.

In German-occupied territory,

the

administr:?tion of the area in conformity with rules and

policies laid down by the German authorities was entrusted
to an Army officer, usually a General, who was designated

as Military Commander (Milltaerbefehlshaber).

The Military

Corar.anders had the 'primary mission of insuring security and
order within the region or country that they were responsible

for, including the protection of roads, railroads, supply
lines,

and communications.

Rear Area Commanders.

During wartime the operational

prea of the army (Heeres) was divided into various segments.

The operational area of an army (Armee) consisted of the corabrt zone and an army rear area.

The operational area of an

array .^'roup consisted of the operational areas of the armies
under it and an army group rear area.

-
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army group rear area coincided with the boundaries of the army
rear areas and extended to the territory under civil administra

tion of the Heich, such as the Commissariat Ostland in the east.

The army group and army rear areas wer§ commanded by
general officers who were directly responsible to the commander-

in-chief of the army group, or army, respectively.

The missions

With wnich these commanders were charged can be summarized as
follovjs:

1.

Administration of the occupied area;

S.

The maintenance of peace and order in these areas;
and

3.

Responsibility for the security of the railroads
and main supply routes leading to the front line,

as x^ell as for all supply agencies engaged on be

1

half of the front line troops.

In order to accomplish these missions, these commanders often
had one or several of the following units at their disposal:

1.

Security divisions (Sicherungsdivisionen);

2.

Units of the German police;

3.

Indigenous police and constabulary forces recruited
from the native population;

4.

Special security battalions (Landes-Schuetzenbataillone).

For the administration of the civilian population, the fol
lowing subordinate headqu^^rters were usually organized in an
army or

rri'iy group rear

area:

1.

District wain Headquarters (OberfeJ.dhommandanturen);

2.

Sub-district Headquarters (Feldkoramandanturen); and

3.

Sub-district Detec.iments (Ortskommandanturen),

In addition to these, numerous special staffs were at the dis

posal of the commanders of the rear areas, which were charged
with such tasks as supervision over agricultural output,
forestry service, mining, and industrial utilization.

The commanders of army rear areas were generally called
"Koruecks" (Koramandier

doe rueokwaertigen Armee-

-
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gebletes).

The commanders of army group rear areas were known

OS "Befehlshrber des rueckwaertigen Heeresgebletes", and they
often carried after their titles the numerical designation
identifying the army group rear area for administrative pur
poses.

Thus, the defendant von Roques was known a.s the Com

mander of Army Croup Rear* Areo. 103 (South).

Higher SS and Police Leaders.

During the course of the

Nazi regime, Heinrich Himmler succeeded in bringing about an
almost complete merger of the regular Cerman police forces
with the police and intelligence components of the SS.

This

merger was reflected in Himmler 's own title - Leader of the

SS and Chief of the German Police (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chef

der Deutschen Pollzei).

Thereafter, Himmler designated vari

ous of his subordinates to head

the

SS and police activities

in specified areas of Germany and in German occupied territory.
An individual thus designated was called a "Higher SS and

Police Leader" (Hoeherer SS and Pollzei Fuehrer, usually -r^bbrevicated HSSPF).

In the occupied territories, the HSSPFs

continue:! to be personally responsible to Himmler ani tasi ccmtant

instructions from him, but they were, for operational pur
poses, responsible to the senior military commander strtionod
in that territory.

The principal functions of the HSSPFs were

to control the local police authorities, handle special police
and intelligence matters, *^nd c.-^rry out other special missions
of a security nature for Himmler and for the railitr-ry authori

ties.

A HSSPF usuniiy hold the rank of Gruppenfuehrer or

Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS, these ranks being respectively
the equivalent of a two st-^r and a three star general in the
United States Army.

-
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SUPERIOR ORDERS

Control Council Law No, 10, Art. II, Sees. 4 (a) and
4 (b), provides :

"4.(a) The official position of
any person, whether as Plead of State
or as a responsible official in a Govern

ment Department, does not free him from
responsibility for a crime or entitle .
him to mitigation of punishment.

(b) The fact that any person acted
pursuant to the order of his Government or
of, a superior does not free him from re

sponsibility for a crime, but may be con

sidered in mitigation."
These two paragraphs are clear and definite.

They relate

to the crimes defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Art.

II, Sees. 1 (a), 1 (b),

and 1 (c).

All of the defendants

in this case held official positions in the armed forces

of the '-^hird Reich.

Hitler from 1938 .on was Commander in

Chief of the Armed Eorces and was the Supreme Civil and

Military authority in the Third Reich, whose personal
decrees had the force and effect of law.

Under such cir

cumstances to recognize as a defense to the crimes set
forth in Control Council Law No. 10 that a defendant

acted pursuant to the order of his government or of a

superior would be in practical effect to say that all the
guilt charged in the Indictment was the guilt of Hitler
alone because he alone possessed the law-making power of

the state and the supreme authority to issue civil and

military directives.

To recognize such a contention

would be to recognize an absurdity.
It is not necessary to support the provision of

Control Council Law No. 10, Art. II, Sees. 4 (a) and (b),
by reason, for we are bound by it as one of the basic
authorities under which we function as a Judicial Tribunal.
Reason is not lacking.

»
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Inasmuch as one of the reiterated arguments ad
vanced is the injustice of even charging these defendants
with being guilty of the crimes set forth in the Indict

ment, when they v/ere, it is said, merely soldiers and
acted under governmental directives and superior orders

which they were bound to obey, we shall briefly note
what we consider sound reasons for the rejection of such
a

defense.

The rejection of the defense of superior orders
without its btiing incorporated in Control Council Law No,

10 that such defense shall not exculpate would follow of
necessity from our holding that the acts set forth in

Control Council Law No. 10 are criminal not because they
are therein set forth as crimes but because they then
were crimes under International Common Law.

International

Common Law must be superior to and, vi;here it conflicts
with, take precedence over National Law or directives

issued by any national governmental authority.

A directive

to violate International Criminal Common Law is therefore
void and can afford no protection to one v/ho violates
such law in reliance

on such a

directive.

The purpose and effect of all law, national or
international, is to restrict or channelize the action

of the citizen or subject.

International law has for

its purpose and effect the restricting and channelizing
of the action of nations.

Since nations arc corporate

entitles, a composite of a multitude of human beings,

and since a nation can plan and act only tiirough its
agents and representatives, there can be no effective
restriction or channelizing of national action except
through control of the agents and representatives of

the nation, who form Its policies and carry them out in
action.

— 61

'

I/--

% '.V

:h

The State being but an inanimate corporate entity

«v

or concept, it cannot as such make plans, determine
policies, exercise judgment, experience fear or be re

strained or deterred from action except through its ani
mate agents and representatives.

It

would be an utter

disregard of reality and but legal shadow-boxing to say

that only the ^tate, the inanimate entity, can have guilt,
and that no guilt can be attributed to its animate agents
who devise and execute its policies,

x^or can it be per

mitted even in a dictatorship that the dictator, absolute

though he may be, shall be the scapegoat, on v;hom the sins
of all his governmental and military subordinates are

wished; and that, when he Is di'iven into a bunker and

presumably destroyed, all the sins and guilt of his sub
ordinates shall be considered to have been destroyed v;itli
him.

The defendants in this case who received obviously

criminal orders were placed in a difficult position but

servile compliance with orders clearly criminal for fear
of some disadvantage or punishment not immediately

threatened cannot be recognized as a defense.

To es

tablish the defense of coercion or necessity in the face
of danger thel?e must be a showing of circumstances such
that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in
such imminent physical peril as to deprive him of free

dom to choose the right and refrain from thu wrong.

No

such situation has been shown in this case.

furthermore, it is not a new concept that superior

orders are no defense for criminal action.

Article 47

of the German Military Penal Code, adopted in 1872, was
as follows:
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"If through tho execution of an order
pertaining to the service, a penal
law is violated, then the superior giv
ing the order is alone responsible.
Howevur, the obeying subordinate shall

• bo punished as accomplice (Theilnehraer):

"l) if ho went beyond the order given to him, or
"2) if he knew that the order of the superior
concerned an act which aimed at a

civil

or military crime or offense."
The amendment of this in 1940 omitted the last two words

"to him" in Section 1 above and in Section 2 changed the

words "civil or military crime or offense" to "general
or military crime or offense."

If this amendment had

any effect, it extended rather than restricted the scope

of the preceding act.
It is interesting to note that an article by Goebbcls,

the Reich Propaganda Minister, which appeared in the

"Voelkischer Beobachter", the official Bazi publication,
on 28 May 1944, contained the following correct statement
of the

law:

"It is not provided in any military law
that a soldier in the case of a despica
ble crime is exempt from punishment be
cause ho passes the r,:,sponsibility to
his superior, especially if the orders
of the lattor are in evident contradic

tion to all human morality and every
international usage of warfare."
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A qUGstion of ^^onorr^.l intorost to the v?.rious

dofonCants in this c^.so involves tho criminal rosponsihility
for drafting, transnitting, and Liplononting illogal
orders of their superiors',
I

For tho first tino in history individuals arc oallod
upon to answer criminally for certain violations- of

international law.

Individual criminal responsibility has

boon Imown, accepted, and applied horotoforo as to

cortain offenses against international law, but tho

lJurnborg trials have oxtondod that individual responsibility
beyond those specific and sonowhat limited fields.
This Tribunal is therefore ch'^rgod not only to

dotornino v;hother certain acts infringe international law,
but also whether criminal responsibility attaches to a.n
individual for such infringonont, and wo must look not
only to the international law itself but to fundamental

principles of criminal law as generally accepted by tho
civilized nations

quostion.

of the world for

detoralnation of

that

Such has boon tho principlo applied by tho

Tribunals v/hich havo procedod us and wo conform to that

standard..

•ponsiblo,

For a defendant to bo hold criminally ros-

there must bo a broach of some moral obligation

fixed by international lav/, a personal act voluntarily
done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under

intornational law.

Control Council Law No. 10, Section 4, Sub-soctlon

b, provides that:
"Tho fact that any person actod pursuant
to tho order of his Govornnont or of a

superior does not froe'hir.] from res

ponsibility of a crime, but may bo
oonsidorod in mitigation."

-
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It is urgod that a co:'X""'andor boconos rosponsiblG
for the tro.nsnittr.1 in any nc.nnor whatsoovor of a crininal
order.

Such a.concrasion this Tribunal considers too

j.ar reaching.

The transr.iittal through the chain of

co.r.iand constitutes an ir.iploi:iontation of an order.

Such

orders carry tho authortativo v/oight of .the superior
\/ho issues thoij and of tho subordinato counandors who
pass thoi-j on for conplianco,

Tho

leoro intornodiato

acboinistrativo function of transmitting an order diroctod

by a suporior mithority to subordinato units, hov/ovor, is
not oonsidorod to anount to such ii'iplomontation by tho
comnand.or through whoso headquarters su';h orders pass.

Such transj'iittal is a routine function which in many
instancos would bo handled by tho staff of tho coni.iandor

without being called to his attention.

Tho coi'.r.oandGr is

not in a position to screen orders so transnittod.

His

hoadquartors, as an 1 iplor.ionting agency, has boon by
passed by tho suporior coimand.

Purthormoro, a distinction uust bo drawn as to tho
naturo of a criminal ordor Itsolf.

upon which any army oporatos.
of an

Orders are tho basis

It is basic to tho discipllno

arny that ordors aro issued to bo carried out. ' Its

discipline is built upon this princlplo.

Without it, no

arny can bo offoctivo and it is certainly not incuiebont
upon a soldier In a subordinato position to scroon tho

ordors of suporlors for quostionablo points of legality.

Within certain llrdtations, ho has tho right to.assui'.io
that tho orders of his suporlors and tho sta.to which ho

servos and which aro issued to hln aro in oonfornity with
Intornational law,

Ilany of tho defendants hero wore field compandors and

woro charged with hoavy rosponslbllitios in actlvo conbat.
-
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Ttioir logal fo.cilltios v/orc liuitocl,
not lavryors.

Thoy v/oro soldiors -

Military coLaiandors in tho fiold with far

reaching military rosponsibiliti-os cannot ho charged "und-or
intornational lav/ with cri-jinal participation in issuing

ordors v/hicn aro not obviously crirjinal or which thoy aro
not shown to have loiown to bo crininal undor intornational

law«

Such e com.iandor cannot bo oxpoct^d to draw fino

distinctions and conclusions as to logality in connection
V7ith ordors issued by his superiors.

Ho has tho rijaht to

prosiuno, in tho absonco of specific knowlodgo to tho

contrary, th"t tho legality of such ordors has boon oroporly
dotorninod before thoir issuance.

Ho cannot bo hold

crininally rosponsiblo for a aioro error in judguont as to
disputable logal quostions.

It is thoroforo considorod that to find a fiold. connandor crininally rosponsiblo for tho transaiittal of such

an order, ho "oust havo pp.ssod tho order to tho chain of

coixiand

tho ordor oust bo ono thot is crininal upon

its lacoj or ono v/hich ho is shov/n to havo known was
crininal,

\i/hilo, as stated, a connr.ndlng officer can bo crininally
>

rosponsiblo for inploi.ionting an illogal ordor of his suporiors,
tho question arises as to whothor or not hoboconos
rosponsiblo for actxons conLiittod within his con'-.?and

pursuant to crl.iinal ordors passed dov/n indopondont of hln.
Tho choices v/hich ho has for opposition in this caso 'arc

fow; (1) ho' can isruo an ordor countorr.iandlng tho order;
(2) ho can resign; (3) ho oa.n sabotage tho onforcoiaont of
tho ordor within a sonowhat liuited sphero.

ds to countornanding tho ordor of his suporiors, ho
has no legal status or powor,

L eountorrjandlng ordor would

not only subject hin to tho sovorost punishiaont, but would
66
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"bo uttorly futilo nnd .in

it v/ould undoubtodly

have focusod tho oyos jf Hitler on its rigorous onforconont.
His socond choico —resignation —was not nuch.

"bettora

Resignation in v/a.r tino is not a privilogo

gonorally accorded to officors in an arioy.

in tho xj.rr.iy of tho United States.

This is true

DisagrGouont with a state

policy as oxprossod by an ordor affords slight groxmds for
resignation.

In Gcr:::any, undor Hitlor, to - assort such a

ground, for resignation probably v/ould havo entailed tho
nost serious consoquoncos for an officors
iuaothor field of opposition v/as to saboto.go the order.

This he could do only verbally by personal contacts.

Such

verbal repudiation could never be of suf.iTlciont scope to
annul i t s

onforc er.jo nt.

h fourth decision ho could nal<e Vi'as to do nothing.

Control Council Law Ho. 10, :.rticlo 2, paragraph 2,
provides in portinont part as f ollov/s ;

"Any person v/ithout regard to nationality
or tho cap'-.city in which ho actod, is dooriod
to have covrnittod a crino as defined in

paragraph 1 of this article, if ho...

(b) was an accessory to tho connission of

a.ny such crino or ordered or abetted tho

sane or (c) took a consenting p'^.rt therein
or (d) was conhQc"'tordr with? plans or ontorprisos
involving its conbission
" (onphasis
supplied),

As horotoforo stated, his "connoctijn" is construed
as requiring a personal broach of a i.ioral obligation.

Viewed'fron an international standpoint, such has boon

tho intorprotation of proooding Tribunals.
nay however be negative.

This comioction

Under basic principlos of co:::.:r.nd

authority and rosponsibility, an officer who noroly stands
by whilo'his subordinates oxocuto a crininal order of his
superiors which ho knows is crininal, violates a noral

obligation undor international law.

-
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By doing nothing ho

f

cannot wash his hands of intorn-tional rosponsibility.
His onlr dofenso llos in the fact that ,the ordon was fron
a snpcrior which Control Council Law Ho. 10 doclaros constitutos only a uitiar.ting circunstanco.

•

In any ovont in dotorninlng tho criminal rosyonsibility
of the dofondants in this case, it boconos nocossary to
dotormino not only tho criminality of an order in itsolf
bub ^.Iso ..s to whothor or-not such an order v/as crinina.1 .
on Its face.. Certain orders of tho lYohmacht and tho

Gornan hrr,ry wore obviously criminal. No legal opinion was
nocossary- to dotornino tho illerality of such orders. By
ajiy standard of civilised nations thoy wore contrary to
tho customs ^of war and accepted standards of hui.ianity,
duiy co:-.nandine officer of normal intollisonco rmst see

and understand their criminal nature, hny participation
in implononting such orders, tacit or othorwiso! an-

silent acquiescence in their onforconont by his subordinates;
constitutos a criminal act on his

There has also been much evidence and discussion in
this case concornine tho duties and responsibilities of
staff officers in connection with tho preparation and

transmittal of illegal orders. In regard to tho respon
sibility of the chief of staff of a field oonmand, tho
. t

finding of Tribunal Vin Case No. 7 as to certain defendants
has boon brought to tho attention of tho Tribunal. It is
pointed out that tho decision as to chiefs of staff in '
that case was a factual detornlnatlon and constitutes a
legal dotornination only insofar as it oortains t-, tho
particular facts therein involved. V/o adopt as sound law

tho finding therein made, but wo do not give that finding
tho Ecopo that is urged by dofonso counsel in this case

-
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to tlio ol*! oct tlio-t all cri:::;inQl acts wltliin a conir.iand a.ro

tho solo rosponsibility of tho connanding gonoral and that

his Ciiiof of staff is absolved fron all criminal rosponsibility
;ioroly b^ reason of tho fact that his oonnianding gonora.1
i-ia^ bo charged with rosponsibility thoroforo

It is further

pointod. out that tho facts in that case aro not applicable
to any dofondant on trial in this case.
The tostinony of various dofondants in this case as

to tho functions of staff officers and chiefs of staff

has not boon entirely consistent»

Corrianding generals on

trial havo pointoci out that there woro corto-in functions
v/hich they nocossarily loft to tho chiefs of staff and.

that at tines they did net toow of orders which adght
bo issued landor authority of tholr connand.

Staff officers

on trial have urged that a coiesanding officer v/as solely
responsible for what v/as done in his nano.

Both con

tentions aro subject to soliq scrutiny. ,
In regard to tho functions of staff efficors in

gonoral as derived fron various docurjonts and tho tostinony
of witnesses, it is established that the duties and

'

functions of such officers in tho Gornan /jany did not
differ v/idoly fron tho duties and functi:;ns in other arnios
of tho v/orld.

Ideas and gonoral diroctivos nust bo trans

lated into properly proparod ord.ors if they aro to bocono

offoctivo in a nilitary organisation.
is the function of sta.ff officers.

To prepare orders

Staff officers are

an indisponaablo link in tho chain of thoir final oxocution.

If tho basic idea Is crininal imder international law,
tho staff offlcor who puts that idea into tho forn of a
nilitary order, either hi- self or through subordlnatos
under hiio, or takes personal action to see that it is

properly distributed to those units where it boconos
-
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oiToctivG, connits a crininal act undor intornational
lav/,

Staff officers, oxcopt in liriitocl fields, are not
endowed with connand authority.

Subordinate staff officers

normally function through the chiefs of staff,

fhe

chief of staff in any coiTjand is the closest officer,
officially at loast, to the connanding officer. It is
his function to see that the wishes of his cor.iuanc?ing
officer arc carried out. It is his duty to keep his
corr.ianding officer, inforned of the activities which take

place v/ithin the field of his connand.

It is his function

to sec that tho cooeanding officer is roliovod of certain

dotails and routine i.iattors, that a policy having boon
announced, the nothods and procedures for carrying out
such policy are properly executed. His sphere and personal
actrvitios vary according to tho nature and interests of

his conrianding officer and increase in scope dopondGnt
upon tho position and responslbilltios of such coix.iandor.

Since a chief of staff does not havo connand authority
in the chain of co;jnanci, an order over his ov/n signo.ture
docs not have authority for subordinatoa in the chain

of connand. ..s shown by tho record In this case, however,
ho signs orders for and by order of his cor.manding officer.
In practice, a connandlng officer nay or nay not have

soon those orders.

Kowovor, they are prosuioed to oxpross

the wishes of tho connandlng officer. V/hilo tho conr.-.anding
officer nay not and frequently does not see those orders,
in tho nornal process of connand ho is inforned of then
and thoy are prosmod to represent his will unless

ropudiatod by hln.

failure to properly oxerciso

cotnioand authority is not tho rosponsiblllty of a chief
of staff.

-
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In tho absonco of particip,'^tion in crininal orders

or thoir oxocution within a co:;ii-iand, a chiof of staff
doos not bocono crininally rosponsiblo for orinino,! acts
occnrrin£5 thoroin.

Ho ho-s no cor.]i.iand authority over

subordinate units#

^#11 ho can do in such cases is

call those nattors to tho attontion of his corr-.imdingGonoral,

Coniiand authority and rosponsibllity for its

oxorcisG rest definitely upon his conioandor#

Undor normal military procoduro a dommanding officor
signs cor.imunications to higher corr:andors.

Ho also in

certain casos signs ord.ors to subordinatos which are

considered to osto.blish basic policy or whoso importance
ho wishes to omphasizoi but tho majority of orders

issuod in a command, as shown by the record, are issued
"for'' or "by order" and signed only by the chiof of staff,
zVll such orders are binding on subordinates.

How far

a chiof of staff can go in issuing orders without

previous authorization or v/ithout calling thorn to the
attontion of his conmandor doponds upon many factors,

including his own qualifications, his rank, tho nature
of tho headquarters, his personal rolatienship with
his commander, and primarily upon tho personality of tho
ooimiandor.

position.

h

chief of staff doos not hold a

In tho Gonoan

clerical

chiefs of staff wore not

used below an army corps.

Tho ranlc and caro with which

staff officers wore solootod show in itself tho wide

scope of their responsibilities which cm.ld, and. In many-

instances und.oubtodly did, result in tho chiof of staff

assuming many command and. oxocutivo rosponsibilitios
which ho exorcised in tho name of his com.-iandor.
One of his main duties was to

roliovo his commander of certain rosponsibilitios so that

-
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such co-ix.ip-ndor could confino hiusolf to thoso ;..]o.ttors
considorod by bin of najor iioportanco^

It

of coursG

the d\ity of u chiof of staff to koop such cor,r:andor infornod of tho activitios which took place v/ithiii the field
"of his connrnd insofar at loast as thoy wore considorod of

sufficient inportanco by such ooniiandor,.

Another v;oll

acGOptod fvinction of chiefs of staff and of all staff
officers is, within the field of their activities, to
proparo orders and directives which they consider nooo30o.ry

and appropriate in that field and which are subnitted to
their superiors for approval.

As stated heretofore, tho responsibility allov/ed achiof of staff to issue orders and directives in tho noaio
of his coainandor varied v/idoly and his indopencLont powers

for exorcising initiative therefor also varied v/idol^ in

practice. ' Tho field for personal initiative as to other
staff officers also varied v/idoly.

That, such a field eld

exist however is apparent fron the tostimny of tho various

defendants v/ho hold staff po3itl^n3 and in their testimony

have 'pointed out various oases in v/hich thoy laodifiod

tho specific desires of their superiors In tho In'corosts

of legality and hurianity.

If thoy wore able to do tliis,

tho sane power could bo exorcised for othor ends and

purposes o.nd thoy wore not rioro tro.nscribors of orders.
Surely tho staff officers of tho OK?// did not hold

their high ranlcs and positions and did not bask In tho

hrlght sunlight of official favor of tho Third ^?nd
Thousand Year Reich by noroly inpoding o.nd annuling tho
\\'.

W'i' •'

v/ishos

ITazi nastors whon thoy served.

'.»•

n
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It ovor-taxea tho credulity of this Tribunal to

bolioyo that Hitler or hoitel or Jodl, or all throe of
thoso dead oon, In addition to their riany activities as to
-
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v».1

both nilitary r.iattors and natters of state, v/cro rosponsiblo
for the details of so nany orders, words spchon in conforoncos,

and oven spoochos which v/oro r.:ado.

V/o c.ro aware that nany

of the ovil and inhunauo acts of the last v/ar nay have

originated in the ninds of these non»

But at is oq^ua-lly

true that the ovil they originated and sponsored did not

spread to the far flung.troops of tho Wehrnacht of itself.
Staff officers were indlsponsablo to that ond a.nd cannot

oscapo crininal rosponsibility for their essential con
tribution to the final oxocution of such orders on tho

ploa that thoy v/oro conplying with tho orders of a superior
who was noro crininal.

-
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COmfilSS.^'R ORDER

This "was one of the most obviously malevolent, vicious
and criminal orders ever issued by any army of any timeIt called .for the murder of ^'tussian political function

aries and, like so much of the evils of the Third Reich,
originated in Hitler *s fertile brain,

-^s v/ill bo shown,

it was issued prior to the opening of the campaign against
hussia.

On 30 March 1941 Hitler held a conference at Berlin

with leaders of the VKohrmacht.

Von Loeb was present i

-^t

that time, according to the summary contained .in i-rcneral
Haider*s- Diary, Hitler said?
"Clash of two Idecloglos.

Crushing

denunciation of Belshevism, identified
with asocial criminality. Coiranunism
is an enormous danger for our future. ii«o

must forget the concept of comradoship be
tween soldiers.

A Communist Is no comrade

before nor after the battle.
This is a
war of extermination.
If we fail to grasp

this, and though we'arc sure to beat the
enemy, vie shall again have to fight the
Communist foe 30 years from nov^* We do
not wage war to preserve the enemy.
If

"Vtfar against Russia; Extermination of the
Bolshevist Gormnlssars and of the CoouTiunist

intelligentsia. The new states must bo
Bocialist, but without intellectual classes
of their own.

Growth of a new intellectual

class must be prevented.

A primitive Social'

ist intelligentsia is all that is needed.
We must fight against the poison of disin
tegration. This is no job for military
courts. The Individual troop commander must
know the issues at stake. They must be

leaders in the fight.

The troops must

fight back with the methods with v/hloh
they are attacked. Commissars and GPU
men are criminals and must be dealt with
as such.

This need not moan that tho

troops get out of hand. Rather the com
mander must givQ orders which express the
common feelings of his troops.
'This war will be very difforont from tho war
in the Vi/est,
in the East, harshness today

means leniency in the future. Commanders
must make the sacrifice of overcoming their

personal scruples."
.

...
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This seemed to have caused quite a bit of excite

ment among those present, who, of course, recognized it
as being brutal, murderous and unclvilizedi

After Eit-

Isr had made his speech and had departed to his inner

sanctum, protests were uttered by the commanders to the
effect the extermination planned by Hitler would yiolate

their soldierly principles, and, further, would destroy

discipline.

Brauohitsch agreed with them and promised

to express their opinion to the OKyV and Hitler respectively.
He tried through Aeitel to obtain a change in the plans
but was unable to do so.

Subsequently, he lent his ap

proval to the objections made by the field coirimanders,
'who, in some instances at least, expressed a negative

opinion of the order to their subordinates and tried to
avoid its execution as far as they could do so without

peril to themselves.

One of the means to ameliorate the

brutality of the Goramissar Order v/as the issuance by von

Brauchitach of what Is known as th^ "Maintenance of Dis

cipline" order hereafter referred to.
On 6 "^une 1941 the Commissar Order was issued from

the Fuehrer Headquarters as. "TOP SECilHT. Transmission only

by officerJ" and was captioned, "Directives for the Treat
ment of Political Commissars."

It was as follows:

"In the fight against Bolshevism it is not

to bo expected that the enemy will act in accord
ance with the principles of Humanity or of tnw
International Law. In particular, a vinaictive,
cruel find inhuman treotment of our prisoners

must be expected on the part of the
Commissars of all types, as they are thu actual
leadors""of the resistance.

"The troops must realize:

'l)

In this fight, leniency and considerations of

international law are out of place in dealing
with these elements. -^hey constitute a danger
for their own safety and the swift pacifica
tion of the conquered territories.

'2) '

originators oi barbarous Asiatic raethoda
warfare
•
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are the political ^-'ommiasars.

'-^'hey must

therefore be dealt with most severely, ^
once and sumisirily.

"Therefore, they are to bo liquidated at once

r

when taken in coinbat or offering resistance.
"For the rest the following directives will
applyJ
"I.

Combat

1. )

zone

Political commissars who oppose our troops
will be treated in accordance with the 'de
cree concerning the application of martial

law in the Barbarossa area'.

This applios

to Goimissars of any typo and grade, even

if they are only suspected of resistance,
sabotage or of instigatxon thereto.
Reference is made to the 'directive concorning the conduct ol the troops in^'-ussia.'

2.)

Political commissars as organs of the enp^

troops
by special
insignia
r r o o p s are
ai-o recosnizabio
X ov/—
o-- red star witn interwoven gold hammer and

sickle on the sleeves - (for particulars
se-' 'fhe -H-rmed Forces of tho- USSR*, High
Gomiand of the Armed Forces/General Staff

of the Army, Q.u IV, Auction Foreign armies
Jiast (II) No. 100/41 secret, of 15 January
1941, appendix 9 d). They are to be se

gregated at once, 3. g. still on the^battle

field, from the prisonors of war. This is
necessary to prevent them from influoncing
the prisoners of war in any way. These
commissars will not be recognized as soi-

diors, the protection of prisoners of war

by international law does not apply to them.
They will be liquidated after segregation.

3.)

Political commissars who have not committed,

nr arei not suspocted of hostilp_ac^ will

not be harmed lor the time being. ^^1^
after deeper penetration of the country
will it be possible to decide whether of
ficials v/ho were left behind may stay

whore they are or will bo handed over to
the Sonderkommandos. Preferably the
latter should decide on this point.

As a matter of principle, in deciding the

question whether 'guilty or not guilty ,
the personal impression which the commissar

makes of his mentality and attitude will

have precedence over facts which may be
unprovablc.

4,)

In cases 1.) and 2.) a short message (mes

sage form) about the incident will be senti
a) by divisional units to divisional

headquarters (Intelligence Off leer)

-
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b) by troops directly under the com
mand of a

corps,

army group or a

an army or an

Panzer group, to

the respective headquarters. (In
telligence Officer).
5.)

Kone of the above-mentioned measures must
obstruct the operations, iuothodical
searches and mopping-up actions, therefore,
will not be carried out by the troops.

"II.

In the communications zone.
Commissars who are arrested in the comrauni cat ions
zone on account of a doubtful attitude will be

handed over to the Einsatzgruppcn and/or Ein-

satzkommandos of the Security Police (Security
Service).
"III.Limitations of Courts-Martial and Summary Courts.

The courts-martial and summary courts of the
regimental and other conmanders must not be
entrusted with the

execution of the meas\iros

as per I and II. "
On 8

June 1941 von Brauchitsch sent out a

supplement

of two additional clauses to be added to the original, viz.
to I Number 1,

"Action taken against a political
coinmissar must be basod on the fact

that the person in question has shown

by a special, recognisable act or at
titude that he opposes or v/ill in future

oppose the Viiehrmacht."
to I

Number 2,

"Political commissars attached to the
troops should bo segregated and dealt
with by order of an officer,

incon

spicuously and outside the proper battle
zone."

On 24 Iviay 1941, however, von Brauchitsch formulated
the Maintenance of Discipline order, in which as a supple

ment to tho Fuehrer Order it is said:

"Subject: Treatment of Enemy Civilians and Criminal
Acts of members of the wehrmaoht

against Enemy Civilians.

Attached Fuehrer decree is (hereby) announced.
It is to be distributed in writing dovm to the com

manders with jurisdiction of their own beyond that,
the principles contained in it are to be made known
orally.
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Supplements to I

-

I expect that all counter intelligence
measures of the

troops will be carried out ener

getically,. for their ovm security and the speedy
pacification of the territory won.
It will be
necessary to take into account the variety of ethnic strains within the population, its over

all attitude, and the degree to wlruch they have
been stirred up.

i.;ovement and combat against the onerny^s armed
forces are the real tasks of the troops"
It demands

the fullest concentration and the highest effort of
all forces.

'J-his task must not be Jeopardized in

any place, therefore, in general, special search
and mopping-up operations will be out of question
for the

combat troops.

The directives of the fuehrer concern serious
cases of rebellion, in which the most severe measures
are required.

Criminal acts of .a minor nature aroj, always
in accordance with the combat situation, to be

punished according to detailed orders from an of
ficer (if possible, a pest conirniinder) by resorting
to provisional measures (for Instance, temporary
detention at reduced rations, roping-upon a tree,
assdgriment to labor).

The G-ln-C*3 of the -t^rmy G-roups are requested
to obtain my approval prior to the rc-instatemont
of \iVehrrnacht jurisdiction in the pacified territories.
The G-ln-C»s of the Armit^s are expected to make
suggestions in this respect in time.

Special instructions will be Issued about the

treatment to be given to political dignitaries.
Supplements

to II-

Undor all circumstances i t will remain the

duty of all superiors to prevent arbitrary excesses

individual members of the iirmy .and to prevent in
time the troops becoming unmanageable.
It must not
come to i t that the individual soldier oommits or omits

any act ^

thinks proper toward the indigenous popu

lation; ho must rather feel that in every case ho
bound by the orders of his officers.

I consider

it very important that this bo cloarly understood
down to the lowest unit.

Timely action by every

officer, especially every company commander, etc.,
help to m£Llntaln discipline, the basis of our
successes.

Occurrences with, regard to 'I* and *11', and
#iich are of special Importance, are to bo reported

by the troops to the OlvH as special events.
(signed)

-
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von Brauchitsoh"

There aro 340 copies of this order, which, os noted,
viad attached a copy of the Fuehrer Order.

This apparently

was given wide distribution, although the original Fuehrer
Ord®^

^ very limited distribution.

It is said the

intenp.nce of -U1 sc 1p1 ine order was

conceived by von Brauchitsch as a moonis of sabotaging the
Hitler order, but it will be noted that in the quoted part

of Haider*s Diary ho has Hitler saying, "This need not moan
that the troops get out of hand."
It seems to bo conceded - if any concession is nect-ssary that this order was criminal.
«•

apologist.

It has neither defender nor

Instead of a straightforward and manly refusal

to execute a criminal order,

some of the defendants sought

a surreptitious sabotaging and evasion of its enforcement.

However, in spite of such rejection or opposition on the

part of those in high command, tho record contains a large
number of reports showing the execution of coirunissars by
units subordinate to various of tnc defendants, as v/ill
be shown in the discussion of the case pertaining to each.

This would havG been avoided had some of these commanders

been sufficiently courageous to have forced the issue.
This was not done.

It was implemented throughout tho army.

It is claimed that on some occasions at least, blown-

up or exaggerated or even fictitious figures v^ero given of
the number of theso functionaries who were murdered.

But

the cold, hard. Inescapable fact reraains that many were

so executed in utter violation of the laws of war and of
humanity.

Dan these defendants escape liability because this

criminal order originated from a higher level?
it was diroctod to units subordinate to them,

They knew
deports

coming In from tiirjo to time from these subordinate units
showed tho execution of these political functionaries.
—
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is true in many cases they said they had no Imowlcdgc
these repcrts. They should have had such knowledge.
they had expressed thoir opposition to and rejootion
the Commissar tirder, that tho reports showing the car

rying out of this order would havo boon shown to them

by their subordinates is a conclusion that is Inoscapablc.
It was criKiinal to pass it down to subordinate units.
When tho subordinates obeyed the order, the superior cennot absolve himself by the ploa that his character was so
well known that his subordinates should havo had the

courage to disobey tho order which ho himself in passing
It down showed that he lacked. Such a pica Is oontomptible and constitutes no defense.

-
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BARBAROSSA JURISDICTION ORDER

The so-called Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order is in a

dif

ferent category from the Commissar and Commando Orders and

its consideration is somewhat more complicated.

This order

was issued by Keitel on 13 May 1941 as "Decree on Exercis

ing Hilitany Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and

Special Measures by the Troops", and reads as follows:
"The Wehrmacht' s :^pplication of its laws

(v/ehrmachtsgerichtsbarlceit) place at maintaining
discipline.

"The vast extent of the operational areas

in the East, the fighting methods necessitated
thereby and the peculiarity of the enemy give
the I'/ehrmacht courts jobs which - in view of
their limited personnel - they can only solve
during war operations and until some degree of
pacification has been obtained in the conquered
area if they limit themselves at first
main

to their

task.

"This is possible only if the troops them
selves oppose ruthlessly any threat from the
enemy population.

"For these reasons herewith the following
is ordered for the area 'Barbarossa' (area of
operations, army group rear area, and area of

political administration).
I.

"Treatment of Crimes committed bv Enemy Civilians

1.

Until further order the military courts and

the courts-martial will not be competent for
crimes committed by

enemy

civilians.

2.
Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly
by the troops in combat or while fleeing.
3.
Also all other attacks by enemy civilians
against the Armed Forces, i t s members and

auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the
troops with the most rigorous methods until the

assailants are finished.
4.

(Kiederkaerapfen).

Waere such measures were not taken or at least

were not possible, persons suspected of the act
will be brought before an officer at once.
officer v;ill decide whether

they are

to

be

This
shot.

"Against localities from which troops have
been attacked in a

deceitful or treacherous man-

ner, collective coercive measures will be applied

-
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immediately upon the order of an officer of the

rank of at least "battalion, etc., commander, if
the circumstances do not permit a quick identi
fication of individual perpetrators.
5.

It is strictly forbidden to keep saspects in

custody in order to put them at the disposal of
the courts after the reinstatement of jurisdiction
over indigenous inhabitants.
6,
The C in C's of the Army Groups can - by
agreement with the competent commanders of the
Luftwaffe ^^nd the Navy - reinstate .iurisdiction
of the Wehrmacht courts for civilians,
sufficiently pAcified.

in areas

"For the area, of the Political Administra

tion this order will be given by the Chief of the
OKVL
II.

Trea-troenjt of_crime^ coramlt_ted againsjt i.nhabijtant^
by_.m_embers_of the, Nehrmanh^ ^nd
2.'-^xiJ.i^r_ie^.

1. With re^ard^to, £ffenc£s_c2mmi_tt£d_a.£a3n£t_
^nerny; £ivil^ians_ ^_m£mbers_of ^he. Wehrraach_t or
by its auxiliaries, prosecution is not oblig.gtory.
even where the deed is at the same time a military
crime or misdemeanor.

2.

When judging such offences,

i t will be taken

into consideration in any type of procedure that-

the collapse of Germany in 1918, the subsequent
sufferings of the German people and the fight
against National Socialism which cost the blood
of innumerable followers of the movement were

caused primarily by bolshevist influence and that

no German has forgotten this fact.
5,

Therefore the judiciary will decide in such

case whether disciplinary punishment will be ap
propriate, or whether prosecution in court is

necessary.
In the case of offences against in
digenous inhabitants the judiciary will order a
prosecution before
the maintenance of
of the Forces call
plies for Instance

the military courts only if
discipline or the security
for such a measure.
This ap
to serious deeds due to lack

of self-control in sexual matters, which origi
nate from a criminal disposition and which in
dicate that the discipline of the troops is
threatening to deteriorate seriously.
Crimes
which have resulted in senseless destruction of

billets or stores or any other kind of captured
material to the disadvantage of our Forces will
be judged, as a rule, not less severely.
"The order to start Investigation procedure

requires in every single case the signature of
the judicial authority.

-
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4,
£ -treme. caution is required in judging tiie
credibility" of statements made by enemy civilians.
III.

"Responsibility of the Troop Commanders.

"Inasfar as.they are competent, it is the personal
responsibility of the troop commanders to see to
it -

1.

that a l l officers of the units under their

command are Instructed in time and in the

most emphatic manner about the principles
set out under
2.

' I ' above.

that their legal advisers are informed in

time of these rules and of_the_verbal communi£p^i£n_s in_wh.i£h_the_p£ljt^al j^n_tent_lone

of_the_Si^reme_Command_( Fu^hnungX were_ex-

£lained io_the_C__in C'_s.
3.

that only those sentences will be confirmed

which correspond to the political intentions

of the Supreme Command (Fuehrung).
IV.

"Protection as secret matter.

"Once the camouflage is lifted this decree will
merely have the classification of a Top Secret. "

It is divided into two main parts: first, it dispensed
with court-martial jurisdiction over the civilian popula

tion and provided that civilians in the occupied areas would
be subjected to arbitrary punishment upon the decision of

an officer.

The second part provided th^^t there was no ob

ligation to prosecute members of the wiehrmacht or its
auxiliaries who committed crimes against enemy civilians

except in c^ses involving discipline which were restricted
to certain types of offenses.

As to the first phase, court-martial jurisdiction of
civilians is not considered under international law an in^

herent right of a civilian population and is not an inherent

prerogative of a military commander.

The obligation

towards civilian populations concerns their fair treatment.
Court-martial jurisdiction of a military commander and its

extent are determined by his superiors.
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It has been urged

In this trial that

there is no rule of international law

that guerillas be brought to trial before a court and that
this order authorizing their disposition on the arbitrary
decision of an officer is therefore not Illegal.

There may

be some doubt that trial before a cou?:'t is in fact required
under international law.

But in considering this order it must be borne in mind
that it was not solely applicable to guerillas and that it
is an obligation upon an occupying force to provide for the
fair treatment of the civilians within the occupied area.

Whatever may be said as to the summary proceedings against

guerillas, the allowing of such summary proceedings in the dis
cretion of a junior officer, in the case of the wide variety

of offenses thet were left open'to him, is considered criminal.
Furthermore, the fourth paragraph of Section I above
in its most favorable construction Is at best ambiguous

but the logical inference to be drawn from this section goes

further In the opinion of the Tribunal and provides that sus
pected franc-tlreurs may be shot, which is also considered

illegal.

The fourth paragraph of Section I also provides for col
lective coercive measures to be applied immediately upon

the order of an officer of at "least a battalion, etc.,

commander", and is considered Illegal in that it places
no limitations upon such collective actions whatsoever.

For these reasons the first part of this order Is
considered illegal and we so find.

With regard to the second aspect of this order, that
Is the obligation to prosecute soldiers who commit offenses

against the indigenous population, this obligation as a
matter of International law Is considered doubtful.

The

duty imposed upon a military commander is the protection
-
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- oX ±yx& civilian population^

Whether this protection

be assured by the prosecution of soldiers charged

with offenses against the civilian population, or
whether it be assured by disciplinary measures or other
wise, is immaterial from an international standpoints

This order in this respect is subjept to interpretation.
It surely opened the door to serious infractions of
discipline.

The German Army was concerned with the dis

cipline of its troops.

That discipline could not be

maintained without punishment.

Unwarranted acts of a

soldier against a civilian, constituted a breach of dis
cipline.

As a matter of fact, practically any offense

against civilians could be construed as a breach of dis

cipline,

The provisions of the act itself recognize in

part this situation.

Recognition of this fact in the

order was further strengthened by the von Brauchltsch
so-called disciplinary order.

This order was issued on

21 May 1941, practically coincident with the Barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order, and was quoted above in connection
with the Commissar Order.

This order was apparently given wldo distribution
and i t is considered not without merit that the mili

tary authorities in the issuance of this order had sub
stantially limited Section" 2 of the Barbarossa Juris

diction Order insofar as that order did away with the

obligation to prosecute.

At any rate, as far as the

acts of a soldier against the civilian population were

concerned, practically any act might be Interpreted as
an act against discipline.

This disciplinary order by von Brauchltsch, however.

ae -
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was virtually canceled by certain subsequent-orders issued

by Keitel which will be hereafter noted in this opinion.
As regards the first part of the Barbarossa Jurisdic

tion Order, commandeps were merely deprived of jurisdic
tion.

It was not a positive prder to do some act.

It was

merely an order which took away part of their powers.

It

is difficult to see how courts-martial could have been

established to try civilians under such circumstances and

the actions of such courts would have been Illegal and futile.

As regards the second part of the order, as heretofore
stated, it was subject to the interpretation that unwar
ranted acts against civilians constituted a breach of dis

cipline,

The illegal application of the order, therefore,

rested to a marked extent with the commanders in the field.

Another provision of this order must be given consi
deration in this regard.

Section 6 of paragraph I provides

that the commander-in-chief of the army groups can by agree
ment with the competent commanders of the Luftwaffe and the

Navy "reinstate jurisdiction of the wehrmacht courts for

civilians, in areas sufficiently pacified".

While the

limitation is placed upon this provision that the areas
must be sufficiently pacified before the jurisdiction of

the Wehrmacht courts could be reinstated, this provision
nevertheless left the door open for comraanders-in-chlef of
army groups opposed to the arbitrary provisions of the

order rs to civilians, to take action to eliminate it from
their areas.

This the record shows none of them did.

This Tribunal does not hold field commanders guilty
for a failure to properly appraise the fine distinctions
of international law, nor for failure to execute court-

martial jurisdiction which had been taken away from them,
but it does consider them criminally responsible for the
-
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. treiismission of an order that could, and from its terms
would, be illegally applied

where ti^ey have transmitted

such an order wlthgut proper safeguards as to its appllcation.

For that failure on their part they must accept

crimina.1 responsibility for its misapplication within subordinate units to which they transmitted it.

And in view

of tne relation of this order to frgnc-tlreurs, it takes

the view tlia.t while commanding generals might not be
able under the provisions of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction

Order to establish courts-martial to try them, that such
commanders were nevertheless responsible, within the areas
of their comiaands, for the summary execution of persons

who were merely suspects or those who, from their acts,
were not in fact franc-tireurs at all, such as the ex

ecution of the nineteen year old girl who wrote a song
derog'atory of the German invader of her countryi

^
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C0m:UM)0 ORDER

Following the Dieppe raid, and after drafts and changes
had been prepared largely by V/arlinont and Lahi'-iann, Hitloxj
issued the folloy/ing order on 18 October 1942:
"TOP SECRET

"1.)

For sor.ie tine our enenies have been

using in their warfare methods v/hich
are outside

the

Conventions.
treacherous

international Geneva

Sspecially brutal and
is the behavior of the so-

called corx-)andj3, v;ho,. as is ests.blished,
are partially recruited even fron

freed criminals in enemy countries* From
captured orders it is divulged, that

they are directed not only to shaclcle

prisoners, but also to kill defenseless
prisoners on the spot at the moment in
which they believe that the latter as
prisoners represent a burden in the
further pursuit of their purposes or

could otherwise bo a hindrance. • Finally,
orders have been found in which the

killing of ioris oners has boon demanded
in prliKiiple.

"2.)

For this reason it was already announced
in an addenduio to- the /^rned Forces report

of 7 October 1942, that in the future,
Germany, in the face of these sabotage
troops'Of the British and their accom-

plices^ v;ill-resort to the same pro

cedure, i.e., that thoy will bo ruthlessly

mowed down by the Gorman troops in combat,
wherever thoy may appear.

"3.)

I therefore order;
"Prom nov/ on all enemies on so-called

Cor.iriando Missions in Europe* or hfrlca

challongod by Gorman troops, oven if
thoy are to all appearances soldiers
in uniform or demolition troops, whether'

armed or unarmed, in battle or In flight,
are to bo slaughtered to the last nan.
It does not make any difforonco whether

thoy are landed from ships and aeroplanes

^for their actions, or whether thoy arc
f

^

dropped by parachute. Even if those
individuals, v;hon found, should apparently
bo proparod to give themselves up, no

pardon is to bo granted then on principle.
In each individual case full information

la to bo sent to the O.K.W.- for publi

cation in the Report of the Military
Forces,

<
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»4.)

If Individual nonbors of such corinandos,
such as ai^onts, saboteurs, etc# fall
into tho hands of the nilitary forces
by sone other noans, through tho police

in occupied territories for instance,
the^'" are to bo handed over inioediatoly
to the SE>. ahiy inprisonriont under
nilitary-guard, in PW Stockades for

instance, etc., is strictly prohibited,
Gvon if this is only intended for a
short tino.

"5.)

This order does not apply to tho troatnent
of any onony soldiers who, in tho course
of nornal hostilities (largo-scale
offensive actions, landing oporatlons and
airborne operations), are captured in
open battle or give thonselvos up. Nor

does this order apply to oncny soldiers
falling into otat hands after battles at

sea, or onony soldiers trying to save
thoir livos by parachuto aftor battles^

"50

I will hold rosponsiblo undor liilitary
Law, for failing to carry out this order,
all connandors and officers v/ho either

have negloctod their duty of instructing

the^troops about this order, or acted

c-gainst this order v/horo it was to bo
executed.,"

This order was criminal on its face.

It sinply

directed tho slaughter of those "sabotage" troops,
Tho connection of certain defendants with i t is
treated in tho discussion of tho individual cases.

-
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NIGHT :JTD FOG DEGHEE

This was another criminal oj^<^or from Hitler ?s brain,
It was slf;7ied by Keitel on 7 DoCGnber 1941, after prior
-)0

nor;otiations with Lohnann

V/arliDont, and is as follows

"SinoQ the opening of tho Russian
Ganpaign, Oc ^r.iunist olenents and other
anti-Gernan circles have increased their

assaults against the Reich and the
occupation power in tho occupied torritorios,

Tho extent and the danger of those activities
necessitate tho nost severe ".loasuros against
tho rjalefactors in order to intimidate then*

To begin with one should proceed along
according to tho following diroctivos,
I.

''In case of criminal acts connittod by
non»-Gornan civilians and which are directed

against the Reich or the occupation power '
endangering their safety or striking pov/or,
tho death penalty is applicable in principle,
IX.

"Criminal acts contained in paragro.ph

I will, in principle, bo tried in tho
occupied territories only when it appears-

probable that death sontencos are going to

bo passed against tho offenders, or at least
tho main offenders, and if tho trial and
tho oxooution of the death sentence can be

carried nut without delay. In other oases
tho offenders, or at least tho main offenders,
are to be talcon to Germany,

X

III.

"Offenders who are being taken to Germany

arc subject to court-martial procedure
there only in case that particular military
concerns shculd require this.

Gorman

and

foreign agencies v/ill declare upon inquiries
on such offenders that they wore arrested
and the state of the procooding did not
allov/ further infornations,
IV.

"Tho Conmandors-in-Chlof in tho occupied
territories and the justiciaries, within their
jurisdiction, will bo personally hold res
ponsible for tho execution of this decree,
V.

"Tho Chief of tho OKVV will docido in
which of tho occupiod torritorioa this docroo

-
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shall bo appliod.

Ho is authorized '

to furnish explanations, supplements,
and to issue directives for i t s
execution.
The Reich Minister of
Justice v/ill issue directives for

the execution within his jurisdiction."
V/o have heretofore quoted from the Judcment

of the

International Military Tribunal relative to this order
and i t need not be repeated;

The enforcement of this

cruel and brutal order cost the lives of many innocent

people and untold suffering and misery to their loved ones
The connection of certain of the defendants with i t

will bo treated in our handling of the cases against them.
There are criminal orders involved in this case,
other than those we have specifically mentioned, which we
discuss in connection with the case of the defendants to

whom they were applicable.

•
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HOST/vGES ;j® KEPRISAIjS

In tho Southoast Caso, Unltod States vs. V/ilheln

List, ot al. (Caso No. 7), tho Tribunal had occasion to
oonsidor at consldorablo length tho lav/ rolatinc to

h\'

hostai^os and reprisals.

I'll

It was therein held tliat under

cortaln vory rostrlctivo conditions and subjoct to

certain rathor oxtonsivo safeguards, hostages nay bo taken,

and after a judicial findin^^ of strict conplianco with all

pro-conditions and as a last dssporato ronody hostayos

nay ovon bo sontoncod to death.

It was held further that .

slnilar drastic safoGuards, rostrictions, and judicial

pro-conditions apply to so-callod "reprisal prisoners".
If so inhui'-iano a noaauro as the killinG

innocont persons

for offonsos of others, ovon whon drastically safoGuardod
o.nd linitod, is over pornissible under any theory of
international law, killinc v/ithout full conplianco with
all roqulronents would bo nurdor.

If killinc

pernissiblo \mder any circuiistancos, then a killinc v/ith

»

full conplianco with all tho nentiened prerequisites still
would bo nurdor.

In tho caso hero presented, wo find it unnecessary

to approve or disapprove tho conclusions of lav/ announced
in said Judcr.iont as to tho porr.iissibility of such killiu^.p^

In the instances of so-callod hostaco takinc ^^-nd killincj

and tho so-callod reprisal killincs v/ith which v/o have to
doal in this caso, tho safecnards and pro-conditions

required to bo observed by tho Sjuthoast Judcieont wore
not ovon attonptod to bo pot or ovon sucC'^^^Qd as necessary.

Killincs without full conplianco with such pre-conditions
are noroly terror nurdors. If the law is in fact that
hostaco and reprisal killincs are never por::issiblo at all.
-

i'J jr >,
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thon also tho so-callod hosta^o and reprisal killin£;s in
this case are norely terror niorders.
Tho responsibility of defendants for any such acts
will bo considered in our dotormination of tho cases

acainst -the individual defendants.

%
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p;jiTis;.iT \i4RP.JiE

a?hQ Gxecution of partisans as franc-tirours is

'

.

connoctod with tho Barbarossa Jurisdiction Docroo in
that i t involves tho troatnont of civilians "by tho

occupying and invading forces.
The record In this case contains :;aich 'testimony and

ai-.ions the nuiierous exhibits are nany documents doalinr; v;ith
so-called partisan v;arfaro,

V/o doen it desirable to naico

sone ooi:]i-.:ont on tho law relatinc thereto boifore considorinc
tho cases of the Individual defendants,

;.rticlGS 1 and 2 of tho ;jinox to the Hacuo Convention
are as follows:

"Article 1.

"Tho lav;3, riyhts, and duties of war
apply not only to arnies, but also to
nilltia and voluntoor corps fulfilling tho
following conditions :

"1.

To be connandod by a person responsible
for his subordinates;

"2,

To have a fixed distinctive o;;jbloi:i
recognisable at a distance;

"3,

To carry arns openly; and

"4,

To conduct their operations in
accordance with tho lav/s and custons
of v/ar •

\

"In countries whore nilitia or volunteer'

corps constitute tho arny, or forn po.rt of it,
they are included under the dononination
'arny *.
".,rticlG 2,

"Tho inhabitants of a territory v/hich

has not boon" occupied, v/ho, on tho approach
of tho onony, spontaneously take up arus
to resist tho invading troops v/ithout having
had tli:io to or.''"anizo thensolvos in accordance

with ;.rticlo 1,' shall be regarded as belligerents
if they carry arns openly and if they respect
tho laws and custons of vi-'ur

A failure to noot these roquironents deprives one so

failing on capture of a prisonor of war status,
\7e have a strong suspicion from the record
in this ,caso that anti-
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partisan warfaro was used by the Gornan Roich. as a pretext

for the Gxtornination of many thousands of innocent persons

Hitler stated what it soens becane the V/ohrnacht policy
when he saids

"••• This partisan war again has sone
advantages for us; it enables us to

eradicate everyone who opposes us«"

The defendants without exception clain that they oxocuted
as partisans only those who were operating as franc-tiruors
and bandits and who failed to conply with the requironents

of the rules of war to constitute then lav/ful bolligeronts.
They clain thoro is no ovldenco adduced by the prosecution

that tho defendants are guilty of executing any as so%

ca3,lod partisans who conpliod with the roquirenonts to
constitute then lawful belligerents, that is, any who wore
not in fact franc~tirours»

ilowovor, wo need not on tho

record before us dotonoino whether this is true or untrue
for tho evidence shows beyond any question that it was tho

policy of the Wohrnacht to create classes of partisans by
definition in orders and directives and by construction and

in this manner they brought v/ithln the list of those they
proscribed as partisans and shot or hung not only tho franc-^
tireur, in fact, but also many other classes that no

conceivable reason can be foiand for so including except as

Hitler stated it, "to eradicate all those who oppose us".

In a conference called by Gen. Mueller (General for Special

hsslgnmonts) at V/arsaw before tho Russian campaign to

instruct the Judge .advocate and Intolllgonco Officers of
the arnios on tho meaning and scope of tho Rarbaroasa

Decree, the following v/ns tho construction and instruction
givens

"One of tho two ononles must die;
do not spare tho bearer of enemy ideolo'^
but kill him.

'
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"Evory civilian v/ho inpodcs or incitos
othors to iupodo tho Gorman Wohrnacht is

also to "bo considorod a j^uorilla (for
instance s instigators, porsoiis who distrihuto loaf l o t s n o n obsorvojico of Gorman

orders, arsonists, dostroyinG of road
signs, supplies, etc.).
"Tho population is doniod tho right to
take up arms voluntarily, IJblthor are para

nilitary associations (Konsonsl Osscavlachin)
entitled to do so,"

The classification certainly is elastic and capable of wide

extension,

"Every civllian_j;'7hp_inpedes_or iucito£ othor^s
V

to_i^£do th£ Gernan_V/£hr;;.]acht", taken as a criterion for
detenaining who is a frano-tirour, clearly opens tho way

for arbltriny and bloody inplonontation.

.

Those falling into

the various classifications v/ere sui'.i.iarily executed as

partisans snd so classified in tho reports.

There is no

warrant in tho Rules of War or in international lav/ for

dealing with such persons as franc-tirours, guerillas, or
bandits.

Rod drny soldiers in uniforn were in sone

instances shot as so-called pc.rtisans.

There is, of course,

no warrant in international law for such action.

The neat vicious

classification of the proscribed was

that of "partisan suspect".

The executions of such wore

a regular routine and their executions wore reported along
with those of the so-called partisans.

Suspicion is a state of nind of tho accuser and not a
state of nlnd or an act by tho one accused.

It is a

nonstrous proposition containing tho very ossonco of
license that tho state of mind of tho accuser shall bo tho

doternlning factor, in tho absence of ovldonco of guilt,
whether the accused shall or shall not be suix.iarily oxGcutqd,
But it is said that when those accused wore captured they"
wore interrogated and sono wore not executed but released

or sent to prison canps.

But this is no defense for it
-
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doos not nocGssarily r.ioan that those who v/ore executed

as suspects had boon found guilty even by the infernal

intorrogation, by an officer, but only that the interro
gator had not had hx£

renovod, so, xmdor the order, they, being still susp'ectod^
>

woro oxocutod.

This doos not anount to even the ninlnun •

of judicial protection roqviirod' before an execution.

.

The classification of the victins in the ntuoorous

reports in the record as partisan suspects is a natural

and proper one to bo nado under the order for execution o^
nere suspicion of partisan activity.

If, as defendants

have contended, no suspects wore oxocutod until they v/oro

Jt

lawfully found and adjudged to bo guilty, there v;as no
need whatsoever for the distinction nado in the classifi-

cation.

Wo find froi.i the evidonco that there woro great

nuiMbors of persona oxocutod in the areas of various of

those defendants, who, under no stretch of tho inaginatlon,
woro franc-tirours and groat nunbors of others executed

solely on suspicion, without any proof or lawful detornination that thoy v/ore in fact guilty of tho offonsos

of which thoy woro suspoctod.

Tho orders to oxocuto such

persons and noro suspects on suspicion only and without
\

proof, were crininal on their faoo.
thoroto woro crininal,

Sxocutions pursuant

Thoso who gave or passed dovm

such orders nust boar crininal responsibility for passing

thon dovm and for their inplonontation by tho units sub
ordinate to thon.

Notwithstanding our strong suspicion that tho
oxocutlons of persons doscribod in tho docu^ncaits as

partisans woro in a vast nunbor of cases not oxocutlons
of thoso whon it was pornisslblo to oxocuto undor tho

Rulos of War, but a noro cloak under which innocent
-
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persons woro oradioatod, wo accord to tho dofondants tho

"bonoflt of any possiblo doubt and detornlno tho question
of their criminality on tho basis of cases of tho typo
nontioned concorning tho criiuinality of which under both
the law and tho ovidonco thoro can bo no doubt*

Wo shall dotormino on conaidoration of tho ovidonco

oach defendant's guilt or innocence as to such matters
charged against hini

k

-
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THE HAGUE AKD GEKEVA COKVEKTIONS

Anotlier q.uestion of general interest in this case
concerns the applicability of the Hague Convention and

the Geneva Convention as between Germany and Russia.

In

determining the applicability of the Hague Convention it
must be borne in mind, first,

that Russia ratified this

convention but Bulgaria and Italy did not.

The binding

effect of the Hague Convention upon Germany was considered
by the Ix-IT.in the trial against Goering, et al.

On page

253 of that Judgment It is stoted:

"But it is argued that the Hague Convention
does not apply in this case, because of the

general-portlclpetion'

clause in Article 2

of the Hague Convention of 1907.

That

clause provided:

'The provisions contained in the regu
lations (Rules of Land Warfare) referred
to in Article I as well as in the present
Convention do not apply except between
contracting powers, and then only if all

the belligerents are parties to the Con
vention. '

"Several of the belligerents in the recent
wa.r were not parties to this Convention.

"In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not
necessary to decide this question.
The rules
of land warfare expressed in the Convention
undoubted.ly represented an advance over exist
ing international law at the time of their
a.doption-.
But the convention expressly stated

that it was an attempt 'to revise the general
laws and customs of war', which it thus

recognized to be then existing, but by 1939
these rules laid down in the Convention were

recognized by all civilized nations, and
were regarded as being declaratory of the
laws and customs of w^r which are referred

to in Article 6 (b) of the Charter."
It is apparent from the above quotation that the view

adopted by the IKT in that case as to the Hague Conventions
was that they were declaratory of existing international

law and therefore binding upon Germany.

-
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In

this connection it is further pointed out that the de

fense in this case, particularly as regards partisan v;arfare,

primarily is based upon the fact that partisans oould

be shot or hanged since under the Hague Convention they
were not lawful belligerents..

The defense can hardly con

tend that Germany was in a position to sort out as bind
ing on her only those provisions of these Conventions
\i\hich suited her own purpos'es.

Like the IMT, v/e do not

feel called upon in this case to determine whether or not

the nague Conventions were binding upon Germany as an in
ternational agreement.
^
:

^

Vile adopt the principle outlined

in that case to the effect that in substance these provlslons v/ere binding as declaratory of international law.

.4.5 rugards the Geneva Convention , it is to be borne
in i-nind that Kussia was not a signatory power to this
convention .

There is evidence in this case derived from

a divisional crdor of a German division that Hussia had

signified her intention to be so bound.

However, there is

no authoritative document in this record upon which to

^

base such a conclusion.

In the case of Goerlng ct al.,

J!.-

above cited, the IMT, on page 232, stated as follows:
"The argument in defense of the, charge
with regard to the murder and ill-treat
ment of Soviet prisoners of war, that
the U.3.S.H, was not a party to the
Geneva Convention, is quite without

foundation.
On 15 September 1941 admiral
Canaris protested against the regulations
for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of

war, signed by General heinecke on 8
September 1941.

He then stated:

*The Geneva Convention fdr the treatment

of prisoners of war is not binding in the
relationship between Germany and the U.S.

S,K.

Therefore only the principles of

general international law on the treatment

of prisoners of v/ar apply.
Since the 18th
Cuntury these have gradually been es

tablished along the lines that war cap
tivity Is neither revenge nor punishment,

-
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but solely protective custody, the
only p\irpos6 of which is to prevent
the prisoners of war from further

participation ..in the war.
This
principle was developed in accord
ance v/ith the view held by all armies
that it is contrary to military tra
dition to kill or injure helpless

people . . . The decrees for the treat
ment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed

are based on a fundamentally different
view-point.'
•if

"if

"it

-i't

4<r

"Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides
that

'ill-treatment.

,

.

of civilian

population of or in occupied territory
. . . killing of hostages . . . wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or vil

lages' shall be a war crime." In the
main, those provisions arc merely de
claratory of the existing lav;s of war
as expressed hj the Hague Convention,
Article 46, which stated; 'Family honor
and rights, the lives of persons and
private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice must be res

pected, ' "
It would appear from the above quotation that that
Tribunal accepted as international law the statement
of Admiral Canaris to the effect 'that the Geneva Con

vention was not binding as between Gorim-iny and Hussia

as a contractual agreement but that the general princi

ples of international law as outlined in those conven
tions were applicable.

In other words, it would appear

that the IMT in the case above cited followed the same

lines of thought v/ith regard to the Geneva Convention
as with respect to the Hague Convention,

to the effect

that thoy wore binding insofar as they, were in substance
an expression of international law as accepted by the

civilized nations of the world, and this Tribunal adopts
this viewpoint.

• ' " • '' "V. 'ijv
;•>>-.

'I'" w n

....
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""

One serious question that confronts us arises as to

the use of prisoners of war for the construction of forti
fications^

It is pointed out that the Hague Convention

specifically prohibited the use of prisoners of war for

any v/ork in connection with the operations of war, where

as the later Geneva Conventions provided that there shall
be no direct connection with the operations of war*

This

situation is fiirther complicated by the' fact that when

the proposal was nmde to definitely specify the exclusion
of the building of fortifications, objection was made be
fore the

conforonco to that limitation, and such definite

exclusion of the use of prisoners was not adopted.
is also much evidence in this

There

case to the effect that

Russia used Gorman prisoners of war for such purposes.

I

lb

Is no defense in the view of this Tribunal to assert that

international crimes were oornmitted by an adversary, but
as evidence given to the interpretation of what con

stituted accepted use of prisoners of war under Internation
al law, such evidence is pertinent.

At any rate, it

appears that the illegality of such use was by no means
clear.

The use of prisoners of war in the construction

of fortifications is a charge directed against the
field commanders on trial here.

This Tribunal is of tho

opinion that in view of the uncertainty of international

law as to this matter, orders providing for such use

from superior authorities, not Involving the use of

prisoners of war in dangerous areas, were not criminal
upon their face, but a matter which a field commander
had the right to assume was properly determined by the

legal authorities upon, higher levels.
Another charge against the field commanders In this

-
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Case 1b that of sending prisoners of war to the Reich for

use in the armament industry.

The term "for the armament

industry" appears in numerous documents,

while there is

some question as to the interpretation of this term,

it

would appear that it was used to cover the manufacture of
arms and munitions.

It was nevertheless legal for field

commanders to transfer prisoners of war to the Reich and
thereafter their control of such prisoners terminated.

Communications and orders specifying that their use vrrs
desired "by the armament industry or that prisoners were
transmitted for the armament industry are not in f^^ct bind

ing as to their ultimate use.
transfer was a

no control.

Their use subsequent to

matter over which the field commander had

Russian prisoners of war were in fact used

for many purposes outside the armainent industry.

Mere

statements of this kind cannot he said to furnish irrefutable

proof against the defendants for the illegal use of pri
soners of war whom they transferred.

In any event, if a de

fendant is to be held accountable for transmitting prisoners

of war to the armament industry, the evidence would have
to establish that prisoners of war shipped from his area
were in fact so used.

Therefore, as to the field commanders in this case,
it ie our opinion that, upon the evidence, responsibility
cannot be fixed upon the field commanders on trial before

us for the use of prisoners of war in the armament industry.
In stating that the Hague and Geneva Conventions express
accepted usages and customs of war, it must be noted that

certain detailed provisions pertaining to the cere end

treatment of prisoners of wf^r can hardly be so designated.

Such details it is believed could be binding only by

-
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International agreement,

-^t since the violation of these

provisions is not in issue in this case, v/e make no com
ment thereon, other than to state that this judgment is
in no vmy based on the violation of such provisions as

to Hussian prisoners of v/ar»

Most of the prohibitions of both the Hague and G-eneva
Conventions, considered in substance, are clearly an ex
pression of the accepted views of civilized nations and

binding upon Germany and the defendants on trial before

us in the conduct of the war against hussia.

These

concern (1) the treatment of prisoners of war; (2) the
treatment of civilians within occupied territories and

spoliation and devastation of property therein; and (3)
the troatment of Hed Army soldiers who, under the Hague

Convention , v/ere lav/ful belligerents,

VMe cite in this category the following rules from
the Hague Hulos of Land ^i/arfare;
Article

4:

"Prisoners of war are in the pov/er of
the hostile Government, but not of the
individuals or corps v/ho capture them.

"They must bo humanely treated..."
That part of Article 6 which provides;
"...The tasks shall not be excossivo.

That part of Article 8 which provides:

"...iiscapod prisoners who are retaken
before being able to rejoin their own
army or before leaving the territory
occupied by the army which captured

them are liable to disciplinary punish
ment <

"Prisoners v/ho, after succeeding in es
caping, are again taken prisoners, are
not liable to any punishment on account

of the previous flight."
p'rom the Geneva Convention ;

-
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That part of Article 2 which provides:
"^..Thoy must at all times be humane

ly treated and protected, particularly

against acts of violence, insults, and
public curiosity..."

That part of Article 5 which provides:
"Prisoners of war have the right to
have their person and their honor re

spected.

bVomen shall be treated with

all the regard due to their sex..."
ii-rticle 4 which provides:

"The power detaining prisoners of war is
bound to provide for their maintenance.
"Difference in treatment among prisoners

is lawful only when it is based on the
military rank, state of physical or mental
health, professional qualifications, or
sex of those who profit thereby."

That part of Article 7 which provides:
"Prisoners of war shall be evacuated

within the shortest possible period
after their capt\u?e, to depots located

in a region far enough from the zone of
combat fcr then to be out of danger..."

Those parts of Article 9 which provide that:
"...Prisoners captured in unhealthful

regions or vhore the climate is injuri
ous for persons coning from temperate

regions, shall be transported, as soon

as possible, to a more favorable climate";

and that:

"...No prisoner may, at any time, be sent
into a region where ho might be exposed
to the fire of the combat zone, nor

used to give protection from bombardment
to certain points or certain regions by

his presence.

That part of Article 10 which provides:
"Prisoners of v;ar shall be lodged In

buildings or in barracks affording all
possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness.••"

Those parts of Article 11 which provide:
"The food ration of prisoners of war

shall be equal in quantity and quality
to that of troops at base camps., •"
and that:

"...A sufficiency of potable water shall be

furnished them..."
-
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That part of ..rticlo 12 which provides that:
^'ClothinG, linon, and footwoar shall
ho furnishGCL pris-jncrs of war "by tho
dotaininc Pov/or.®,"

Tho.t part of *i.rticl3 13 which providos :

"Bolll£oronts shall bo bound tD taho
all sanitary looasuros nocossary to
assuro tho cloanlinoss and hoalth-

fulnoss of cai.ips and to provont
opidonics • •.
xlrticlo 25

•'Unloss tho conduct of i.iilitary opera
tions so roQuiros, sick ana wounc.oa

nrlsonors of war shall not ho transforrod
as long as thoir rocovory loaght bo
^.
ondangorod by the trip*"
hrtlclo 29;

"]^Io prisonor of wm nay bo onployod at

labors for which ho is physxcally unxi .

That part of ;.rticlo 32 which providos ;
"It is forbiddon to uso prisonors of war
at unhoalthful or dangerous work.,.'

That part of Articlo 46 which provides;
"...-ny corporal punishioont, any in-

prisonLiont in quartors without daylight
and, in gonoral, ony forn of cruelty,
is forbiddono,•"

;^rticlo 50 v/hich providos:

4

"Escaped prisoners of war wh) aro

i

rotalion before boing able to rojoin

thoir .'vm aruy or to loavo tho territory
occuoiod by tho arny which captured then
shall bo liable only t^ disciplinary
punish lent •

"Prisoners wIid, after having sucGoodod
in rejoining thoir aruy or in leaving
tho territory :)Ccupiod by tho ..rny

which captured thon, nay again bo takon
orisonors shall not bo liable to an'j

punishment oxi acc junt of thoir previous
flight,"

That part of ..rticlo 56 which provides;
"In no case nay prisoners of war bo

transforrod to penitentiary establish-

nonts (prison, penitentiaries, convict

prisons, etc.) thoro t3 undergo discipli

nary pmishnont #. •"
-

.
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"UhcTor thoso provisions cortain

nccGptod principles

of international law are cloarly stated,

r^oong thoso

applicahlo in this case arc notod those provisions con-

corning tho proper care and naintononce of prisoners of

war.

-'^Iso tho provisions prohibiting their use in

dangerous localitios and or.iplo^a-.iont, and in this connection
it should bo pointed out that wo consider their use by
coiobat troops in conbat areas for tho c:)nstruction of

field fortifications rjid otherwise to conetitutc dangerous

onployioont imdor the conditions of riodorn war.
thoso provisions i t is ..Iso apparent that

Under

tho execution

of prisoners of war for attor.ipts to oscapo was illegal
and criminal.

*4.1so, it is tho opinion of this Tribunal that orders

which provided for tho turning over, of prisoners of war

to tho SD, a civilian organisation, v/horoin all accounta
bility for then is shown by the ovidonco to have been

lost, constituted a crininal act, particularly vdien fron
tho svirroundlng circuiostancos and published orders, it
nust have been suspectod. or Imovm that tho ultiioato

fate of such prisoners of v/ar v/as elinlnation by this
nurd 0 r oua organiS at i on•
Tho contention of tho dofonso as t: tho condition

of nany of the Russian prisoners when captured is considorod a dofonso as far as it goes.

Ho doubt nany

v/oro 3.n a deplorable condition duo to lack of food,

poor clothing, wounds, siclmoaa, and. exhaustion whon
captured.

There is no question that for tonporary periods

these conditions would bring about nuch hardship and

i.iany deaths regardless of tho efforts vof their captors.
However, the ovidonco in this case shows that hundreds

of thousands of Russian prisoners of war died fron hunger.
-
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cold, In.clc of nodical- caro, and lll-troatnont that woro
not a rosult of those conditions.

It Is true that later

on in the v/ar C-orr.iany realized that she had lost for her-

self a tror.ondjus source of r.ianpowor which had "bocorjo
one of tho najor problens of the Gorman nation.

Thoroaftor

to some oxtont her troatmont of pris'^ners of v/ar v/as

based on tho sounder economic principle that it was
bettor to v/ork them to death than to merely lot them die.
Tho groat mass of Russian prisoners of war did not die

because of their condition at the tine of their capture,
Tho argument that tho v/intor ^f 1941-42 v^as the coldest
winter in years in that area can hardly bo alleged as an
oxouso for tho deaths of prisDnofs of v/ar from cold.

Cold,

v/intors have certainly not boon unknovm in those parts

of Suropo where" those prisoners woro kept in captivity..

In fact, cold winters in those parts are tho rule and.
not tho exception.

Hor can i t bo said that tho German

..rmy did njt have fo ^d. with which to maintain thorn.

In

their progress through Russia thoy had seized tho food
supplies of tho people and^ there is no evidence in tho
record to show that Gonaan soldiers at that tino woro

dying from starvation.

There Is ovldonco that in some

cases there wore opidomics of typhus in the Gorman hrmy
but nothing to parallel tho varl-us opidomics which broko

out in tho Russian camps,

Ro d.oubt sold.iors in tho German

hrmy died in isolated cases fro'/.i lack of medical supplies
and nod.lcal attention but tho ovidonco in this case

shows that thousandus of Russian prisoners of v/ar died

from lack of attention while tho Geraan drmy which hold
then vrns not materially suffering from lack of either,

.Is regards tho hujianity of their treatment, tho
ovidonco in this case discloses not only that htuoano
-
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troatrjont was not gonorally roquirod of Gornan soldiors

in dealing with Russian prisoners of war, but that the
directly •^oppaaiterprocoduhe"was

superior orders.

imposed upon thorn by

The treati.iont of Russian prisoners of

war by the Genoan Wehroacht was a crime under international
law and it is so found by this Tribunal.

Goncorning the compulsory use of the civilian popu-

lation, spoliation, and devastation v/ithin occupied areas,
the following provisions of the Hague Convention are
likewise cited as applicable in this case:
*lrticlo'-^3 5

"The authority of the legitimate

power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall
take all the measures in his power to

restoro, and ensure, as-far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely provontod, the laws
in f orce in the countr;^''."
trticlo 46 s

"Panily h'.>nour and rights, the lives
of persons, and private property, as
v/oll as religious convictions and

practice, oust bo respected."

Article 47:

"Pillage is formally forbidden."
Article 49s

"If, in addition to the taxes mentioned
in the above ..rticle, the occupant levies

other money contributions in the occupied
territory, this shall only bo for the
needs of the army or of the acb.iinistration
of the torritoiy," in quosti^n."
Article 50s

"Ho general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the popu
lation on acc->unt of the vacts of
individuals for which they cannot bo

regarded as jointly and sovorally
responsible®"

That part of ..rtlclo 52 which roads as follows s

-
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"Req-uisitlons in kind and services
shall not he demanded from municipalities

or inhrhitants except for the needs of

the army of occupation.

They shall

he in proportion to the resources of
the country, and of such a nature as
not to involve the inhabitants in the

obligation of taking part in military

operations against their ovm country,,.*'
a.

That part of Article 53 which reads as follov/s;
"An army of occupation can only take

possession of cash, funds, and realizable
securities which are strictly the

property of the 5tate, depots of arms,
means of transport, stores and supplies,
and, generally, all movable property

belonging to the State which may be
used for military operations..."
Under the Articles above quoted, it is apparent

that the compulsory labor of the civilian population
for the purpose of carrying out military operations

against their own country was illegal.

Under the same Articles, the compulsory recruitment
from the population of an occupied coimtry for labor
in the Keich was illegal.

It is conceded that this policy of recruitment of
slave labor for the Reich did not originate with the

army. The army apparently desired this source of
labor for its own purposes.

The nature and the extent of this program of re

cruitment for slave labor is shown by Prosecution Exhibit
490.

This docimient concerns the recriiitment of the age

groups 1926 and 1927 for labor in the Reich and applied
alike to men and women within these nge groups.

In other

words, the Reich v/as drafting boys and girls in some in
stances as young as 17 years for slavery in A foreign

country.

The Sauckel plan for the mobilization of foreign

labor v/as based on compulsory requisitioning from the

populations of occupied territories. In fact, all the

-
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economy of the Reich became dependent for its labor to

a large extent upon those sources,.

This stupendous

undertaking could not have been effectively carried
out without the cooperation of the military authorities

in the occupied territories.

Hundreds of thousands of

the helpless population of the occupied territories wore
transferred to the Reich under this program of labor,
recruitment.

The same principles of international law apply to

a large extent with regard to looting and spoliation^
The difference is mainly that in one case Gornaryrequired

human beings and in another, property f.or her own

economy and the conduct of the waPo
It is not contended that individuals of the German

Army were guilty, to a larger extent than is inevitable in
cases of this kind in any army.

The Gorman Armyj, as has

boen pointed out, was on the whole a disciplined arny»
The looting and spoliation sh-own by the record was not
that of individuals but looting and spoliation by the

German government and the German Wehrmacht for the needs
of both.

It was done on a larger scale than was possible

by individuals and the strictness of the prohibitions
against individuals in the army, as shown by the evidence
in this case, seems to have been sometimes based upon

the idea that in looting, the individual was not depriving

the victim of the property but was depriving the Reich
and the Wehrmacht#

The doctrine of military necessity has beon widely

urged#

In the various treatises on international law

thei'e has been much discussion on this quo.sti.^n.
It has boon the viewpoint of many Gorman writers

and to a certain extent has been oontended in this case
-
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that military necessity Includes the right to do anything

that contributes to the v/lnnlng of a war.

V/e content

ourselves on this subject with stating that such a view
v/ould eliminate all humanity and decency and all lavtr
from the conduct of v/ar and i t is

a

contention which

this Tribunal repudiates as contrary to the accepted

usages of civilized nations.

Nor does military necessity,

justify the compulsory recruitment of labor from an

occupied territory either for use in military operations

or for transfer to the Reich, nor does it justify the
seizure of property or goods beyond that which
is nocos3a.ry for

tho

use of the army of occupation.

Looting and spoliation are none the less criminal in

that they ivere conducted, not by individuals, but by
the army and the state.

The devastation prohibited by the Hague Rules and the

usages of war is that not warranted by military necessity.
This rule is clear enough but the factual determination as

to what constitutes military necessity Is difficult.
Defendants in this case were in many instances in retreat
under arduous conditions wherein their commands were in

serious danger of being cut off.

Under such circumstances,

a ooror.iander must necessarily make quick decisions to meet
the particular situation of his command.

R. great deal of

latitude must be accorded to him under such circumstances,

V/hat constitutes devastation beyond military necessity

in these situations requires detailed proof of an

operational and tactical nature.

V/e do not feel that In

this case the proof Is ample to establish the guilt of
any defendant herein on this charge.
Concerning tho treatment of Red Army Soldiers, the
Haaue Conventions provides

-
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"The laws, rights, and dntlGS of v/ar
G-PPly
only to arnies, "but also to
nllltla and volunteer corps fulfilling
the following conditions:

"1«

To "be corvianded by a person respon

"2*

sible for his subordinates;
To have a fixed distinctive ooblon
recognizable at a distance;

"3*
"4«

To carry arns openly; and
To conduct their operations in
accordance v»rith the laws and custons

of war.»
"In countries whore militia or voluntoer

corps•constitute the army, or form part
of it, they are included under the
denomination •ari.iyt,"

This Article defines what constitutes a lawful bolllgorentj
Orders to the effect that Red Army Soldiers v/ho did not

'

turn themselves over to the German authorities would suffer

penalty of being treated as guerillas, and similar orders ,
and the execution of Red Army Soldiers thorounder, are
in contravention of the rights of lawful belligerents
and contrary to international law.
I t has been stated in this

case

that /aierican

occupational oonmandors issued similar orders.

This

Tribunal is not here to txry Allied occupational commanders

but it should be pointed cut that subsequent to the

unconditional surrondor of Germany, she has had no lawful
belligoronts in the field.

-
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RESPONSIBILITY OP CCMVUINDERS
OP

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

ThQ dofonsQ in this oaso as to tho fiold coni-iandors

on trial has boon partially based,on tho contention that
while crininal acts may havo occiirrod within tho torri-

torios undor their,jurisdiction, that those criminal acts

woro comi'-iittod by agoncios of tho stato v/ith which thoy
woro not oonnoctod and over whom thoy oxorcisod no

supervision or control.

It is concodod that many of

thoso dofondants woro ondov/od with executive pov/or but
it is asserted that tho oxecutivo pov/or of field coixiandors
did nob oxtend to the activities of certain ocononic and

polico agoncios which operated v/ithin thoir aroas ; that

tho activities of thoso agoncios constituted limitations
upon their oxorciso of oxecutivo powor.

In this connection it must bo rocognizod that tho res
ponsibility of commandors of occupied torritorios is not
unlinitod.

It is fixod according to tho customs of war,

intornational agroemonts, fundamental principles of
hui'nanity, and the authority of tho connandor which has

boon delegated to him by his own govornnont,

Ls pointed

out horetofore, his criminal rosponsibility is porsonal,
Tho act or ncgloct to act must bo voluntary and criminal,
Tho torn "voluntary" doos not oxcludo prossuros or com

pulsions oven to tho extent of superior ordors.

That

tho choice was a difficult one does not alter cither its

voluntary nature or its criminality.

Prom an intornational

standpoint, criminality may ariso by reason that tho act

is forbidLdon by Intornational agroomenta or is inherently
criminal and contrary to accepted principles of huioanity

as rocognizod and accoptod by civilized nations.

-
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In tho

caso of violr.tions of intornotional asrooriGnts, the

crininality arlsos fron viol-r.tion of the agrooniont itsolfiii othor casos, "by tho inhoront nature of tlio act.
\7ar Is hm.ian violonoo at its utmost.

Undor its impact

Gxcossos of individuals arc not unknov/n in any arriy.

Tho

ncasuro of such individual oxcossos is tho neasuro of .the

pooplo who composo tho army o.nd the standard of dis.ciplino
of tho army to which thoy holong,
gonoral, a disciplinod army.

Tho Gorman hrmy was, in

Tho tragedy of tho Gorman

Wohrnacht and thoso dofondants is that tho crimos chargod

against thorn stom primarily from its h..ghost nillto.ry
loadorship and tho loadorship of tho Third Roich itsolf«
Hilitary subordination is a comprohonsivo hut not
conclusivo factor in fixing criminal rosponsihility.

Tho

authority, both adninistrativo and military, of a conxiandor
and his criminal rosponsihility aro rolatod hut hy no
moans co—oxtonsivo•

Liodorii v/ar such as tho last war ontails

a largo moasuro of d^o—contralization.

j.i high coixjanaor

cannot kocp oomplotoly informod. of tho dotails of military

operations of subordinates and. i.iost assiupodly not of i-.vory
adninistrativo moasuro.

Ho has tho right to assumo that

dotails ontrustod to rosponsihlo subordinates v;lll bo

legally oxocutod.

The Prosidont of tho Unltod States is

Comnandor-ln-Ghiof of its military forces.

Grlr.iinal acts

oonr.iittod by thoso forces cannot in thomsolvos bo charged

to him on tho thoory of subordination.

Tho samo is truo

of othor high coiiuandors In tho chain of cor.imand. Criminality
does not attach to ovory Individual in this chain of
command from that fact alone.
doroliction.

Thoro must bo a porsonal

That can occur only whoro tho act is

directly tracoablo to him or whoro his failure to pajoporXy
suporvlso his subordinates constitutes criminal nogligonoo
-
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on his part. In tho lattor case it nuat ho a personal

neglect arioimting to a wanton, ir.inoral disregard of tho
action of his suhordinatos anounting to acquiescence.

Any other intorprotati n international law w>uld g? \
far hoyond tho h-.sic principles of crh.lnal law as known ^
civilized ncti ^ns#

Concerning the responsibility of a field connander

for crines oonnittod within tho area of his coinand, partiq-

ularly as against tho civilian population, it is urged
by the prosecution that under tho Hague Convention, a
nilitary connander of an occupied torritory is por so

responsible within tho aroa of his occupation, regardless
of orders, regulations, and tho laws of his superiors

limiting his authority and regardless of tho fact that
tho crines cormittod therein were duo to the action of
the state or superior nilitary authorities which ho did

not initiate or in which ho did n6t participate. In thi
respect, howovor, it nust bo borne in nind that a nilit^.ry
oormandor, v/hothor it bo of an occupied torritorj or

otherwise, is subject both to tho orders of his nilitary

superiors and the state itself as to his jurlsclction
functions. Ho is their agent and instrument for certain

purposes in a position fron which thcj can ronovo h
will»

in this connection tho Yamashita case has been cited.

Vftiilo not a decision binding upon this Tribunal, it
ontitlod to groat respect because of the high court which
rendered it. It is not howovor entirely applicable to the
facts in this case for the reason that tho authority of
yaroashita in the field of his operations did not appear to
have been restricted by cither his nilitary superiors or
-
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tho stato, and tho crinos corr.iittod woro by troops imdor

his coi-.^r:and, whoroas in tho caso of tho occupational
corxoandors in thoso procoodincs, tho crinos char^^od v;oro
r.iainly coi;ii.:ittod at tho instance of higher nilito.ry and
Roich authorities.

It is tho opinion-of this Tribunal that a stato can,

as to certain nattors, undor International law liriit tho
oxoroiso of sqvereign pov/ors by a nilitary conn-andor in an
occupied area, but wo are also of the opinion that undor
international: law and accepted usages of civilized no.tions

that ho has certain responsibilities which ho cannot sot

aside or ignore by reason of activities of his ov/n state
within his area.

occupancy exists.

subjoction.

Ho is tho instrunont by v/hich tho

It is his arny which holds tho area in

It is his might v/hich koops an occupied

territory from rooccupancy by tho arnios of tho nation
to v/hioh i t inhorontly belongs.

It cannot bo said that

ho exorcises tho powor by which a civilian population is

subject to his invading army while at tho sano timo tho
state which ho reprosents may como into tho area which he

Holds and subject

tho population to murder of its

citizens and to othor inliur.ian troatmont.

Tho situation

is scr.iov/hat analogous to tho acooptod principlo of
intornational law that tho army which captures tho soldiers
of its adversary has certain fixed rosponsibilitios as
to their caro and troatmont.

Vifo arc of tho opinion, howovor, as above pointed out

in othor aspects of this case, that tho occupying
oomiaandor must have knowlodgo of thoso offenses and

ccq.'uioscG or participato or criminally n^gloct to intorforo in their oonmission and that the offenses committed
must bo patently criminal.
-

But regardless of v/hothor or
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not Tjndar international lav/ such responsibility is fixed
✓

^

upon hin, under the particular facts in this case, res
ponsibility of the commanders in question rests upon
other factors.

In this respect we quote certain pro

visions of the Handbook for the General Staff in V/ar

Tine, pertinent to executive pov/er:
"5. The exercising of executive power
by military connandors is govornod by No.
20 - 24 of /Jvrny Reg. 90 (of the Army in
the Field).

"6. If a Zone of Operation is
determined, the Cor.ii:iandor in Chief of the
Army and the Commanders in Chief of tho
Amies rocoivo at. tho declaration of a
state of defense or at tho declaration of

a state of war authority for exorcising

oxocutivo power in this territory, withovit
furthor order (Paragraphs 2 and 9 of tho
Reich Dofonso Law).
'In other cases
Supreme Com::iandor of

the Fuehrer and
tho

V/ehrmacht

can

transfer such authority for exorcising
executive power to >ho Gonnandor in Chief
of tho Army and tho Conjiandors in Chief
of tho Armies*

"7.

Tho exocutivo power comprises

tho ontiro state pov/or including the right
of issuing lav/s v/lthout prejudice* to tho
indopendonco of jurisdiction. Those
persons invested with oxocutivo power
can decroo local orders o.ffocting tho

territory in v/hioh authority for exor
cising has boon turned over to thon or
transferred to thorn, sot up spooial

courts, and issue instructions to the
authorities and offices conpetont in the

territory named, with tho pxcoption of
tho Supreme Reich Authorities, the

Supreme Prussian Provincial Authorities,
and the Roichloitung of the NSDilP*

"8.

The Supremo Reich AuthDcltiosj

Supremo Prussian .Provincial Authorities, and tho
Roichloitung of the NSD^iP can decree
orders for tho torrltory Into which '

executive power has boon tranaforrod,
only by agroomont v/ith tho persons invostod with oxocutivo power.

Thoir

right of issuing instructions to tho
authoritlos and offioos subordinated
to them ronalns Intact.
Nevertheless

tho right of issuing instruction by
tho person invested v/ith executive
authority takes procodonco.
— 118
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"9« .authority for exorcising
oxocutive power is incumbent only on the

persons inyostecl.

It can bo transferred

further only inasmuch as an authoriza-^ion

is ordered thereto actually or legally.
"Accordingly persons invested v;ith
executive power o.re authorized to entrust
subordinated offices with the execution
of

individual missions.

"10,

The lav;s, decrees, etc, which

are valid at the transfer of the executive

pov/er retain their validity so long as
the person invested with executive power
encounters no contrary order.
"11,

The Conmandor in Chief of the

Amy regulates the exercising of executive
power through the Connanders in Chief of
the ;*.rnios.

"The revision of questions which occur

in the exorcising of executive pov/er does
not fall into the realm of work of the

Army judges.

The civilian conmissionor

with the High Comiiand of the -'.rny is

assigned, for that purpose to the Gor.iiuandor
in Chief of the ;.rmyi the chiefs of the

civil administration, to the Coi.roandors
in Chief of the -mlos.. Persons Invostod
with oxocutive power are authorized^

howovor, to call in the Army judges

assigned to then as counsellors, especially
in the doorooing of legal orders of penal
law content."

It is therefore apparent that oxocutive power under

Gorman law is the exorciso of sovereign powers within
an occupied area conferred upon a military commandor by
the stato.

The defense has undertaken to minimize to

a largo extent this wid^o authority but in view of the
above docuioont, it docs not appear to bo the more

shadow of authority contondiod.

In fact, those pro

visions fix upon an occupying conmandor certain rospon-

aibilitios as to the preservation of law pjid order within
his area.

The contention of defendants that the economic agonclos

were oxcludod from their oxoroise of ©xocutlvo pov/or

is disproved by vari:ius doouioonts which will hereafter be

-
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citod in considoring tho guilt or innoconco of dofondants
on trial,

/jid rogardlosa of that fact, tho proof in this

case also ostablishos a voluntary cooporation of dofondants
on trial with those ocononio agancios in tho furtherance
of thoir illogal.activitios*
Tho dofonso contends, that the activitios of tho

Elnsatzgruppon of tho Socurity Polico and SD v/oro boyond
thoir sphoro of authority as occupational connandors
bocausG tho stato had authorized tho illegal activitios
of those police units and so liriitod the oxocutive pov/or

of tho occupational coiTn.iancGrs«

However, tho occupational

coLiriandors in this caso woro boarors of oxocutive power
♦

»

'

'

and, ono and all, havo doniod rocoipt of any orders showing,
or Icnov/lodgo of, a stato authorized program providing for
tho illegal activitios of tho Einsatzgruppen,

Ono of tho functions of an occupational cor.inandor

endowed with oxocutivo pov/or was to maintain order and

protoct tho civilian population against illegal acts.
In tho absonco of any official diroctivos limiting his
/

oxocutivo powers as to those illogal acts within his

aroa, ho had tho right and duty to tako action for thoir
supproasion.

Cortainly ho is not in a position to contend

that thoso activitios v/oro takoii from his flold of

oxocutivo powor by his superiors whon ho know of no such
action on thoir part.

Tho solo question then as to such dofondants in this
caso is whothor or not thoy Icnow of tho criminal activitios

of tho Elnsatzgruppon of tho Socurity Polico and SD and

jioglootod to suppross thorn.
It has boon urgod that nil of tho dofondants in this

caso must havo had knov/lodgo of tho illogal activitios of
-
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the Einsatzgruppon.

It has been argued that "because of

the extent of their murder program In the occupational
areas and "by reason of the communications availa"ble to

the high coiimanders, and the fact that they were in

coimaand of these areas^ they must necessarily have knov/n
of this program.

The record in this case shows that some

90,000 so-called undesirable elements v/ore liquidated by
Einsatzgruppe D, largely within the area of the 11th Array*
It also shows that some 40,000 Jewish v/omen and children

were liquidated in Riga which at that time was in the
Coniiiiissariat Ostland, immediately to the rear of the Army
Group ITorth,

The Einsatzgruppen and their subordinate

units were organized to carry out this program within the

operational areas of the army.
It is true that extermination of such a large number

of people must necessarily havo come to the attention of
many individuals, and, also, it is established that soldiers
in certain areas participated in some of these executions.

In many respects a hi£^ commander In the German Army
was ronoved from Information as to facts which may have boon
y

known to troops subordinate to him.

In' the first place,

these troops were in many instances far removed from his

headquarters.

In addition the connon soldiers and junior

officers do not have oxconsive contacts v/ith the high
commandGrs and staff officers.

Another factor must also be taken into consideration in

connection v/ith the activities of the Einsatzgruppen,^ This
Is the dual nature of its functions.

On the one hand, it

was charged with the criminal liquidation of certain eloments; on the other hand it exercised legitimate police
activitloa In connection v/ith the security of the rear
communications of the armies, in which capacity it operated
largely against guerillas,
-
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Another factor was the effort made to keep the

criminal activities of these police units from the

Wehrmacht,

In the early stages of the viar many of

their mass execut^g^gj as is shgwn by the record, ^
occurred ugder the

guise of pogremg ipe^igated by the

SIPO and SD but actually carried out by local inha

bitants.

Racial hatreds and pogroms ha^e been known

In Europe for centuries.

Pogroms occurred at the tlije

of the Crusades and have recurred in the history of

Europe, even In our time.

It is established that

pogroms were used by Elnsatzgrjippe A which operated in

the area of the Army Group North and In the Commissariat
OstlaJid, as a vehicle for, their criminal activities.

At times it is shown such pogroms were participated in
by local militia which necessarily owed its existence

to the German Army,
Another source of information was reports submitted

by Einsatzgruppen to army headquarters, but it is noted
that such reports concerned mainly activities within

their legal sphere of combatting partlssrs and the
maintenance of security.

However, such reports showed

tiae execution of Jews, gypsies, and others as specific
classifications of those liquidated.

Reports of the

mass murders carried out by these police units, however,
were submitted through their own channels to the RSHA

in Berlin and were not submitted to army headquarters
or through such headquarters.
An army commander has two reliable and extensive

official sources of information! (l) superior orders;
(2) reports of subordinate urlta.

It is true that no superior orders transmitted to
the defendant field commanders shov; the mass murder
-
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procran of tho Third Roich havo boon introducod in ovldonco
with tho oxcoption of tho Co^.r.iissar Order in which tho

oxoctiting agency was not tho SD but tho arrjy itsolf.
'Official reports of subordinato units nornally furnish
a vast aiiiount of infonnation.

Reports of individual in

stances of illegal acts ::iay however not be subnitted to

higher headquarters if for no other reason than that tho
suppression of such acts is tho province of tho subordinato
rnd their occurrence night bo a subject for criticism,

Also tho staff of high operational coiriands engaged in
extensive combat operations is much loss lilrely to bring
such matters to tho attention of tho commander than tho
staff of a

lower command.

Other factors to bo considorod as to tho laiowlodgo of

criminal acts of tho SIPO and SD by defendants is tho tine,

tho localltioa, tho combat situation, tho oxtont of tho
activities, and tho nature of the command.

This, in brief, sumiviariz os

the main factors considorod

and tho sources of Icnowlodgo appraised in dotormining tho

criminal responsibility of tho defendants in this case In
connection with activities of tho Einsatagruppon of tho

SIPO and SD.

From this discussion it is apparent wo can:

draw no general presumpti'en as to their Icnowlodgo in this
natter and must necessarily go to tho ovidonco pertaining

to tho va.rious defendants to make a dotornlnation of this
question,

j.'ind it is further

that to osts.bllsh tho

guilt of a defendant from connection with acts of tho SIPO
and SD by acquiosoonce, not only must knowledge bo establishod,. but tho tine of such Icnowlodgo must bo ostabllshod.
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Vjfhon V7G discuss tho ovidonco agninst tho various

dofondants^ wo shall troat with groator detail the
ovidonpQ rqla^iins

thq activities of tho Einsatzgruppon

in tho counandg of thq ^ajijous dofondants, and to what
Gxtont, if any, such astivitios were known to and

acquioscod in or supported by then*

•

r. \
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HITLER .J>1D THE VjEHRIyLVCHT

The defense has asserted that there was considerable

opposition to Hitler's plans and orders by the higher

military leadership.

General Franz Haider, who was Chief

of the German General Staff from 1938 to 1942, testified
that Hitler's plans to invade the Sudetenland caused the

formation of a plot for a coup to overthrow Hitler, but
that this plot was abandoned because of the liunich Pact,
Be this as it may, the success of Hitler at Munich increased

his prestige with all circles of the German people. Including
the higher military leadership.

In 1939, Hitler advised certain of the high military
loaders of his decision to attack Prance by violating the

neutrality of the Low Countries.

On 11 October 1939, von

Leeb wrote his commander in chief, von Brauchitsch,
Inclosing a memorandvim prepared by him advising against
this course of action.

In It he argues that the Invasion

would develop into a long drawn out trench warfare, and
then continued:

-it Besides, wo will not bo in
a position to rally allies to our cause.'
Even, now, Italy is sitting on the fence,
and Russia has accomplished everything

it had aimed at by virtue of our victories,
and by this has again become a predominant
and directly decisive factor as far as

Central Europe is concorned.

Furthermore,

Russia's attitude remains uncertain In

view of its continued diplomatic rolations
to the Western powers.
The more v/o tie
ourselves down in the West the more

freedom the Russians will have for their
decisions. On the other hand, Belgium

and, in the course of the years, the
United States of junerica as well will

join our enemies, and the Dominions will

exert all their strength to give effective
assistance to the mother coxmtry."

Thon, in discussing the political repercussions which would
follow from this proposed action, ho said:

-
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"Any vlolc.tlon of Belgium's
neutrali-^y is "bound to drive that comtry
into t^Q arms of France. Prance and
Belgium-v/ill then have one comirion foo5
Germany, which for the second time within
25 years, assaults neutral Belgium^
Germany, whoso government solemnly
vouched for and promised the preservation
of and respect for this neutrality only

a few wo'eks ago]

I have already ela'boratod

under paragraph 1 on the fact that in such
a case it is highly proba"blG that France

will iramediately rush strong forces to the
aid of the Belgians, which means that there
will be heavy fighting already on Belgian
soil.

"If Germany, by forcing the issue,
should violate the neutrality of Holland,

Belgium, and Luxemburg, a neutrality v/hich
V*

has been solemnly recognized and vouched
for by the Gorman government, this action
will necessarily cause oven those neutral
states to reverse their declared policy

towards the Reich, which up till nov/ showed
some measure of sympathy for the Gorman

Cause. The Reich, which cannot count on
Italy's or Russia-s military assistance,
will become increasingly isolated also '
economically.-- Sspoclrlly North /jnorica,
whoso population easily falls for such
propagand-a slogans, will become more

inclined to submit to England's and France's
influence."

Then on 51 October 1939 von Loob wroto von Brauchitsch
a lo"ttor in which he said;

"I consider the military annihilation
of the English, French, and Belgians a
goal which cannot bo attained at present.
For only if they are annihilated would thoy,
if attacked, bo ready for peace.
"To associate the succossgs

in the

East v;ith the wishful thinking in" regard
to the West v/ould bo a fatal deviation from
reality.

"In tho political field, wo have
Poland as security in our hands, don't wo?
If that doesn't suit our opponents, then
lot them attack".

"The whole nf^-tion_is f
de£p_longlng_f^r_p^a^e^ _Tt

a

th£ iF£ondlyi£ war and ro£ard£ 3^t__w^th no

rG£l3^n£ £f_syrn£aFhy wbat£0£V£r^ If Fho
lia2ort3yi£ an2;tEing_oTso,
Ere now £ookTn£ Forwa^rE

-
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£®£^£

ro£ult_from

Fu£hror,_ti£C£U£o3thoJ
st_in£ti^vG^lj

^s iinpos£ihl£

5G£tro^ Fr£n£o_and__EngTand ?'.nd__thot
£n^ Eioro_oxt£n£iv0^pTcins njust £h£r£foro b£ hold In ab£yance« Ls a £oXiior,

£n£ Js2[^'£^£g5 £o£say__tho~sr.cio.

^ "

the Ji^uehrQr woro now to niakg aii
gn4 tg the presont sitijation, under eons

4ltiof|s ifi^hlc^ Vi^orQ jp gonie nigasupe

accoptablo no one would iritorprot this

as a sign of woalmbss or of yielding but

rather as rocognioing tho true status of
pov/or,
Tho granting of an autonomy for

Czechoslovakia and allov/ing the romaindor
of Poland to stand as a nation would

probably moot with tho conpleto under

standing of tho ontiro Gorman poople,
Tho Puohror would then bo honored as a

PrincG of Poaco, not only by tho ontiro
Gorman pooplo, but assuredly also by
largo parts of tho world as woll.
"I an proparod to stand behind you

do£ira^l£ £^"n£C£S£aryT(Smphasis supplTod)
In splto of this, tho plans vi/ont ori for the invasion^
v/hich, howovor, was- dolayod lantil tho following Hay.
Boob toatifiod this dolay v/as brought about by

Von

tho offorts

of von Bock, Haldor, and hinaolf, in the hopo that tho

additional tino might allow a diplomatic sottlemont,

Tho

'

roasons givdn for

^

tho dolay woro puroly military, viz,,

that tho roads woro impassable, tho oquipmont dofoctivo,
otc.

The moral phaso was not consldorod.

So it is cloar thoro was some opposition cmong tho
I

military loadorship to Hitlor's plans, but tho tragedy of

it is that thoso mon, in spito of their opposition, allowed
thonisolvos to bo used by him.

Von Loob was asked by a

monbor of tho Tribunal why it was this loadorship was

impotent and holplosa against Hitler, to which ho replied:
"Hitler was a demon, ho was a
dovil.

Gonoral Haldor has toatifiod

horo that you couldn't know what waa-

going on in his mind.

That, perhaps,

is how i t happonod that thoso wills
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which wore opposing "lihla ono will woro
too viroak to "oe suceossful.

Above all

this v/ill was rcprosented in Qun toplevol loadorship but wo could not got

at hiin.
Hltlor.

Thoro was no way of convincing
Ho Imow oyorything bottor than

ovorybody olso, and that is how disaster
took its course.

"If novi in rotrospoct you look back
on tho v/holo situation, ono night perhaps
think that v/o, tho high military loadors,
should havo formod a moro united front in

opposition to Kitlor.

Lot's perhaps tako

the following caso, Horr von Brauchitsch
and the throe of us, tho thrco army group
comnandors, ono day confrontod Hitler and

toll hin,

'So far and no further.'

Bohind

us is tho v/hole of the Gorman Army.

I

don't bolievo that that would h'^vo made

a srong iz^iprossion on Hltlor.

He would

havo had the four of us arrostod and put
into a concentration camp."

Tho testimony of General Haider, referred to by von Loeb,
was in response to a request that ho give briefly his
impression of Hltlor, and is as follows;

"This is a very difficult task.

A personality which was so unusual, is
difficult to sketch with very few words.
The picture which I gained of Hitler is
as follows :

An unusual power of Intellect;

an amazingly quick comprehension; but

not a trained person who could adapt

himself to logical linos of thought; a
person with very strong emotional tondoncios; his decisions woro"conditioned

by what ho called intuition, that is his
emotions, but no clear logically thought-

out considerations; his Intollect also

included an amazing povror of imagination

and phantasy which In an astonishing

dcgreo had its roporcusslon in his linos
of thought or events; substantial parts
of his character wore a tremendous

tenacity and energy of wlll-pov/or which
also enabled hli;! to surmount all obstacles,
oven in minor matters.

The thing that

nost ImpresEod no about Hitler v/as tho

conpleto absence of any ethical or moral
obligation; a. nan for whom thoro was

no limits which ho could not transcend by
his action or his will; ho know only
his purpose and the advantage that ho
pursued; that for him was the Imperative

call. As far as it seemed to me, ho was
a very lonely nan who lacked tho capacity
to enter into personal contact with other
huizian beings and thus to relax and to

-
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roloaso his porsonallty.

Ho was thus

always torn hy tons ion v/hich nado

cooperation with bin oxtroiiioly difficult.

I was not prepared for your question.
Your Honor.

This is a question about

v/hich nany books will yot bo written,
and I shall bo grateful to your Honors
If you would bo-satisfied with this brief
sketch of n^ino."

In tho closing statorjont of General von Loob in behalf

of all tho defendants, ho referred repeatedly to tho
difficulties confronting then, saying;
"However, in tho Third Reich, under
tho dictatorship of Hitler, v;o found
ourselves faced v/ith a devolopnont which .
was in contrast to our principles and

nature.

It is not true to say that v/o

as officers changed -

the donands reado of

us bocaieo difforont.

"Wo sought to opposo this evolution
under tho Third Reich, but wo lackod tho
moans v/hich might havo boon offoctivo
undor a dictatorship."

hgain ho said;

"In regard to Hitler's Instructions,
which wont against our huieano and soldierly
foollngs, wo wore never moroly his tools
v;ithout a will of our ovm.

Wo did

opposo his instru.ctions as far as wo

doomed this to bo possible or advisablo,
and wo havo to.n od thoir wording down

and rondorod thorn ineffoctive or mitigated
then in practice."

To von Loob, Kitlor was a "demon -x- -k- -x- a dovil", and

to Haider ho had "a comploto absence of any othical or
moral obligation",

Tho demands ho made of tho defendants

may have boon "In contrast to thoir principles and natures",
and against thoir "hiamano and soldiorly foolings", but
tho inescapable fact ronains that in part at least, if

not to tho whole, thoy pormittod thoir conscioncos and
opinions to bocomo subordinate to his v/ill, and it was
this which has placod such groat and Inoradicablo shano
upon tho Gorman arms.

Wo roalizo tho foolings of professional prido, of
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c-Bbition to succeed in their profession of orns^ of fear
for thoir personal safety or of reprisals against tholr

fanilios, thoir love of country, their soldiers' concept
of ohodicncc, and, indeed, the ingrainod respect of the
Gornan for those in authority ovor hin, wore factors in
their docisions. Wo aro aware of the tendoncy towards

degeneration of "civilized" warfare in the uodorn concept
of "total" war, and of the war rsadnoss that engulfs all
pooplo of belligerent powers.

Those.considerations cannot excuse, but it is propor
to consider and Judge in any case the offenses charged
in the light of thoir historical and psychological

background and in thoir coinoctlons with all surrounding
circiiu-.istoncGs.

-
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IvTLKEUi VON L5SB

Field Marshal -i/ilhelm von Leeb was born in 1876, entered
service in 1695, and had various promotions until he became a

Field Marshal in 1940. He was Commander-in-Chief of Army
Oroup North in the campaign against Russia until 16 January
1942, when he resigned primarily because of interference in

technical matters by Hitler and was then placed in the Fuehrer
Reserve.

The Cerman Array, prior to the establishment of array
groups, was based on Heeres or ground forces which were com

posed of armies and subordinate units.

administrative and operational.

The armies were both

When the army group was

established, the staff provided was much smaller than the

staff of the subordinate armies, according to the testimony
of Kuechler, one-third or one-half the size of the staff of
an army.

Judicial authority did not extend through the com

mander of the army group.

He had no representative of the

Quartermaster (General who directly controlled matters of sup
ply.

The Quartermaster General did not operate directly

through the army group but through the armies and army group
rear areas where there were representatives of his depart
ment on the staff.

A commander of the army group in the early stages of
its development had no staff of experts for supervision of
prisoner of war affairs which was directly under the

Quartermaster General and his subordinates.

Nor did the

economic agencies of the Reich operate 'through the army
group.

The armies and commanders of army group rear areas

had exports on thoir staffs to deal with these matters.
During the period of the defendant von Leeb's command
of Army Group North the duties imposed upon him were almost
exclusively operational and his headquarters and staff were
-
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strictly oporr.tipnal In their fmctions.

SxocBtivo power r.t tho b.ginnlns of the Rusaiari ccuypaicn
was conferred directly upon tho '^r^y con.,andors and the ^
cor...andcrs of the arriy group roar areas. It was providodi
howovor, that tho coin.,:.ndor-in-chiof of an arffly group night
issue orders to his subordinates in tho field of executive
power, in other words, his authority in this field was
moro in tho naturo of

y,,.-

i

•

r-irrh-h •^-r^

• *.

to intorvono that a diroct

rosponsibility.,

f

irn. po.or to Inlorvooo "olloooa tho goiioi.o.l pr.ttoni ot

M. oooooM outhotit,

t„tort,o,oto

authority and rosponsIbilR i--r
Wff

I.ovortl.oloo,;

....e to many adi-jinistrativo matters

woro directly vostod in Loob's onbnrd-fv.o+-

u-uDordinatos.

It v;as common for

tho OKH and staff offlcorc of
"n
jj. thMiw mcR
udl to issuo ordorc
directly
to those subordinates \7ith.-'nt
n.uit

such ordors always being submittod

to army group hoadquarters for -i-L
informntion
uimaLion.

xr,

• .

In other inctancos,

orders- addressed to subord-tnnf.so.

suDOxdinato units v/oro sent though

the army group.

In such

o-.oos tno army group headquarters

acted as a for^.-varding rponn.r

,.,•? 4-i

•

•b nc^. , with, implomontation of ordors

resulting from their boxng put into command channels, and
not from action on the part of the defendant.

Tho defendant .s army group had moved frora East frussia

to Leningrad. Ho had under his command from five to six .
hundred thousand soldiers. His oporati-ens were of groat
nagnitudo. Thoy started with the opening of the Russian
campaign on 21 Juno 1941 and his activities terminated
' •

oj,iici'-lly on 16 J,,nu r^ 1942. In this coriparativoly brief
period of txmo ho had moved a great amy over a vast ter
ritory tindor tho arduous conditions of combat. Ls str.tod'
his function was operational. Hany administrative duties

had boon loft to his subordinate art;ilos and his army groavo
roar aroa. Ho and his staff alike would have the right to
assumo that tho conmandoi-s ontrustod with such actdnistrativo
-
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functions would see to their proper execution.

Under such

conditions it must be accepted that certain details of ac-

•

tivities x^ithin the sphere of hie subordinates would not be
brought to his attention.

The evidence ^establishes that criminal orders were ex
ecuted by units subordinate to the defendant and criminal
acts were carried out by agencies within his command.

But

it is not considered under the situation outlined that

criminal responsibility attaches to him merely on the theory
of subordination and over-all command.

He must be shown

both to have had knowledge and to have been connected with

such criminal acts either by way of participation or criminal
acquiescence.

Aside from the charge of Crimes against Peace hereto

fore disposed of in this opinion, the charges against him

relate to tZie period he was Commander-in-Chief of Army Group
North,

think these changes may be broken down into the

following general headings; (l) The Commissar Order; (2) Crimes
against Prisoners of War; (3) The Barbarossa Jurisdiction

Order; (4) Crimes against Civilians; (5) Pillage of Public

and Private Property; (6) Criminal Conduct Pertaining to the
%

Siege of Leningrad.
1.

We shall discuss these serlrtlm.

The Commissar Order.

We have discussed the criminality of the Commissar Order
Von Leeb was present at the meeting held by Hitler in harch

1941 when the proposed extermination of the OommlssarB was

siinounced.

He considered this to be in violation of inter

national law and, as well, to be stupid in that it tended

to defeat its own purpose. He discussed the matter with von
Brauchitsch and lodged a protest with him. Von Brauchitsoh
assured him he would do all he could to prevent the issuance

-
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Of tiie order but notwithstanding this, it was later Issued
by the OKH.

Von heeb as Commander of Army Crroup North and

von Bock of Army Group Center and von Kundstedt of Array
Group South were opposed to it.

Von Leeb made further pro

test to von Brauchitsch on the occasion of the letter's

visits in July and September 1941 and likewise protested
to Keitel on two occasions.

Keitel replied he v/ould do his

best to obtain a cancellation of the order.

Later, pursuant

to the objection made by the commanders of the army groups,
General hueller, Genercal for Special Assignments under Com

mander-in-Chief of the Array, von Brauchitsch, wrote the OKN
on 23 September 1941 as follows:
\

"It is requested to check on the neces
sity of the carrying out of the 'Commissar'
decree in its present form, considering the
development of the situation. Coramranders,

Commanding Officers and the troops them
selves report that the will to fight on
port of the Russians could be weakened if

the Commissars, who no doubt are the pil
lars of the embittered and stubborn re

sistance would find it easier to give up the
fight,

to surrender or to desert.

"At present the prevailing situation is

such that every Commissar faces his death in

any case; that is why a large number of them
is fighting to the last and also forces the

Red Army soldiers to resist stubbornly by
the most brutal means.

"The comb-^t situction being what it is
at present, when here and there the Russian

side shows ? slight weakening due to the
large losses, the diminishing supply of per
sonnel and material, the mixing of units and

the indecisiveness of the leadership, a pa

ralysis of the will to fight generally by

breaking the resistance of the Commissars

might have a not inconsiderable success and,
under circumstances may Srive much blood.

"The achievement of the goal should be

attempted in proper form by all kinds of
propaganda by varied means.

—'^^6„Commande.r-in-Ch_ie£ £f„the__Army _p1_80
beli^v^s_thay jth^ ab^v^ vi^w^ H^lch hrye_Jbeen
report^d_to him personally by all ^my Grouos
deperve consideration frpm3_milltary poInV*"'
and a ye consideration £f the"
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_tr^r_tm_en^ _of_the_Commi_ss_^r_B ac_cord£d_to_
w-to-now ^eeins expedient to_h.lm^"
(Emph.nsis suppliedT

It will be noted this rGcoiiiraend'"'.tion Is based, wholly upon
military considerations without pjiy discussion of the moral
ph^^se which of course would not have interested Hitler.

This recommendation was submitted to Hitler and a notation

was thereupon made In Jodl's writing, as follows:

"The

Fuehrer has refused any change In the decree concerning
treatment of Russian Coramlss-rs Issued up to now."
It is apparent that Mueller's letter corrobcr'^tes von

Leeb's testimony reg-'rding the opposition to this order by
the Commanders-ln-Chlef of these Army Groups.
V;hen this order was issued, it w-s directed by OKH to
the armies In these three groups, who however received copies

for informational purposes.

In other words, the Army Group

had nothing to do with the passing on of this order to subordln:\tc units beyond the administrative functions of for

warding it to them.

However, in addition to his protests to his superiors,
von Leeb discussed this order with subordln:-te ccmm'^nders
rnd let tlicra know of his opposition to it.

He also mention

ed the Maintenance of Disolpline Order Issued by von

Brauchltsch in an effort to thw rt as f^r a.s he could the

enforcement of the Coramlssrr Order.
As a practical purpose, what other action was open to

him?

could not revoke this order coming as it did from
superiors, even from the head of the st-^te.

Had he

undert-.ken to do so, this would have been a fla-.r-^nt disobedionoe of orders.

In discussing the resignation, he sa.ld:

"* * *In addition, as r Commander, I knew
that -^11 Commanders I t-lkeci to were 'gainst

fv.

this order ^nd therefore I hoped that at
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,

least it would not be carried out in its
full measure ynd if I had resigned at that
time then I would have saved myself in the
oneapest manner possible but at the same

time I would have given up the struggle
against Hitler and for the rest such an ap

plication for resignation would probably
not have made the slightest impression on

hitler.

In addition it would probably have

become known why I resigned because I
couldn't suddenly say, 'I am ill- I can't
go on any longer.' "

He was then asked as to his present Impressions /about
this question, to which he replied;

^ have had ample time and opportunity

about this order and about what we

did at that time under the pressure of re

sponsibility and here I must admit I don't

I
^

Imow even today any better way. At that
time as far as it was possible at all, we

^

tacitly sabotaged the order and all de

pended on our doing it tacitly. I really
don t know how we could do it differently

^

today."

This order had been passed down to his subordinate
units, tne 18th Army under Kuechler, the 16th Army under
Bush, and the 4th Panzer Group under Hoeppner. And in
spite of von Leeb's attitude, the reports of units in

these subordinate commands indicate the murder of many of
these functionaries.

It may be that in some Incidents

the figures were fictitious or exaggerated but in spite
of this, we find there were many cases of these atrocities.
But we cannot find von Leeb guilty in this particular.

did not disseminate the order.

He

He protested against it

and opposed it in every way short of open and defiant

refusal to obey it. If his subordinate commanders dis
seminated it and permitted its enforcement, that is their
responsibility and not his.
2.

Crimes against Prisoners of War.

During the period of von Leeb's command of Army Group
North, prisoners of war in his area were under the general
-
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supervision of the Quartermaster &enerol.

He in turn was sub

ject to the supervision of the commander-in-ohief of the OKH,
at that time von Brauchitsch, who in turn was subject to tiie
over-all command of Hitler through the OKW. The Quartermaster
General carried out his functions through subordinates in the

1
V

armies and the army group rear areas. In both there were of
ficers subordinated in part to him but primarily subordinated
to the commander of the armies :nd the army group rear rneas
to whose staffs they belonged. Eesponsibility for prisoner
of w^r affairs w.s therefore directly vested in the comm.anders
of the armies and of the army group rear areas. Direct responsibilioy in these matters by-passed the commander-inchief of the army group. While he had the right to issue

orders to his subordinates concerning such matters, he also
had the right to assume that the officers in command of
those units would properly perform the functions which had
been entrusted to them by higher authorities, both as to the

proper care of prisoners of war or the uses to which they
might be put. He also had the right as heretofore pointed
out, to assume that certain uses to wnich they were put were

legal under the conditions existing m the war with Russia. As
we have stated, their use in dangerous occupations or in

dangerous localities was obviously illegal under internation
al law but there is no subst-ntial evidence tha.t such il

legal uses of prisoners of war were ever brought to the attention of the defendant.

The only evidence th.-^t the use of Russian prisoners of
war to clear away mines was ever called to tiie attention of
the defendant is contained in Rebuttal Exhibit 3, NOKW-3337
Book I, page 4.

This document states that:

"This morning the C in C of Army drouD

Nortn visited the Panzer Group,

"The essential content of the conference
^
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w?s about as follows:"

The pertinent entry reads;

* ^Because of the many mines laid in the
houses they are not yet being entered (a
clear away the mines.• It

^^i^oners are used to

This document was signed by Golling, iSajor, GSC, Liaison
Officer OKIij with Panzer G-roup 4,

It IS considered that this entry is too vague and sub
ject to too many interpretations to establish that the defen
dant von Leeb was advised of this use of prisoners of war and
consented thereto.

^
*

To prove von Leeb's knowledge of the neglect of prisoners
of war It is urged that his Chief of Staff, Brennecke, at
tended a conference at Orscha on 13 November 1941 where the
question of food supplies of prisoners of war was broached
by the Cnief of Staff of the Army Group Center. It is to
be noted that the record of this conference is found in the
files of the 18th Army, one of the units subordinate to von
Leeb and directly responsible for prisoner of wr,r affairs.

The feport in auestion on this meeting, however, merely
states that Army Group Center "points out in particular that
Im

the prisoners of war actually constitute necess.ry addition
al labor, were, however, unable to work in their present
condition, but fell to a large extent into a state of exhaustion".

Nothing appears in this document as to the condition of

prisoners of war within the area of the Army Group North,
nor does it appear that any report was made to the defendant
von Leeb concerning the matter.

It IS also urged that the defendant must have known of
the neglect of prisoners of war from seeing them upon the

roads. This is a broad assumption. . The condition of these
prisoners on the road as heretofore pointed out might well
-
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have been due to tbeir condition when captured and not to

any neglect of their captors at that time,
A Careful examination of all the evidence on this sub

ject does not establish either that the defendant von Leeb
was guilty of neglect of prisoners of Wer or responsible
for their improper use within the abed of his command.
There is proof in the record that Red Army soldiers

were illegally executed within the area of the defendant
von Leeb and to show his connection therewith and responsi

bility therefor, our attention has been invited to certain
exhibits.

The first of these is an order of 13 September 1241.

An examination of this exhibit shows an ordei" issued by the

(3-eneral for Special Assignments with the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army, to the 6th Army which was not under von Leeb's
command.

ThL^a order was sent to army groups for information,

' From these facts neither transmittal via. the defendant von
Leeb nor enforcement of this order can be inferreo.,
A further order of the OKH, signed von Erauchitech,

dated 25 O^Jtober 1941 is also called to our attention, and

^

it is stated that this was obviously distributed by the Army
Oroup North in view of the divisional'order of the 12th Infan-

f

try Division of the 16th Army which was part of the Army
Crroup North, and a somewhat similar order of the 281st

Security Division T^hich was under the command of the Rear

Area of Army G-roup North.

However, examination of these ex

hibits shows neither the actual order which was suppo'sed to
1

jiave been distributed by the defendant von Leeb nor that such
an order was ever transmitted by him to the channels of com
mand.

The order itself does not in fact show the distribu

tion made of the order or that it was in fact ever distri
buted.

,/
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We are therefore unable to find from the evidence that
the defendant von Leeb was criminally connected with, knew

of, or participated in the illegal execution of Red Army
soldiers within his area.

3.

The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.
This was a Fuehrer Order received by the Array Group

under Leeb's command.

There is nothing to show that it

was ever directed to subordinate units under him.

It has

been contended that this was an order pertaining to judicial

authority and would not concern an army group and therefore
would have been transmitted direct to those commanders who

had judicial authority.

Examination of the order itself

however shows that only In part did it pertain particularly

to judicial authority.

Basically, it was an order pertain

ing to the conduct and discipline of troops and of such a
nature to be of the highest significance to any officer in
command of troops, including the army group commanders. The
order itself charges troop officers with the responsibility
of informing subordinate officers.

An entry in the war diary of the Army Group North
JK
«v-

shows that it was transmitted with the OKH order of 1 June
1941 to subordinate units.

There is no evidence in the record

to show that the defendant von Leeb expressed more than a

disapproval of the order and that was on the basis that it
threatened the discipline of the army. We must conclude

from the evidence that this order was put into the chain of .
command by von Leeb'e action.

It was a criminal order, at least in part.

It was

further an order that was at best ambiguous in respect to

the authority conferred upon a Junior officer to shoot in
dividuals who were merely suspected of certain acts. Tnere

-140 -

•

...

...

•.

Is nothing to show that in the transmittal of this order, it
ws.s in any way clarified or that instructions were given in

any way to prevent its illegal application.

The evidence

establishes that von Leeb implemented this order by passing

it into the chain of command.

Coming directly through him' ,

in the chain of command, it carried the weight of hie

authority as well as that of his superiors.

The record in

this case shows that it was criminally applied by units sub
ordinate to him.

Having set this instrument in motion, he

must assume a measure of responsibility for its illegal
application.

4,

Crimes against Civilians.
This charge derives from the activities of Einsatzgrup-

pe

A which was assigned to and operated within the area of

the Army Group North.

With regard to Field Marshal von Leeb's responsibility
for crimes committed by the Elnsatzgruppen within his area of

command, as we have stated, it would be immaterial whether
he knew that his government was carrying out a program of

mass murder and cooperated with it, or whether he was unaT^ore that there was such a program

entrusted to the police

by the authority of the state but still pormlttod acts of
mass murdor to bo oarriod out.
It is urged, that von Leeb knew of the extermination

program of the German government entrusted to the Elnsatz

gruppen.

To prove this three documents have been called to

our attention.

The first of these is an OKH order of

28 April 1941; the second is an OKH order of 9 ^ug, 1941. Roth of
these orders were shown to have been received by the Army
Group North and it can be presumed that communications from
this source would be brought to the attention of the commLinder

-
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of an army group.

However, neither of these documents shows

that extermination program of the Third Reich.

The third

document upon which his knowledge of such a program is al

leged to have "been based is prosecution exhibit 367, The
significant pert of the document is found on page 214 of
Document Book 6-0.

This was an Indosure to an operational

order from the SIPO and SD concerning the use of the Sinsat zkommandos. This indosure, dated 7 October 1941, is
referred to on page 209 where it is said that directives

were completed in agreement with the High Command of the

Army.

However, there is nothing to show that the indosure

was ever transmitted to the Array-Group North or that it was
V

not in fact a draft of a contemplated order. It Is a fixed
rule of Interpretation that an ambiguous document must be con

strued most favorably to the defendant. While this document
definitely shows illegal activities of the Security Police,
the proof does not establish that it was ever received by
the defendant von Leeb,

The proof relied upon to show his knovjledge of these
criminal acts of the Elnsptzgruppen against the civilian

population within the area of his command is in part con
tained in reports of various officers of Einsatzgruppe . A
to their superiors in Berlin.

These reports were not sent

to von Leeb nor through his headquarters.

They are evi

dence to establish that certain extermination activities

were carried out by this organization.

However, they are of

a nature which must be viewed with careful scrutiny. In
many respects as to time and place they are extremely vague.
A report asserts that 135,000 people had been liquidated by
the Einsatzgruppe

A but where these liquidations occurred

is subject to oonsiderable doubt. We know from other proof
that some 40,000 Jews were liquidated in Riga, apparently by

-
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Einsatzrjruppo A, but this liquidation occurrod in tho ter
ritory imder the Reichs Co;:iroissar, Ostland,

and outside

the territory of tho defendant♦

Other than the mass liquidation which occurred at

Kowno, the evidence does not establish any liquidations
v/ithin his area v/hich wore brought to tho attention of

tho defendant.

This action, apparently inspired by^the

Einsatzgruppen, was however carried out as a pogrom,

credited to a'local self-defense orranisation of Latvians,

Hearing of this action, von Locb took action to prevent
any rocurronco of a similar nature within tho area of

^

the 16th Army whore Kowno was locatod.
Reports containing incidents of illegal o:^ecutions by

JT

tho SIRO in connection v/ith soc^urity operations were r.iade

from subordinate units in von Loob*s command to tho Arny
Group Roar Areas, Armies, and Corps Headquarters. But
it is not established that those reports wore transraittod
to tho headquarters of the Army Group North or roportod
to von Leob by his stajif.

V/o are thcroforo unable to find from tho ovidonco sub-

mlttod that tho defendant von Loeb had Imowlodgo of tho
murder of civilians within his area by tho Einsat2G2:'^''-Ppon
or a.cquicccod in such actiyitios.

ITor is it ostablishod from the ovidonco that the

dofondant participated in the rocruitmont of slave labor

for the Roich. The document relied on in this connection
is a report to tho offoct that In a given period, a
number of civilians wore sent from tho Army Group North
to the Roich for labor. Locb was in command for only a
pnrt of the period covered by tho report. Furthormoro,
the docuu-nont does not establish tho invol^jntary nature
of tho recruitment.
-
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5,

Pillage of Public and Private Property.

The prosecution relies upon two orders to sustain this

charge. The first of these orders is from the 12th Panzer
Division on 11 November 1941, directing an operation against
certain villages "used by the partisans as a base of opera

tions" , with instructions to seize the cattle, horses, and
chickens and most of the food, but further directing a small

amount of food be left for the population at-the direction

of the Commander of the operations.

vJe cannot say this order •

was illegal.

Likewise an order of 39th Corps issued on 7 December 1941,

regarding a forced retreat, called for the destruction of
food and fodder that could not be taken along in the retreat.
The destruction of these foodstuffs would tend to hamper the

advancing enemy and we cannot find it wss not justified under
the exigency of the situation.

V7e do not find any criminality under this ph^^se of the
case.

6. Criminal Conduct Pertaining to the Siege of Leningrad,
J^-

Leningrad was encircled and besieged. Its defenders
end the civilian population were in great straits and it w^„.s
feared the population would undertake to flee through the
G-erman lines.

Orders were issued to use artillery to prevent

any such attempt at the greatest possible distance from our
own lines by opening fire as early as possible, so tnat tne

infantry, if possible, is spared shooting on civiliana". We
find this was known to and approved by von Leeb. Was it an
\i:- •

5^:

unlawful order?

.H

7t.''

"A belligerent commander may lawfully
•. n . '

lay siege to a. place controlled by the
enemy and endeavor by a. process of isola
tion to cause its surrender.

-
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The propriety

r-

of attempting to reduce It "by
is not questioned. Hence the
of every source of sustenance
out is deemed legitimate. It

f

starvation
cutting off
from with
is said

that if the commander of a besieged place
expels the non-combatants, in order to
lessen the number of

those who consume

his stock of provisions, it is lawful,

though an extreme measure, to drive them

back, so as to hasten the surrender."

(Hyde, Vol. 3, Sec. 656, pp. 1802-1803)

We might wish the law were otherwise but we must administer
it as we find it.

Consequently, we hold no criminality at

taches on this charge.

For the reasons above stated we find this defendant

guilty under Count Three of the Indictment for criminal re
sponsibility in connection with the transmittal and apolica-

I

tion of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.

Under Control

Council Law Ho. 10 it is provided that superior orders do
not constitute a defense but may be considered in mitiga
tion of

an offense.

vJe believe that there is much to be said for the defen

dant von Leeb by way of mitigation.

He was not a friend or

follower of the Nazi Party or its ideology.

He was a soldier

and engaged in a stupendous campaign with responsibility for
hundreds of thousands of soldiers, and a large indigenous

I

population spread over a vast area.

It is not without signif

icance that no criminal order has been introduced in evi

dence which bears his signature or the stamp of his approval.
We find on the evidence in the record, and for the

reasons above stated, the defendant is guilty under Count
Three of the Indictment, and not guilty under Count Two
thereof.

•
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The defendant Reinhardt v/as horn 1 March 1887 at

Bautzen in Saxonlao

Pie served as a jonior officer in World

War I and after the war, remained v/ith the Reichswehrc

As

a Major General he participated in the invasion of Polniid

as Commander of the 4th Panaer Division and of Belgium and
the Netherlands as Commanding General of the 41st Panzer
Corps,

V/ith this corps he took part in the invasion of

Yugoslavia,

Still coitmianding the 41st Panzer Corps, he

entered the campaign against Russia, the corps "being sub

ordinated to Army Group North.

On 5 October 1941, he was

appointed Commander of Panzer Group 3,

In March 1942 he

was appointed Comrnander-ln-Chief of the 5rd Panzer Army which
position he retained lontil appointed Commander-in-Chief of

Army Group Center on 16 August 1944.

Duo to difforencos with

Hitler concerning his conduct of nporations, ho was relieved

of this command on 26 January 1045.

In 1940 he was promoted

to Lieutenant General of Panzer Troops and in 1942 to Full

General#

The dofondant Reinhardt is charged under all

tour Counts of the Indictment,

Counts I and IV having

been disposed of, there remains to bo considered the question

of his guilt under Counts II and III which charge res-

poctivolys

V/ar Crimes and Crimes against Ilumanityj Crimes

against onemy belligoronts and prisoners of war, and War
Crimos and Crimes against Humanity; Griraos against Civilians,
The Commissar

Ordor

The Commissar Order v/ns transmitted to Reinhardt by
Gonoral Hoeppnor, the Commander of Panzer Group 4, and
Rolnhardt thoroaftor communicated It orally to his Divisional
Cormnandors#

lie testified that when ho transmitted it to

-
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^ his divisions^ ho dir-octod orally that it was not to ho

carriod out.

Ho tostifi-jd furthor that Goncral Hooppnor

was opposod to the ordor and that ho, Roinhardt, protostod

it to Gonoral Hoeppnorj that Gonoral Hooppnor protostod to

tho Array Group under von Loob and prosuraably, the protest
was carriod back frora the Array Group to the Co^vr.andGr-in-

Ohiof of tho Arraioa. Notwithstanding this allogod rcslstanco
and repudiation of tho order, it appears frora tho docuraonts

that reports of exocutod corariiissars shortly began to bo
sent in frora subordinate divisions and that thoy wero sort
on by tho corps«

Tho Russian carfpaign began 22 Juno 1941.

The 269th

Infantry Division reported on 9 July to tho :iXXXI Corps
that 34- PolltrLilcs wore liquidatod. On the sarao day tho
XXXXI Gorjjs reportod to Panzer Group 4 a total of 97

Politrul<:s had been executed in the Corps area up to 8 July,
The balance of 63 liquidatod coraraissars doubtless fire

chargeable to tho tiiroo roraaining divisions of tho Corps,
tho 1st and 6th Panzor Divisions and tho 36th Motorized
Division.

On 10 July 1941, Paiizor Group 4 reported to

Array Group North that up to 8 July 1941, 101 corar.iissars

I

had boon liquidatod.

Out of a total of IQi oxecutod

^ Politruks, 97 woro liquidatod by Hoinhardt*s XXXXI Corps,
and tho balance of 4 by the LVI AK of Panzer Group 4.

At tho tino of. tho report, Panzor Group 4 consisted only
of XXXXI ilK and tho LVI

Thereafter, 71 coraralssars

wore executed by the 19th of July by Panzor Group 4,

Wo havo nontioned that Roinhardt testified that ho orally
directod that this order bo not carried out,

A second

defense, which is supported by tho tostinony of tv/o
witnesses, Bruns, the Intelllgonce Officer of Hoeppnor*s

Panzer Group 4, and Mueller, an ,ID0 of Bruns, is to the
-

i
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— • (Effect that all of theso reports wore fictitious.

The

testimony might ho noro credihlo if they had not drawn such
fantastic conclusions as that Ilooppnor clearly expressod
his repudiation of the Commissar Ordor hy having Bruns

road it to tho Corps Commandora and later that ho expressod
it by gesticulation,

Muollor was more definite as to

Hoeppnor's rejection of the ordor but it is not possible
for tho Tribunal to beliove Iri the face of theso reports
that commissars wero not shot pursuant to this ordor within

tho area of Heinn^rdt's coiomand,

Tho order was a criminal

order on its face, and ono v/hich under the Gorman military
regulations and certainly under Intornational law should

^

not havo boon passed down by oithor Hooppner or Roinhardt,
If intornational law is to heve any offoctlvonoss, high
commanding officers whon thoy are directed to violate it

by comi-aitting murder, must havo the courage to act, in
definite and unriistakablo terms, so as to indicate thoir

repudio-tlon of such an oro.or,

Tho proper report to havo

boon mado from division to army group level v/hen a request
was ma.do from tho top level to report tho number of copmlssars
Icillcd, would ha.vo boon that this unit does not murder

I

onomy prisoners of war.

Counsel for tho defendant, in his brief, makes tho
following statomonts

"War has its own laws, ovon more than
poacotimo, Ono of tho most inoomprohonsiblo
laws of war is that certain nows spreads
through mysterious channels and with un—
beliovablo rapidity over entire fronts,

entire iirLiios and whole countries, that

it even spreads from one's own front

line to that of the oneiey, and It can
nevor bo found out how this was possible.
Of course, this also happynod with such
an extraordinary order as tho Commissar
Ordor, Several witnesses testified that
i t was known among the Russians oven at

an oarllor date than among our soldiers
in tho front lino,"

^ I'ii -

&-•
I#?- '}.
. . . . . .

m

Unless the order had been-coniiaunicated ratiher- extenslFely^

at.d. as a pcliey down to low levels and even to the troops ^
it is difficult to understand how it would sweep the entire
Russian front♦

Tl^e obvious explanation for this is that it

became kno^/n because of its inplonentatron.

That the dv^fense of fictitious reports may itself be
fictitiaus is sug^^estod by the activity report of one of

Reinhardt*s divisions.

The 36th infantry Division on 3

July 19UI before thxe need for any fictitious reports ivas
created by a top level inquiry^ notes the capture of Latvian
and Russian soldiers and that tv/o political commissars were

eliminated during the advance.

On U July, a political

commissar who protended to bo a sergeant was eliminated#

On

6 July, three commissars v/ere eliip.inated and on I6 September,
a captured Politruk of a Russian Rifle Regiment was eliriiinated.
It is not quite comprehensible why the shooting of these
five commissars on three different days is reported unless

the executions actually occurred.

In January 19U2 an activity report of the 35th Infantry
Division, subordinate to Roinhardt, contains the follo'wings
I

"... The reason for the will to fight

may be found primarily in the fact that
well in advance the enemy learns how the
Kommissars and political leadors are
treated when captured by the Germans.
The mistake of drawing attention to
this has been made even in German

propaganda leaflets. It woulb have
been better to keep the treatment of
the Kommissars a secret.

It would

have sufficed to transport them sep
arately to the rear, to a camo specially

established for this purpose by th^
Corps, and to take them 00 task only then
and there,"

The Tribunal finds that Reinliardt passed on this criminal order

and bears responsibility for its execution in his area.
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Tho Commando Order

^

A-

Wo havo discussod this criminal order gonerally in a
precoding part of this opinion.

sont to the 3rd Pa.nsor Amy,

A copy of this ordor was

Tho War Diary of this Amy

for 27 Octobor 1942 shows it was roceivod,

Roinhardt, at

this time, v;as in command of tho 3rd Po.nzer Army,

On 28

OctohGr, the 9th Corps, subordinato to tho 3rd Panzer Army,
notes the ordor roceivod in its War Diary, . 'Wo tako no
stock in tho dofonse' that this ordor was not to bo effoctivo

In tho cast.

That the 3rd Panzer Army was of tho opinion

that it \Yas applicable in tho oast, appears from tho War
Diary of this army for 18 November 1942, which is several

I

v/eoks after tho rocolpt of the .order.

In that V/ar Diary

i

I
I

i t is stated:

"Variohs difficulties havo arisen conoorning
tho GXQQutl.m of tho Fuehrer ordor of 21

October relative to the sheeting of terrorists
and groups of bandits. The Pz, army, asks
tho
Group to clarify above all, whothor
this order Vol. lib, 30a., moi'oly concerns
British terror groups or whothor it also
a.ppllos to tho bands in tho occuplod area,

£bo ht"tltudej;__thot 5_until_a_now__0KW_docre£
_io_publl_3h£dj^ whTch ls__ln £^£S£Q£''^„^-

Handlt^ £^£

£'^£'^_'^£

i^^£y£'h9'^£

£"^£^^_^£

Bandits who voluntarily

surrondor v;lthout being forced to do so by

their situation, will be treated as PW*s,
iUi order will bo issued to the troops on
this subject.
(unph-asis supplied)

That tho army coneidorod the Counando Order of general

application is shov^n by the emphasized portion of tho
abovo quotation, that until otherv/lse advised, tho order
was to bo carried out against mon In uniform.

Another entry

In the V/ar Diary of tho 3rd Panzer Army referring to this
same situation roads as follov/ss
"Until new regulations of OKW are pub

lished, bandits who surrender voluntarily
without being forced by circunstanoGS,

-

193

-

v/111 bo troatoO. as

PW's,

All other

bandits, also tho unifornod onos, will
bo shot.

"This order will be dostroyed after
reading, this ordor will not bo passed
on in writings"

It v;'as a crininal order, Roinhardt passed it down in tho
chain of co/njand.

It nay bo stated as a natter soraov/hat in nitigation and

as shov/ing the personal attitiicie of tho defendant Heinhardt,
that in hovoubor 1943 he issued an ordor that parachutists

are lawful conbatants and are to bo treatod as prisoners

of war»

That v/as at a time whon tho Gorman Army was not so

flushed with succoss and v/hon i t was a

littlo noro inclined

to soften tho troatnont noted out to tho Russians.

The

Tribimal has noted it as being a rnattor proper, at least
for considoration, on tho question of mitigation.

It should

further bo noted in this connection that 'it does not appear

that Reinhardt, though ho rocoivod it, over passed on
literally cr in substance tho notorious Roichonau Order.
Prohibited Labor of Prisoners

of War

ordor from tho CoLr.iandQr-ln-Chief of tho Arnios,

providing that ninoa wore to bo dotoctod and cloarod by
Russian priaonors of war in ordor to spare Gonoan blood, v/as
issued on 29 October 1941,

This ordor was tro-nsnittod In

tho aroa of Army Group North and v/as inplomontod in

Roinhardt*s area.

His LIX Corps issued an ordor providing;

"If It is suspected that roads or places
are mined; priaonors of war or tho local
population aro to walk in front or clear
tho mines,"

The activity report of tho 3rd Panzor Army, dated 15
Leconbor 1943, notos that there were five prisoners In
Lula'-;" 230 who were requostod for mine cloarlng and that
194 -•
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Dulag 230 was inforrned accordingly,

A report sent by tho

LIX Corps to tho 3rd Panzor Army covering tho months of

Jarmary, Pobruary, March-, and May 1943, relative to tho

usG of prisoners of war, for thoso months rospoctlvoly
shov/s tho following I

246 in supply units, 104 for billot

and field fortification construction; 193 in supply units, ^
25 for billot and fiold fortifications; 196 in troop supply
units and 183 for billot and fiold fortifications; 175 in

ti^oop supply services and 11 for billet and field fortifi

cations,

On 6 January 1944, the 3rd Panzor Army furnished

40 prisonors of war to an SS unit for fiold fortification
work at the front,

A report of tho 83rd Infantry Division

in tho 5rd Panzor Amy shov;;3 25 prisonors of war put to

work by tho Second Riflo Battalion wero killed while

working.

An activity report of the 3rd Panzor Army states

that on 4 Octobor 1943, 200 prisonors of- v/ar wore used
on field fortifications.

Nu-ierous

other documents

show

tho uso uf prisonors of v^'ar on field fortifications and

at tho front, their uso being so general that v/o conclude
it was tho policy of tho 3rd Panzer Army under Roinhardt
to uso prisonors of war for that purpose.
An order signed by Roinhardt as Commandor-in-Chiof

of the 3rd Panzer Army, bated 18 October 1942, confirms
✓

this conclusion in every respect.

Under the heading.

Labor Allocation of Prisoners of War and Civilians, he
states s

"The urgent need for Prisoners of war
in the zone of operations and for tho
economy and armamcjnt industry at home

requires a thorough raid planned organi
zation of the labor allocation of

prisoners of War,"

We do not find all of the above uses of prisonors of

v/ar criminal.

To uso tiiori for field fortifications., loading
-
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amimition, for mlno clearing, and any othor v/ork that is
dangorous was clearly prohibited by international law and
conatitutos a

v/ar crime •

Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War

Reports of subordinate units show the hanging of two
former Russian Soldiers for being friendly to partisans;

and the shooting of four Russian prisoners for planning to

escape, and six prisoners of war who had stolon arms and
ammunition and tried to escape.

On 15 December 1942 a

report shuv/s the shooting of a liussian prisoner of ?/ar
since he could not be removed under the eye of the enemy
and within the rango of enemy machine guns,

Pcur days

later the same unit reported that two other prisoners of
war had to bo shot.

Turning Over of_^ Prisoners of Vfar to the SD
On 24 July 1941 the High Comiaand of tho VVehrmacht
issued an order for tho screening and soparauion of Russian

prisoners of war in the camps in tho zone of operation by
which x:)olitically untonable and suspicious olenonts ,
commissars, and agitators were to bo segregated^

i\n

activity report shows tliat the connandor of the Rear Army

Korucck 590, subordinate to Roinh^rdt, issued an order of
29 DGcembor 1942 containing the followings

"6.)

Tho fetching of prisoners from tho

prisoner coilecting point for tho

purpose f interrogation, transfer
to a trcansiont canp, 'si:)Ocial treat
ment* or discharge can take place
only through the Poldgondaruorie
Battalion (motorized) 695 and the
Security Police and SD Dorogobush
in mutual agroemont.
In tho event
that no officer of the Peldgondarmorie
Battalion (motorized) 695 knowTi to
tho camp commandant of the prisoner
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eclloctiriG point, nor the Chi of of tho SD
unit Dorogobush, should bo supervising tho
tr.king ciway of tho prisonors, a written
authorization issued by those offices nust
be handed to the Caiop Corxiandante
Tho

turning-over of a pris':^ner nay in any event
take place only a, ainst a v/ritten receipts"
This V/ehrriacht report should bo noted for the reason

that the torn "special troatnentl', enclosed v/ith quota.tion
narks, is used with apparent understanding.

The next para

graph to that above quoted is of interest a.s relating to
labor allocation.

It is stated therein thatj

".hi allocation nay take place only in

keeping v/ith tho stock available of ablebodied prisoners#
Onl^" those prisonors
nay bo allocated for labor in whoso case
no special treatnont is to be expected,

and whise interrogation has been concluded,"
Since tho whole report concerns prisoner of vmr natters, it
is to be expected that tho ipr is oners who nay not bo allocated

as "special treatnont" are prisoners of war-,

.Is an oxanplo

of tho carrying out of the general policy to olininate those

opposed to tho •/ohrnacht,

tho following appears in a

report received by the 3rd Panzer ..^.rny;

"On 28 Decenber 1941, the prisoner of
war x.losandjr IV.^SSILJEW, who v/orked in a
snow-shovelling detail and thereby cane
into touch v/ith the Russian civilian

population, was arrested and shot in
Schachov/askajai he continuously had
caused imrest aiiongst the population by
talking to tho peoxole ab ut the ovorwhelning defeat of the Gernans and
prophesied that tho Russians would soon

appear in Schachowskaja,"
In connents onanating fron one of Roinhardt^s staff

officers relative to the suggestion for the fornation of a

Russie.n Red-Cross, it is indicated that ho v/as opposed to

authorizing the Rod Gross to nako any search for prisoners

nissing in action and the reason which he gives is set
forth v:ith great frankness.

It is as follov/s;

-
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"Ovorwholningly Ir.rge nu:-ibor of POV/*s
c.Gcor.sGcl with-jut docuinGntary clGposition,
G.nc!. of civilians v/h) disapper.rGd duo to
brutal actions,"

.".t this point wo rofor to tho follov/ing finding of
Tribuno.l V in Case 7, and adopt it as a correct statoriont
of tho law.

I t is as f ollov;s s

"V/ant of hnov;lodge of the contents of
reports iiado to hir.i (i.e. to tho C01.1::anding
General), is not a defense.
lieports to
Coriiianding Generals are iiade for their
specia.1 benefit, .jiy failure to acquaint
theiuselves with the contents of such

reports, or a failure to require
additional reports whore inadequacy
appears on their face, constitutes a
dereliction of duty which ho cannot
use in his

own behalf."

De_porJ^ation and Ensla.yoioent of Civy^ians
Deportation and enslavement of civilians v/as carried
on within the area of Reinhardt *s arr-y coar^ands on a scale

of great e::tent.

dt the cutset of )ur consideration of

this subject, it should be said that there is no inter
national law that pori'jits the deportation ^r the use of

civilians against their v/ill for other than on reasonable

reoyaisitions for tho needs of the army, either within the
area of the army or after deportation to rear areas or

to tho homeland of tho occupying power.

This is the holding

of the II.iT Judgment and this c msistently has been the

holding of all of the iTurnberg Tribunals.

It is necessary

then only to determine factually v'hether v/ith the knowledge,
consent, or approval of the defendant the deportation a.nd
enslavemont occurred.

There is no military necessity to

just5.fy the use of civilians in such manner by an oocuoyinr^
✓

force,

"th-sy woro forced to labor against their will,

it latters not whether they v^ero given extra rations or
extra privileges, for such matters could bo considered, if

at all, only in nitiga.tion of punishment and not as a
«
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clefonsG to the crime.

VJhile v/o do not, in referring first

to 0. report to the 3rd Pan.^er ^^rr.y, dated 6 I.Iarch 194d,
follovf the chronological ord-or, v/e set i t forth first
•because

i t deals v^ith the manner of conscription and the

r.ttitud.e of the army long after the beginning of the war.
In this report the f ollov/ing appears s

"partly the workers are being seized
in the streets and. under the pretext that

they are to v/ork for 2-5 days, they are
being brought to work without any v/inter
clothing, shoes, mess kit and blankets.,,

The indigen:)us auxiliary police fetched, the
Russians ov.t of their houses at night, but

partially these people could, buy themselves

out of it b^r giving £ome__^al.coh£l__tjD ^h£

indiaenous_aT^^lir.r^:r_poli

"This manner £f_cojn£crintion did no^

£n£r£a£o3the~Rus£i an£ '

_'^2.

'

.Apparently d.uo to an error, some terribly diseased, and
afflicted, persons were sent out on a v/ork assignment.

The

oxplo.n: tion contained in the document which is offered.,

in Iloinhardt *s d.efense, shows,probadoly, a mistake hut d.oes
not otherwise groo.tly improve his situation.

It shows

hov/ labor recruiting was ca.rriodc on and that the a.rmy v/as

cooperating.

.j:iong other things, it states;
✓

"Army h.LI,. order to the General Commands,
that in case of drives for the recruitment

of labor forces, a labor allocation official
has to participate right from the start.
The -^rmy EconoLiy Official - Group Labor could,
supply officials from his ov/n ra.nks; but

whether this employment could be achieved
speed.!ly enough in each case, is a mo.tter
s t i l l open to doubt.

"2.) The criticized, cond.itions .in the
recruitment o' labor forces (kidnaeping on

the street, cornp.tnoss of the O.D. men
(indi: onoMs aius a lie ry police) etc.) can
never be entiroV' oliminotod, especially
in eases of sud nn demand.
It is possible
that

the criticized events

concern the

ICaminski drive, in v/hich mce 750 workers
wore supolied.

But such abuses are a.lso
net entirely avoidable v/ithin the area of

the Divis.lons. In the case of the '78 year
olds, the blind and the cripples etc.' it

-
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is, c.ocordiiiQ "'^o a statouont by tho

Fortification Fn^rinoor Staff 7, a case
in which a group of 15 - 20 pooplo once
happonoc'. to get nixed up with a transport
in tho beginning of Fobruary.
Hosponsibility
can not be fixed any more, .as nothing is
kiiovm about this

in Vito'osk,"

Tho Corr/aandor of Korueck 590 in a report to tho 3rd

Panzor JaTiy reported tho following o.ssigmricnts s

wouon for

tho Poioh, lOOj field fortification constructions mon,

956; v;or.]en, 2199,

His ropcrt also contains tho followings

*'500 nalo and 500 fonalo workers were

conscripted at the tine, as ordorod in

paragraph 18 of the Procurenont Order,

This

conscription, howevor, was suporscdod by the
subsoci_uont ordors concorning tho formation
of transports of labor dctachi:]Gnt3.
Tho
following must be said abovxt tho organizing
of those tr.ansports ;

ITowhoro v/as thoro any desiro or inclination

for this labor assigni'iont; indeed, sonotimos
it ovon occurred that non wopt when they
wore being shipped away, ^".Imost all of tho
workers had literally to bo dragged away.
This causod ver^- grave difficulties for tho
local i.iilitary administrative offices,
because all of the tiwansperts had to be
assQubled at very short notice and almost

simultaneously.
There were not always
sufficient forces (lillitary Police, hilitra-y
Police Service) to bring the workers fron

reiaote villages.

Those who were brought,

howevor, sometinos proved to be unfit for
work.
There was no suitable place to
accomuodate those who v/ere fit to bo sent
a ol-.co which would have i'lade guarding

easy until they could bo shipped av/ay. The
v/orkors, howevor, had to be" closely guarded
at all times, for otherwise, they wou.ld
have run away,"

Tho foregoing shov/s clearly that these pooplo who wore
used for work v/oro not volunteers but wore romidod up and.
Ir.r^ressod into

service as slaves.

Tho huartleri:]els tor for the 3rd Panzer hrmy on 3

pocember 19i2 made a report to ..rry Group Center in which
was contained tho followings
"The applic.-.tion of force, unavoidable

in putting tho population to work
and^oentioned already in one of the
regular rejorta as causing a great
^

2.00
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is beginning to saov; effects-.

In

Cifficnlt oy_lnad0£uato fooci_rations_
which - according to consistent reports
fron all districts -

are not sufficient

to satisfy the hunger of the population

"Notovvorthy is the generally established
fact that the nurebor of persons staying

away fron v;or!: or of those v;ho nust"
forcefully be driven to work! is on the
increase.

"The extent of difficulties to bo sixmountod

co.n bo realised v;hon bearing in nind that

nearly_all__W2rkorsJnave to_be pressed into

service and E^l"'^Zoit^i^_indivldually-be_

2r_lV2n__to work_by £old_lorSj_ ^Co^acks ,„and_
nenbor^ of_tho_—ux_iliar;*_Pol_iceJonphasis
suppliodT

~

letter signed by Roinhardt undeh date of 28 I.'arch

1943 to the Gonnanding General of the 43rd Corps shov/s
conclusively his knowledge and attitude toward the labor
progran.

..nong other thin as in the letter he said

I*.'
.v.

"Tine and again, I have, v;hen touring

the area, noticed squrds of civilian v/orkdrs
practically idling, Furthornore, the
nU!..ibor of inhabitants assigned to a job
coea not correspond to the task which

cor Id, wijbh^pr op or
The supervisory

personnel Xfu.rnished by the troops, by
Organization lODT etc.) is just standing
by and does not shov; any military bearing;
foronen and supervisors do not tako any
steps to urge i.^.oro working speed. This
intolGra';-)lo state of affairs will irn-'lodlatoly
ccaso once and for all.
V/e must keep in
mind that in the homeland oven Gonaan v/ornen

and girls arc ^/orking hard, readily fulfilling
what they considor their elonontary duty,

T: is being the case, v/o ought to be
ashamed of ourselves, if v/e did not request
the civilian inhabitants of the occupied

k'

territory, called upon to work on our
behalf, to utilij.e the working day fully.
In this respect, I rather prefor a daily
loininum of ei ht vvorking h.m.rs, of v;hich
the fullest

use

is jiac.G' and which include

brealcs, t^^lon^or hour2,_iialf of__which Is

3po_nt in__dawdlin£,

Tiie population - which

is being subjected to a much greater strain

on the Russian sice - must be compelled to
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.

.1.

fulfill
through
of food
just as

oy roquircnents, if nocessr.ry
rotGntion of v/cigos^ doprlvG.tion
and restraint of personal liborty;
I shall call to accoimt any super

visory personnel of any description and
ranlc, if rny donands are not enforced^

Supervision of v/orlcers is a military duty
like any other and requires the full efforts
of the porsomiel assirxiod.

"It is roqiiested that all military
superiors and all organs in charge of tra-ffic
control and of the naintonance of discipline
cooporato v;ith ne in the full exploitation
of labor of any kind."

The Goioi.:andor of the XXXXIII Corps, to whom this letter

wa.s a.ddrossod, on 2 Jvino 1S43, issued a directive to dro.ft by
force nalo and female labor power from the rural cormounities

of the corjmunica.tion zones.

Ho then specified five rural

coriTjunities in which coercive measures v/ere to be carried
out.

Ho directed that the policy bo announood as ponoanent

so the population v;ill cone forth from its hideouts and
bo soizod.

The effect on the people is indicated by his

statement that the drafted forces will attempt to dodge

the labor allocation with evory moans at their disposo.1.

The ruthlessness intended is shown by the direction that

''11 liGii and women -are to bo instructed tnat they

be

shot at v/hon attempting to floe and the reason given ^
"...only partisan adherents flee; they
undor.ao corresponding treatment."

How many so flooinr v/oro shot and d-eiiominatod as partisans
in the reports, tho record does not show.

The report states

that for several ViToeks tho population of the rural commmlties

"docs not Gooperato in fighting against them (the bandits)

in a measure which is to bo ompeoted for tho final liberation
of

To remedy this lac'x of cooperation with thoir

gorman conquerors, all male inhabitants of those rurc.l
CO"" junitios, os well as females, botwoon tho ages of 14
and 45, unless the v;omon had one child under eight, wore

-
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